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Part 1: The distinction between a social rule and convergence of
behaviour does not depict the internal point of view regarding
behaviour in traditional rural social groups. Nor does it depict how
people actually behave. It is ideological, contingent on the modern
era and the emancipation of the individual. It is a matter of the
theorist's presuming a logic, a form of life, that stipulates what
may count as a reason for action.
Part 2: Linguistic jurisprudence, as ordinary language philosophy
that it is, does not expect, regarding the conceptual, to find a
reality independent of society and the happenstance of society's
language. In a positivist fashion, it merely describes social
reality. The distinctions it comes up with (and so the one Part 1 was
about) are factual instead, part of the logic/ form of life of modern
Western society. - Yet social reality is complex and many sided, not
a coherent theory. Existing assumptions/ distinctions in social
reality/ language are contradictory and interminable. - Linguistic
jurisprudence is not concerned with all assumptions that may exist as
possibilities, only with the typical ones that form the network of
assumptions, which communication presupposes. - There are many
languages not one. Communication exists no more, even if Oxonian
armchair philosophy keeps taking it for granted. - Communicating is
not presupposing rules. It is changing them, adjusting them to the
people we encounter. We are both the same and different, there are
both many and one languages. It is all a matter of what we choose to
see. The positive reality of any given aggregate will entail an
infinite number of communities/ societies, and corresponding
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languages, along with their negations. Uncommitted description cannot
take place (is interminable) without the adoption by the theorist of
a logic, which cannot be found in the external reality to be
described.
Part 3: Language is not a matter of uncommitted observation of
social practice, but rules in our minds. The theorist is not
reporting social groups' languages, but examining his own. The
question is what is law, not what people take 'law' to mean.
Linguistic jurisprudence is a sort of Platonic idealism, examining
concepts, the words' senses, not references, the noumena not the
phenomena. These exist independently of each particular individual,
insofar as common action and common enterprises are required, and
insofar as the individual seeks to define itself and construct its
logic in accordance with this community. The definition-seeking
philosopher is a re-organiser of our common enterprises, and a
teacher as to how the individual should think and determine its
identity, Family resemblances make no difference to the traditional
philosopher. However, linguistic jurisprudence's rejection of strict
definitions and the emphasis on open texture entails a certain
flexibility and allowance for change. It is to be explained by the
condition of the modern world, where the community on which the
traditional philosopher's assertions depended has largely been
eroded. The method of the attention to language does not depend on a
presumption of ordinary language as evidence of correctness, but on
the fact that significance may be lost through abstraction. The
diversity of semantic structures does not refute linguistic
Jurisprudence, for the theorist's propositions do not preclude
another one proposing different ideas, should they be more sensible.
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The final problem with linguistic jurisprudence is its lack of
explicitness and awareness. The need for awareness however, is not
absolute, nor is the strict demand thereof wise.
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There was a time when the jurisprudence of ordinary language was
firmly established in this country as the incontestable paradigm of
legal philosophy. The claim to a description of social facts through
attention to ordinary language came close to amounting to a simple
statement of what jurisprudence is about. Herbert Hart was widely
praised, most particularly for his innovative method in The Concept
of Law. ' that left the rigid, obscure and unrealistic attitude of the
past behind. Yet, in more recent times, this very method, that used
to be celebrated even when some substantive claim of Hart's was
challenged, has become the object of fierce criticism and general
doubt. Hart is still much praised, but the once fashionable trend of
linguistic jurisprudence has now been abandoned. Nowadays we tend to
accuse it of superficiality, conservatism and lack of touch with
serious sociology. Yet, just as then, when Hart's sparse
methodological remarks were uncritically applauded, now his manner is
totally dismissed, with little examination, care or understanding, in
arguments hardly ever followed through to enlightenment, but only to
pointless ad hominem conclusions.
This study is about the jurisprudence of ordinary language and
its method. It is about the claims linguistic jurisprudence made to
knowledge, and their meaning. It is an excavation, in pursuit of what
in them is true.
This work is also then about ordinary language philosophy, those
much confused and often misunderstood ideas, linguistic Jurisprudence
assumed as firm philosophical ground; that frock, once so trendy,
linguistic jurisprudence forgot herself in.
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This work is also about our incoherent times, the place of the
intellectual, communication and lack of it. It is about humans and
the groups they make, It is about the concept of rule. It is about
language, and it is about logic.
Finally, this study, with its sometimes naive vocabulary and its
unassuming fashion, is a work of epistemology, concerned with claims
to truth, their meaning and justification. It is a work of
philosophy, seeking an account for our logical distinctions, our
conceptual truths.
Thus the reader will find many things in this book. What he, or
she, will not find, is caricatures of thinkers and their theories, to
be subsequently attacked. All that is attacked is ideas this student
puts forth for discussion. Authors and other books are fully cited in
notes at the end of each Part. No claim to novelty is made, except
that this examination and reinterpretation of linguistic
Jurisprudence is original. This student does not believe that there
is anything new under the sun.
This study is not concerned with contradicting anybody. It is a
search for truth, i.e. that which deserves to be remembered rather
than pass into oblivion.
Some methodological issues
A. "Linguistic jurisprudence"
This term is used to refer to the historical trend of the
jurisprudence of ordinary language. It is especially used to denote
the method and epistemological stance of this trend. Thus, in Part 2,
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it takes the definition of a positlvist description of social facts
through attention to ordinary language. Should this idea happen to be
refuted, "linguistic Jurisprudence" will subsequently assume whatever
other definition is to be substituted for this one. '
Linguistic jurisprudence is an abstraction from particular
authors and texts, not always corresponding to any one of them.
Nevertheless, it does rely very heavily on Hart and his archetype. In
a sense, this work is to some extent about Hart and his undertaking
in The Concept of Law.
However, I have generally declined to speak of "Hart" or "Hart's
method", in favour of the rather more complicated "linguistic
jurisprudence". There are two main reasons for this. First,
"linguistic jurisprudence" is more accurate. There are various texts
by and ideas of Hart, having no relevance to this study. Hart has
written other things besides the idea that we should seek elucidation
of legal concepts through attention to ordinary language. His writing
does not always exhibit the manner of e.g. the exposition of the
distinction between "being obliged" and "having an obligation". In
The Concept of Law itself, there are many theses, e.g. on legal
reasoning or about the distinction between law and morality, whose
truth or falsity is a matter entirely separate from whatever
episteraological discussions we make, and which need not even be
interpreted in accordance with either "linguistic jurisprudence" or
"the method of The Concept of Law". whatever that be. Thus,
"linguistic jurisprudence", though not absolutely strict, affords us
a useful degree of greater precision.
Second, "linguistic Jurisprudence" gives us the freedom to
diverge from what Hart happened to argue for (which, after all, need
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not always be consistent or important). Thus we can disregard
subsequent renouncements and qualifications, or writings that do not
fit what at times we take linguistic jurisprudence to be. Most
importantly, there is no solid exposition of the method followed by
the trend we are concerned with, or of its philosophical assumptions.
There are just scattered remarks here and there, a few arguments that
would be totally inadequate for our purposes even if they had been
consistent, and the vague debt to the "revolution" of ordinary
language philosophy, a movement itself characterized by piecemeal
applications and avoidance of general theory. Such theory as there is
(e.g. Winch's The Idea of a Social Science) could not be applied to
the trend we are concerned with directly, nor could it be attributed
to any of its authors anyway. Therefore, in order to give adequate
epistemological content to the notion of "linguistic jurisprudence",
it has been necessary to attribute to it constructs much more
theoretical and of far greater complexity than anything of this sort
Hart actually wrote or could have had in mind. This rendered terms
like "Hart's method" quite inappropriate and misleading.
I shall finally admit that this is also a matter of my taste for
depersonalization. Names of persons are used to refer to them, in
their concreteness. In the context of this study such reference is of
no use. This is not a biography or a historical study of any sort. It
is a study of epistemology.
B. About the assertions of Part 1
Our study of epistemology is preceded by a discussion of the
fundamental in The Concept of Law distinction between mere
convergence of behaviour and a social rule. Unlike what follows in
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Parts 2 and 3, this discussion is not metatheoretical, but at the
same level as linguistic Jurisprudence, in many ways a piece of
linguistic Jurisprudence itself. Without prejudice to the interest
this discussion may have in itself, its role within the whole work is
to introduce the epistemological analyses, by identifying a problem
for linguistic jurisprudence, whose existence gives some substance
and significance from the outset to the metatheoretical questions.
In the course of this discussion, many analyses and claims are
made from a variety of disciplines. In the context of the whole work,
they have the same standing as the ones of The Concept of Law that
they seek to challenge. I have proceeded with them, in the same style
of and reliance on "common sense", that characterized the
jurisprudence of ordinary language, and which I remain, after all,
rather fond of.
Taken in themselves however, the account of the notion of the
rule in old societies and the one of the change in modern society,
still stand in need of clarification of their epistemological status.
They might be said to be sociological. Now, under 'sociology', quite
diverse claims can be advanced. 2 These accounts are certainly not
functionalist; although not incompatible with it, they do not depend
on a view of society as an organism, parts of which have functions in
its maintenance. They are not materialist or evolutionist either;
they are not in general concerned with the material conditions, how
or to what extent the physical environment determines the formation
and maintenance of social groupings and of the "knowledge" (in the
sense of the sociology of knowledge) these groupings construct. They
rather come nearer to the sociology of understanding. They are
reconstructions of the underlying meanings that support the actor's
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view of the world, "the actor" here being an ideal type, not
necessarily corresponding to any particular actors in the particular
social groupings that might fall under the terras "old" and "modern
society".
They might be said to be historical too. Yet it is important to
realize that we do not have here a history of how people happened to
think in fact. With respect especially to the ideas and ways of
thinking mentioned in connection with the change of the notion of the
individual (in "The change in modern society"), such an attribution
would be totally absurd. This is rather an account of how language
has changed, what ideas stand behind the - mostly unconscious -
formation of the modern concept of the rule, in the head of today's
man. Both this, and the account of the social rule in older societies
(in "Reflections on old societies"), are not descriptions of people's
actual thought; they are ideal types of actual thought. They are
semiotic analyses, tracing paths of and resulting in patterns of
thought. At the end of the day, what I have done here, is to patch
together this part of the semiotic universe.
Perhaps this creates more problems than it solves. All the same,
I think that it is accurate. If the reader should think that it falls
outside what should be understood by "sociology" or "history", then I
make no claims to either.3
Vocabulary
There are some terms whose meaning evolves in the text. These are
the terms 'logic' and 'reality' (and 'fact', 'thing' accordingly).
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This evolution is part of the argument at one of the text's levels of
interpretation. It should present no problems, despite lack of
elucidation at this point.
There are terms that acquire a technical meaning at some point,
e.g. 'society', 'community', 'network of assumptions'. I have not
used them technically before their stipulation.
There is also the term 'language' which is at times vague and may
happen to shift. Its ambiguity we have inherited from ordinary
language philosophy (and the post-structuralists), where it is also
used to mean "way of thinking", "form of life". I have at times
spoken of 'language stricto sensu' and 'language lato sensiS , or
'language as dictionary' and 'language as encyclopedia', in order to
resolve this ambiguity, in places where it seemed bothersome rather
than illuminating.
I have decided to (re)adopt the word 'lingual' as the general
adjective referring to language (stricto sensu). It is to be
distinguished from 'linguistic' which is used to refer to the study
of language, the discipline studying language.
I have not applied a uniform solution to the problem of the third
person singular pronoun in the English language. With respect to it,
I am at a loss. I detest morphemes like 's/he'; they smell too much
of computer culture, "virtuality" and uneducated technocrats speaking
in tasteless plastic abbreviations. Terms like "he or she" on the
other hand, do not depersonalize, the way I am used to from languages
that have the gender system. So, at times, I have used such terms; at
others, where such construction seemed elegant enough, I have used
"one" or "they". Sometimes, when I felt a great degree of
depersonalization to be necessary, I have used the gender system,
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thus rendering "individual" or "subject" as "it" (as in Latin, Greek,
German), and treating *-er' endings as indicating male gender (but I
have nowhere rendered "person" as "she" (in accordance with Latin and
Latin languages), as this seemed too bizarre).4 Most of the time I
have not bothered to think about it, adopting whatever seemed
acceptable at the moment. I did not seek to impose one uniform
solution, but let this text be one more indication of the flux the
English language (or at any rate my feeling of it) is in at the
moment. After all, and despite the ink that has been spilled on the
issue, I cannot help feeling that this is just a matter of language
(stricto sensu).
I have not used words such as 'chairperson'. Just as with 's/he',
I would in general avoid them, even at the cost of being called
"sexist", "politically incorrect" and the like. And I have sometimes
used 'man* as indicating the species rather than the male of the
species. I admit that when it comes to language (stricto sensu) I
often tend to be somewhat conservative.
The quotation marks ' ' indicate the morpheme, the lingual
expression, regardless of sense. " " are used as general. In Part 1
however, with its borrowed style of a description of language, the
former have also been used to indicate an abstraction from actual
quoted speech, an idealized version of what speech, thought, etc. is
to be encountered, in contrast to the latter which indicate actual
speech. The same is true for "Moles", in the "Selective Literature
Review". Finally, " " indicate a title. (But titles of books and
periodicals are just underlined). Having finished this work, I am
uneasily aware that these distinctions are not really necessary in
it, and that perhaps they offer nothing more than needless complexity
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most of the time. Hence, the various quotation marks may be treated




1. Cf. Wittgenstein Philosophical Investigations §79. Just as 'Moses', which nay
alternately stand for either "the man who led the Israelites through the
wilderness", or "the nan who as a child was taken out of the Nile by Pharaoh's
daughter", should the conjunction of these propositions for the same figure be
denied, so 'linguistic jurisprudence' is a name (or better, an idea) that will
not be abandoned so long as we can find a definition worthy of it,
2. Relate R. Bendix Embattled Reason, p. 116-9, especially p, 118: "Men like
Siiunel, Durkheim, and Weber define the "social fact" in accord with their
orientation to substantive problems. Such definitions generate pseudo-
controversies, when differences among theorists are discussed without regard for
their different purposes of cognition. There is no single sociological theory.
There are only schools of sociological theory because the most eminent scholars
in the field choose their theoretical orientation in accord with substantive
concerns and with their sense of what is real or significant in society,"
3. Compare Mclntyre in After Virtue p. 72, who is unhappy with the distinction
between philosophy and sociology. He disagrees that he has to choose between the
one or the other, He thinks that an adequate philosophical analysis of, in this
case emotivism, cannot escape being also a sociological hypothesis and vice
versa.
4. Notice that the feminine gender of persona is inherited from a time when this
meant a player's mask, xpooaxiSav. On the other hand it is only in English that
it feels strange; certainly not in Italian (perhaps because it accords there
with the third person of polite address),
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PART 1
DPINO SOMETHINO AS A RULE
DPINO SQMETHINO AS A RULE
A rule is one thing, a habit is another
CTo say that a rule exists does not mean] only that a group
of people, or most of them, behave 'as a rule' i.e.
generally, in a specified similar way in certain kinds of
circumstances. . . Mere convergence in behaviour between
members of a social group may exist... and yet there may be
no rule requiring it. The difference between the two social
situations of mere convergent behaviour and the existence
of a social rule shows itself often linguistically. In
describing the latter we may. . . make use of certain words
which would be misleading if we meant only to assert the
former. These are the words 'must', 'should', and 'ought
to', which in spite of differences share certain common
functions in indicating the presence of a rule requiring
certain conduct.'
What a clear distinction. And how fundamental, indeed! How could
anyone forget it. But look at 'rule'; 'as a rule', 'rule requiring a
certain conduct'. Why on earth must there be one word meaning so
different things?2 Surely it can only cause confusion and
misunderstandings. It makes one wonder whether we should try to make
some other language that could not cause misunderstandings so easily.
In any case, we can at least try to point with precision to the
differences between the two notions and social situations, that is
mere convergence of behaviour, i.e. 'habit' on the one hand, and rule
demanding conformity, i.e. 'rule' on the other.
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First, for the group to have a habit it is enough that
their behaviour in fact converges. Deviation from the
regular course need not be a matter for any form of
criticism. But... where there is a rule deviations are
generally regarded as lapses or faults open to criticism,
and threatened deviations meet with pressure for
conformity. . .
Secondly, where there are such rules, not only is such
criticism in fact made but deviation from the standard is
generally accepted as a good reason for making it,
Criticism for deviation is regarded as legitimate or
justified in this sense, as are demands for compliance with
the standard when deviation is threatened.
...[the generality of a habit in a social group] is
merely a fact about the observable behaviour of most of the
group... [For the existence of such a habit] it is enough
that each [individual] for his part behaves in the way that
others also in fact do. By contrast, if a social rule is to
exist some at least must look upon the behaviour in
question as a general standard to be followed by the group
as a whole. 3
These are apparently descriptive propositions. They merely
describe how things are, they do not depend on any decision of ours,
that sets a rule to be followed. If such a rule is to be derived,
this is a simple consequence of the way things are, independently of
us as observers. And it looks like we have to follow this rule, that
a social rule is one thing and a collective habit is another, because
it amounts to a distinction that cannot be manipulated, as it exists
in (social) reality, independently of our wishes or imagination. It
looks like this distinction imposes itself on us as a necessity,
insofar as we do not wish to be saying nonsense, in the same way that
even if I wish to jump now out of ray window and stay alive, I cannot.
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Is it really so? Is this distinction actually independent of the
wishes of the observer who asserts it?
This will be the subject of our study in Part 1.
Reflections on old societies
If we consider older ways of thinking, we shall not find such a
clear distinction between the two notions of the rule. In older
societies, the existence of an established practice, is a good enough
reason for maintaining it. Settled convergence of behaviour is often
enough for criticism of the deviant.
Let's start with an example. When new farming technology began to
arrive in societies up to then unaware of it, one could observe a
very typical reaction. The farmer who had used an animal drawn plough
for tilling all his life, would normally show disbelief and
unwillingness before the choice of the tractor, and would give as a
reason: "I have ploughed this way all my life, and so did my father
and my grandfather and his father before him. And so does everyone in
my village". 3* In what way can this count as a reason for not
changing from the ox-cart to the tractor?
One could say that the traditional farmer accepted in this case
the rule that he must farm the way his progenitors did. It is
conceivable, but it was not normally the case. And even if it were,
it is not even half the story. For, firstly, this utterance amounts
to an assertion of his belonging within a group; a group where people
use ox-carts and not tractors. Secondly, but in the same dimension,
it is a way of identifying himself; we often identify ourselves
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through our practices. *■s And thirdly, it is an indication of doubt
and disbelief. It is based on considerations like these: "I have seen
many others do it and I have done it myself, and I know, that this
way I shall get a good crop. You say your way is faster and I believe
you, but how do I know that this smelling stuff won't spoil my crop?
It's expensive. What if it runs down?6 I'm a poor man and my crop is
too dear to experiment with". It amounts to saying: "I have no
example to foil ow". 7
This last point takes us to the role imitation has in social
practice. Individuals educated in a rural society, are hardly ever
educated in a theoretical manner. They are educated through example.
The older individuals do something, and the younger ones are expected
to imitate. What the young need to acquire is the necessary skills
and dexterity in reproducing the same movements that will produce the
desired result through a given way, through a given method. The
mistakes that the young may make are due to clumsiness. They are
typical mistakes that everyone makes in the beginning, and so is
expected to make.
This is not only so for the technical part of one's education. It
is precisely the same for all kinds of different activities. It
applies equally to fishing or shaving, but also to dancing and
singing, discussing, approaching the other sex. In short, it applies
to living. With the difference that in some activities one is not
educated "explicitly", but is expected to imitate without being told.
He/she will be told only after having made a mistake. And even then,
sometimes, only through being laughed at, or reprimanded, depending
on how high the expectation was that he/she should imitate naturally.
What about the element of obligation? Must the young try to
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imitate? Don't they need to be convinced that this is the right way?
The youth may indeed ask "why?" and also "why not that instead?",
at least - but, anyway, certainly most often - when educated
technically. The old one may then be annoyed, for he thinks the youth
should have understood; he's not paying enough attention; "can't you
see? are you stupid?". Or, the old one may be pleased, if it is the
case that the youth is showing intelligence and individuality. He' 11
then answer: 'In order to X. If you do A, (undesirable) Y will come
about, because of C. ' Or he may simply say: "Just do it. (And don't
ask. )". This reaction may be due to the fact that the teacher does
not know why the alternative offered is not a good one, 8
This last case is of particular interest to us. Because the youth
is expected to do what he's been told, apparently with no reason. If
he keeps asking why, he is insolent. He is doubting the authority of
the older. And this is bad behaviour.
The authority of the old is of particular importance in such
societies. A modern mind will attribute these strict limits to the
possibility the pupil has of challenging the teacher's authority, to
prejudice. The situation will be understood as a game of power.
Interesting though these thoughts may be, there is something more to
it.
There always are many ways of doing something. At first they may
all look equally good to the thinking individual, and they may be
equally good in fact. But one of them is the practice of the
community. It is known that this way will bring about the result
intended. The fact that each individual is expected to abide by the
accepted practice is due to two reasons. The first one is for the
individual's good. No matter how ingenious one is, one cannot
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anticipate everything. The danger of failure is often far more
important than the possibility of good from successful novelty.
Reflection and theory need time and the possibility of
experimentation. These are luxuries. The individual will "do overall
better", 9 if he simply follows the traditional ways. At least, he
will be more productive, on the whole. And this brings us to the
second reason, which is a matter of the community's good. The
community's unity is strength. If each one acts out of their own
accord, the community will be weakened. Equally so, if many fail in
their undertakings, because they tried to do it their way. The first
reason accounts for the element of advice and care towards the young
one, when he's being told "you must do it, because everyone does it".
The second reason accounts for the element of reproof.
As for practical reasoning at the level of the individual's
decision for action, this is dominated by a general argument from
authority. Before each individual that now starts to take part in an
activity (be it common or not) and needs to learn how to succeed in
it, there have been myriads of others in the same position. They
invented and re-invented a particular way - a particular rule - to
carry through the particular undertaking well. Time and again, this
way has been chosen among the same range of alternatives that some of
the young "invent" again and again as new, only to find subsequently
with regret, that the old established rule was best, and that they
had better listened to the old ones from the beginning. Each new
individual is not in any way different or better from the ones who
have preceded. Nor is today's sun or soil different from yesterday's.
So what was good, or appropriate, or efficient for everybody else
before, is equally so for the individual now. If everyone before, as
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well as everyone around, adopt this pattern of behaviour and say It
is good, If every exception is identified as a mistake, this new
individual must do the same. If someone does not listen, he acts
wrongly.
Consequently, the habit of obedience, especially on the part of
the young, is traditionally conceived of as a virtue. The pupil is
supposed to do as he is told and suppress his "arrogance", even
though he does not see the reason why. With time, reflection and
experience, he will perhaps come to see that this was the best thing
to do, he will give the answer to his "why"s himself. And then he
will be wise. Accordingly, disobedience and the tendency to revolt
are conceived of as vices. '°''1
This is how having a rule to follow is constructed. This is also
how reasons for criticising behaviour are constructed. Now, at the
origin of this way of thinking, we can identify a somewhat different
social structure.
Think of the wild animals that run around in herds. They all go
together. Is it the case for each individual to consider whether
there will be less danger from predators in that direction or the
other? Certainly not. One strong animal takes a direction and the
others follow. Can an individual decide to take another direction? If
it did, it would run to its peril. Why is it that the strong ones
lead rather than follow? Because it is more important for the weak to
be near the strong rather than the inverse.
In the same way, in older communities (e.g. nomadic tribes) there
are some who lead and some who follow. The latter have nothing to do
with considerations as to what must be done. The reason why they do
this (and not that) is that everybody else does this.
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But let's return to our main argument. Since convergence of
behaviour is not a simple fact but also a reason for the individual
to conform, in rural societies the rule is indistinguishable from
common practice. They both come to existence together. If an observer
were to identify a successful novelty, that is, a new way of
behaving, subsequently to be characterized within the community as
good, he would simply see other members imitating it, for reasons
amounting to the innovator's personality or status, rather than to
the new rule's e.g. efficiency. Through imitation a common practice
would come into being. At the same time there would be a social rule.
At the point when the novelty is identified, one could say that
the normative element has to be distinguished from the practice,
because for the innovator, as well as the first imitators perhaps,
the novelty depended on a norm; it was what one must do. But this is
not a social rule yet. From the internal point of view12 we should
need to take it into account, if the innovator saw this norm as a
social rule, as applicable to everyone. However, in this case, from
this point of view, we cannot identify a novelty, because the norm
would have to be conceived of as the appropriate consequence of a
more important norm (which is a common practice). The innovator was
simply following a rule, according to the correct interpretation. I3, 14
Consequently his action cannot be distinguished from the practice
which corresponds to the other rule.
But what about pressure for conformity? Surely, there are cases
when we meet it and cases where we do not.
I do not think that there is such a clear distinction here
either, What are we going to regard as pressure for conformity? Isn't
being laughed at a case? Whom do people laugh at? The one who is
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different, the one who is not normal. And isn't one who often acts
differently conceived of as being abnormal? But even if it is only
one case of acting Irregularly, isn't there pressure for conformity?
Suppose one of the peasants stops going to the bar in the evening to
have a drink, with no apparent reason. Soon, he'11 meet with
indications of hostility. And what about the overall cultural
framework of proper and improper attitudes? Isn't this, as such,
pressure for conformity?
What is the role of pressure for conformity? Consider this. Why
do people laugh at someone who's made a mistake? Why is it so funny
when someone trips and falls? So that he will be more careful next
time. Both for his own and the community's good.
"Deviation from the regular course need not be a matter for any
form of criticism". But this is a contradiction. In traditional
societies there is always a right way of doing something and the
wrong ways. The regular course is the course one must follow.
Regularity - just like normality - is good. Irregularity is bad.
Regularity is a characteristic of Nature. And Nature is at the same
time the way things are, and the way things must be. ,s''6
A social rule as a matter of consciousness
We have not considered yet the third aspect of the distinction we
are discussing. It is best illustrated by this example:
...observation of the movements of motor vehicles at
certain crossroads may reveal a significant statistical
regularity whereby an extremely high proportion of the
vehicles is observed to stop when a red light shines in
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their direction. But no such observed or described
regularity is or entails a statement of the existence of a
social rule about vehicle driving. To observe or to state
that the pattern 'vehicles stopping when facing a red
light' occurs in 99 per cent of cases is neither to see nor
to say that there is a rule. The same would hold if it were
observed that 99 per cent of drivers play car radios when
stopped at traffic lights. 17
In the traditional way of thinking we traced, that has been
developed in rural societies, there is always a rule together with
each regularity. We may not always know it, that is, we do not always
see the reasons behind the facts. But there is always a reason. If 99
per cent of drivers play car radios when stopped at traffic lights,
it means that they must do so, even if they do not realize it, in the
same way that leaves must fall from the trees in autumn, or people
must die, even if they do not see why or don't even realize it. The
child did not see why either, when being taught the rule to follow.
Still, even with these presuppositions, a distinction remains to
which this example points: there are rules one needs to be taught,
and rules one follows anyway. There are cases where we abide by a
rule, meaning that we are conscious of its existence as a reason for
our action. And, there are cases where we are not aware of any such
rule; in this sense we act independently of it. If there is one, it
is certainly not a social rule. There are rules which an observer can
identify and use for prediction; the behaviour of the object of
observation is not consciously determined in accordance with them. An
individual's habit is such a rule. And there are rules which serve
for guidance of the actor. In the case of a habit, the object acts as
a rule but not according to one. If there is here a normative
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element, it is one for the observer; that the latter must predict
this rather than that alternative.
So let us consider this distinction then.
How can people come to have a habit in common? Can they do it
independently of the interaction with one another? To some extent,
yes. However, although randomness may produce very strange results
sometimes, it would not be very convincing to assert that 99 per cent
of drivers play car radios when stopped at traffic lights, and that
there is no explanation for it, other than that it simply happened
for each one to have acquired this habit separately.'8 On the other
hand, it would make much more sense if we tried to explain it with
imitation and the way fashion works.
Let's take a habit typically acquired through imitation and
fashion: that of smoking. Take a non-addicted smoker, e.g. one at the
beginning, or one used to smoking only occasionally. Why does he
smoke? Possibly out of insecurity; he wants to merge within a group
(e.g. that of certain of his classmates). Probably as a habit; with
no particular reason. Or, perhaps, for reasons of appearance, in
order to convey a "macho" message, or to look cool and enigmatic. 19
Is he conscious of these reasons? Hard to say. We would have to speak
of degrees of consciousness depending on the case.
Picture him in front of the bar, having a drink; or, perhaps I
should say posing with a drink. He notices a "wild chick" and -
automatically - takes his best pose and lights a cigarette. He is
certainly following a pattern of behaviour, it is one he has picked
from films, photographs, people he's looked at and liked the way they
looked. Is he conscious of acting according to a rule? Well, he
believes that he is looking good this way. Isn't there a rule here?
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Of course there is. And it is not only a rule of prediction for the
observer. It is a "cut and dried" manner in application of a
principle or value (to look good).20 It has been elaborated and
established through fashion; as long as this fashion holds and
provided he applies the rules correctly, he will achieve looking
good, through an established way, as real as any fact depending on
the culture which constitutes him and his environment. - But does he
consider this as a standard to be followed by everyone? - I think he
does; for everyone under similar circumstances who wishes to look
cool and enigmatic (in order to look good). Just like we think of it
as a standard for anyone who wishes to make a will to follow the
appropriate formalities. - Is there a common practice in application
of the rule? - There certainly is; there's a whole bunch of guys
around him taking poses with a cigarette. - But there are numerous
ways of looking good; there are also others around him trying other
ways. - True; there are also numerous ways of making a will. 21
There are various ways of explaining the fact that someone acts
as a rule in a particular way. We mentioned insecurity and habit
(i.e. inertia) to account for the fact that someone habitually
smokes, even though it does not make him feel well as such (feeling
well could be an explanation for the individuals who have become
addicted). However, such explanations can only account for a habit at
the level of the individual. They are not sufficient when we are
concerned with the fact that a habit of this kind can become as
widespread as smoking still is. It is only through the cultural
investment of the relevant act with value of some kind (e.g. through
investing the act with meaning) that a group can come to have a habit
in common. 22 And when such an investment of value has taken place,
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since the act is conceived of as an application of the value, there
will be a social rule requiring it, as part of a given mannerism in
service of this value.
This cultural process is of course largely unconscious, to a
bigger or lesser degree, depending on the case and the individual
concerned. When one watches Humphrey Bogart in "The Maltese Falcon",
one does not normally identify the patterns through which Bogart is
constructed as a positive image. Even less is one conscious of
reasons why these patterns are (re)constructed in one's mind as
appropriate and not some others. Accordingly, imitation of manners
does not have to take place consciously. But this does not reduce the
relevant rule to one of prediction only (besides, this rule as one of
prediction does not exist yet). For the rule here is constructed as
the reason why the pattern should be adopted.
One might still think that nevertheless there is a difference in
the way one regards one's conformity to a rule e.g. of law and to one
of fashion, in that when e.g. one stops at a red light, one does so
in awareness of the rule as his reason, whereas this is not the case
with fashion. But this is not true independently of the pre-
established concepts we are considering, We may have all degrees of
awareness of our rules as reasons, in abiding by any rule. I am not
conscious of abiding by a rule when I stop at a red light. I do it as
a habit. We shall concede to this distinction only (because we need
not question it here): there are rules concerning what obligations
and duties23 people have, and there are rules concerning e.g. how to
fly an airplane. But this does not amount to a distinction between
acting according to a rule and doing something as a rule.
We distinguished in the beginning of the section between rules
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one needs to be taught and rules one follows anyway, But what one is
being taught is not necessarily something one will be subsequently
conscious of. Nor does the fact that one is being taught something
entail that the "teacher" meant to teach it to one. Education is
largely an unconscious activity.24
Habits
With what we have said so far, we have not touched upon the
distinction at the level of the individual. There it seems, mere
regularity of behaviour can exist without being due to a rule which
one acts according to.
This is in perfect accordance with the way we understand and
speak of habits. There is nothing normative about them. A habit is
never a reason for action. It is only a cause. It is a practice an
individual has out of inertia. However, there can be nothing common
about it, at least not in the way we speak of a common practice. Two
or more individuals may have a habit in common; but never a common
habit. Only an individual can have a habit. To speak of a group
having a habit is like making a metaphor, which has the consequence
of picturing the group as an individual. (Think of the proposition
"the Russian society has the habit of producing every few centuries a
leader who struggles to introduce some changes and pull it towards
the West").
Still, the habit is not independent of reasons. It has been
instituted through them. It has been established for a recurrent set
of circumstances, through the adoption of a way of acting in
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application of a principle or value.26 Through repetition of this
pattern of behaviour, the individual ends by acting in the way
adopted (the rule) without bringing forth reasons for it (the
principles concerned).26 This is precisely how memory functions in
human action, for reasons of economy and efficiency. It means that a
man will be faster in acting according to the rule, while at the same
time his mind will be concerned with something else.26* This is how
one will be able to stop at a red light without thinking about it.
The pattern here is being followed without a reason, i.e. the fact
that one acts according to a pattern does not depend on one's
acknowledging a reason for it. Consequently, the pattern of behaviour
may continue to be repeated, even when the connection with the
principle served has ceased to exist. So, the habit is an explanation
how a regularity of behaviour may take place and why it may exist
even though there are no reasons for it. It is precisely in this way
that the word habit is primarily used, i. e. in order to indicate a
case, where one acts independently of one's reason and even contrary
to it.
Nevertheless, as long as an adopted pattern of behaviour has not
been consciously (and properly)27 challenged, it will still be
coupled with assumptions of value, at some level of consciousness,
and will be apt to generate judgements too. This is true even for the
lot of movements and gestures we make as part of any activity, with
no apparent reason, which we have acquired through seeing and
imitating others. I shall make a story to illustrate this.
Whenever James as a child was with his father in their car and
they happened to stop at the first red light, if his father was
nervous or distressed, he used to say something like "let's see
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what's on the radio", switched it on, played with the buttons for a
while, making typical gestures and comments, stopped at some station
and then put in gear and moved on, because the light had turned
green. At the next red light, he would realize that the radio was
actually playing something he didn't like and would repeat the whole
thing all over again.
When James grew up, he behaved in the same manner. He manifested
his nervousness while driving, in the same way, with the same
gestures and the same tone in his voice. He didn't do it
deliberately. Though he was following a pattern of behaviour, he did
not think he was following a rule. Nevertheless, it was part of his
conception of a driver, and this might show if he was asked to
describe or picture a driver in the way we typically describe in art.
He particularly liked driving. It gave him a sense of control. He
always drove himself and went everywhere by car. He believed he was
an excellent driver. It made him nervous if someone else was driving,
so he avoided entering a car as a passenger. At an age when people
have for long been accustomed to understand and judge what they see
according to what they already know, rather than adjust what they
know to what they see, his car broke down and he was given a lift by
a stranger. When they were stopped by a red light, the stranger
manifested his nervousness by playing with the gear stick and the
handbrake. When James related the incident later to a friend, he said
that the guy who had given him the lift was a bit weird. He also said
that the guy was not a very good driver.
The fact that one behaves in a certain way as a rule is not
independent of one's normative assumptions, be they based on
authority or on other "proper" reasons, and whether one is conscious
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of them or not.27* I think that this is the psychological explanation
for the negative connotation in terms like strangeness or
peculiarity. It explains why the peasant who would stop going to the
bar in the evenings would meet with hostility from the rest of the
group.
On the other hand one may be willing to see positively a
difference in attitude or behaviour and change one's own. This
depends on curiosity and the willingness to learn, which may also be
part of one's normative assumptions (coupled with one's accordingly
behaving as a rule in favour of change). If it is, it will be largely
due to the existence of a rule in one's culture in favour of
investigating and learning, and disapproving of pre(-)judice. For
this may be a positive image in one's culture. Such a rule will be
found to a lesser extent (and with less strength) the more the
community resembles a herd and to a bigger extent (and more strength)
the more it resembles the society the enlighteners of the 17th and
18th century aspired to. As we shall see later, this and the rule in
favour of tolerance, are predominantly to account for the fact that
the distinction we have been considering between 'acting as a rule'
and 'acting according to a rule' seems so fundamental and necessary.
Conclusions on the necessity of the distinction
The idea in challenging the distinction between the two notions
of the rule, i.e. between 'rule' as mere convergence of behaviour and
'rule' as reason explaining the convergence, was not to conclude
whether it is valid. The problem is not whether it should be adopted
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or rejected in general. It is a distinction we make in fact. It is
largely established in our ways of thinking and understanding. The
problem is to see how fundamental or self-evident it is, as well as
what it is that makes it fundamental and self-evident.
It is not a distinction to be found in what we might call first-
order reality, i. e. what exists independently of an observer, First,
if the proposition "mere convergence in behaviour between members of
a social group may exist and yet there may be no rule requiring it"
is meant to describe this reality, it is false. Rather the contrary
is true, unless of course we refer to small scale convergence within
a group, which may take place with no explanation other than
randomness, 28 especially if it is true that "beaucoup de gens, peu d*
idees".29 And second, the distinction is not necessarily to be found
in how people think in fact about their social rules, either. For the
largest part of human history, and, I dare assume, for the largest
part of today's world too, the most common and from one point of view
the most important reason for action is precisely the fact that "this
is what everybody does". Conformity as such is understood as a good
thing and social rules are constituted by common practice. It is only
in situations where no established pattern exists already, that
people conceive of different possibilities as serious alternatives
and reflect on reasons of other kinds. Only for people whose
education entails the self-evidence of the Humean distinction, are
the two notions as such so clearly independent (in principle).
Finally, even at the level of the individual, it is true that
regularities of behaviour, far from being independent of normative
assumptions, they also generate normative judgements themselves.
Neither is this distinction a priori embedded in our minds, That
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is, it is not necessarily imposed on the observer qua human
intelligence. If it were, it would be impossible to find cases where
people don't make it, and yet don't fail to make sense. Furthermore,
it would then be very strange indeed for the same word to be
applicable in both cases. And we would expect the term 'rule' for 'as
a rule' to be a separate entry in the dictionaries, from the term
'rule' for 'according to a rule'. There would be two words, with a
similarity due to historical or other chance, e.g. like 'bear' for
the animal and 'bear' the verb.
It is a distinction in the ways we speak and think, but only one
possible distinction; not one that has to be made, from a point of
view that describes language. When to a "why?" one answers "that's
the rule", it need not be either descriptive or prescriptive, it need
not mean either "that's how people do it in fact" or "that's how you
must do it". It may well mean indiscriminately both. It could mean
e.g. "this is what everybody does, so this way you can be sure to
succeed in the undertaking"; couple this with the speaker's
involvement and responsibility and it means "you must do it" (or "do
it"). Or, it could mean "this is how people in our group behave". The
distinction exists in the language for us to be able to make it,
depending on the reasons we have for it, or simply because we wish
to. In the same way that I may wish to see a triangle in a picture as
hanging or standing. 30
However, the conclusion that the distinction is not necessarily
imposed on the observer does not entail that it is wrong, nor that it
is not fundamental. It is correct and true, provided it is backed by
certain normatlve assumptions as to what may count as a rule for
someone to abide by, what may count as a reason for action. It is
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correct from a point of view that distinguishes among the reasons
people act for in fact, and prescribes what form such a reason may
take, in order to be prima facie admissible for discussion, and what
it may not. It stipulates what is a reason "stricto sensu". In modern
culture it is true that the fact that everybody does something, is
not a reason for the individual to do it too.
The change in modern society
We saw that in more traditional ways of thinking, the relevant
normative assumptions are radically different. The fact that
everybody else does something, is also a reason for the subject to do
it, and so it can constitute the social rule from the internal point
of view.
The change in the normative assumptions regarding what may count
as a reason for action, is a major characteristic marking the modern
era (which can perhaps be placed in time, roughly from the discovery
by Europe of the rest of the Earth culminating to the enlightenment,
until our days and the radical changes in thinking that begin with
Marxism).30* This change exists in a dialectical relation with the
emancipation of the individual as person and its establishment in the
modern way of thinking as the primal autonomous unit. The individual
is for the first time conceived of as someone in himself, allowed to
have his own wishes and desires, independently of the others.31 In
pre-modern times, what one - truly - wants or feels is constituted by
one's status, i.e. by one's belonging to certain groups through one's
identification through the appropriate general categories. (To take
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an easy example for today's ways of thinking: mothers love their
children. It is not possible for a mother not to love her child, or
else there is something wrong/bad with her). It is the groups that
constitute the individual. In modern culture, the individual is
discovered as an identity behind its status.32 And since what one
wants is not pre-established by one's status any more, since it need
not be the same as what everybody in the relevant group wants, since
on the contrary, each one has one's own purposes and path in life,
which may happen to coincide with but are independent of others' ,
since man is egoistic by nature, it is then obvious that it cannot be
a reason for one's action the mere fact that some or even all others
follow this pattern of behaviour. Because one need first interrogate
what one's own wishes are, for they are in principle independent of
the others' even if they are in fact the same.
Now, if the individual is the primal autonomous unit, and it is
the group that is defined as an assembly of individuals rather than
the individual as part of the group, i.e. if the individual has in
principle a separate identity and, from the normative point of view
of its constitution as a person, there is no reason why he should be
like the others, his factual similarity being a mere contingent fact,
then difference as such shall not be understood as an abnormality;
nothing has gone wrong. So the individual's possibilities for
difference are greater, because, each person being in principle
identified separately, each person is therefore allowed to be in
fact, through his practices, separately identified. Furthermore, now
that the individual is the carrier of value by himself and not
because of his ability to serve the community, now that instead the
unity of the group is a good thing because - and to the extent that -
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it serves the persons who constitute the group for their separate in
principle but contingently convergent interests, 33 the desirability
of unity has stricter limits and so less things can be threatening to
it. If unity is not good as such, conformity is not good as such
either, and pressure for conformity becomes irrational and
prejudiced. Hence the enlightened rule of tolerance.
But we must not think of this change as if it took place once and
for all. This change as a matter of fact depends on security and
comfort on the part of the individuals. Curiosity is limited from
fear. The will to experiment is limited, if it amounts to great
risks. And without them, one will simply do like the others do,
because it's safest, and one will demand that the others do the same,
because a weakness of the community will expose one to greater
threats. Thinking and learning is an expensive activity. The more the
ones who can afford it - and the more their possibility to influence
or impose their way of thinking on the rest -, the more dominant the
image of the clever and radical investigator will be, in contrast to
the one of the pious and respectful of authority learner. These two
images have existed and fought each other in the modern era of the
West, until roughly the mid-twentieth century, when the second one
was overwhelmed. The same is true for tolerance vs. demand for
conformity. The same is true for convergence as a quasi per se
desideratum. Certainly the parents a generation ago used to expect
their children to behave "like all children do". The situation in
other parts of the world may still be different.
Besides, we may speak of dominance of one of these images rather
than its opposite, only at a very high level of generality and
abstraction, which enables us to regard a culture or a people as a
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unit. At a slightly lower level of generality, we can see that, at
any given moment, these opposed images and ideas, these opposed
normative assumptions have different strength and degree of
acceptance each, depending on the activity or the part of the
population concerned, or both. A normative assumption that is
dominant in one activity may well be marginal in another. Think for
example of the separate and independent constitution of the
individual in contrast with its constitution in accordance with its
status, on the one part for a male merchant and on the other for a
female housewife. Or think how dominant the rule of tolerance is in
contrast with the demand for conformity, on the one hand for a group
of legal philosophers and on the other for a group of English
hooligans.
(It is important to realize that this is true, not only for the
modern Western world, but for traditional societies as well. If we
should move from plausible accounts of ideas and ways of thinking, to
descriptions of actual social groups, we must remember that both ways
of regarding reasons for action (just like both the dependence on and
independence from the group of the individual) exist at any given
moment with varying strength, depending on the particular sub-group
and the activity concerned. It would be the silliest mistake to
assume that in older societies there was no individuality or
experimentation, that the individual was always subordinated to the
group. On the contrary, and even for the most primitive nomadic
tribes, it is obviously true for instance, that it happened from time
to time for an individual to subordinate the group (especially for
small groups), precisely after having brought about the breakdown of
established common practice, thanks to the success that resulted (or
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even merely happened) after. And individuality is not always looked
upon with reproof in traditional societies, and not in the same
degree from everybody. A father for example, may even feel proud if
his son is a little of a rebel.)
In any case, at least on the level of dominant ideology and with
a strength that varies depending on the type of activity affected, we
may say that, in modern Western culture, there is a rule in favour of
investigating and learning and disapproving of prejudice. We saw that
in traditional culture this kind of attitude is not as favoured,
because of the importance of success in the undertaking. In order to
know, one must experiment and learn from one's mistakes, which may
cost dearly. So it is better for one to imitate, rather than
experiment; if he manages to learn in the end, so much the better.
But even if he does not, success was more important. In modern
culture instead, the importance of success in the undertaking is
moderated by the ideal of knowledge. And the ideal of knowledge is
backed by the belief that there will be greater success in the long
run, in the undertakings the relevant knowledge serves for, in spite
of the mistakes and failures the process of learning will entail.
Now, such a process of knowledge, that is based on free investigation
and experimentation, entails the uncovering of the reasons behind the
"pre-emptive" reasoning through authority;9 it entails disregarding
authority to a great extent. Consequently, since knowledge is valued
independently to some extent, what is identified as a - true or
proper - reason for an action, is the one behind the fact that this
is what the teacher said or that this is what everybody normally
does. What makes an action correct, the requirement that an action be
made, is not any more identified with what the others do, because one
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is not anymore supposed to imitate, in order to succeed, but to
learn.
Equally important in the distinction of reasons from practice is
the rule of tolerance. It is entailed by the necessity of coexistence
of different persons. It amounts to that difference is not to be
banned, convergence in behaviour is not to be sought after,
especially by means of force, unless such action can be ad hoc
justified. Before, the justification for conceiving someone else as
having an obligation towards conformity with what the others do, was
general: others have thought about it and concluded on the right
thing to be done; you're not any better or wiser than them; nor are
you better than us who conform. Now, this changes: although you're
not better, you may well be different; what is good for the others is
not necessarily good for you. In this way, the general justification
(from authority) towards conformity is taken away, and so an ad hoc
justification is needed each time. In a way, it amounts to a shift of
a "burden of proof". Now that no general rule in favour of conformity
exists anymore, difference need not be ad hoc justified; only
demanding from someone to conform need be. In short, one is not
supposed to do what the others do. One may be supposed to do
something, but not because the others do it. So, how people act is
one thing, what one must do is another.34
Habitual adoption of reasons
The distinction between "mere convergence of behaviour" and a
rule requiring it, as a basic, self-evident distinction, is a part of
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this change in the semiotic universe, in the second-order reality. It
rests upon the assumptions mentioned above, regarding the
constitution and identification of the individual as a person and its
relation to the group, the ideal of knowledge and the prescription of
tolerance. 35 It ultimately rests upon the investment of the
individual as person with value. Independently of these normative
assumptions, which lead to a logical separation between the
convergence in behaviour as such and a reason for action, it is
merely a possibility; not a necessity.
Of course, when you come across the proposition "mere convergence
in behaviour does not necessarily entail the existence of a rule
requiring it", you don't identify it as normative, or as depending on
anything having to do with the dominant concept of the person. You
understand it as a simple and self-evident truth; there are two
things here which, although possibly dependent on each other, are
nevertheless separate. One had better keep them this way, or else one
shall be confused. Furthermore, when this proposition is connected
with the use of the terms 'as a rule' and 'according to a rule', you
are amused and something seems to light up, just like a fertile
metaphor. But there is no connection with the individual as a carrier
of value, not even with what you would understand as reason for your
action. The distinction is there by itself; nothing to do with you.
It is real. You approve of it, but it is true and necessary to make,
independently of your approval.
This is precisely what we should expect. For people are rarely
aware of the backing assumptions behind the ideas they form and the
understandings they take for granted, and even then only to a limited
degree. And, to be unaware of such a backing assumption is simply to
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be unaware of the possibility that it might change. It means
precisely to conceive of its logical consequences as necessities. The
only difference with the way habits are connected to normative
assumptions Cas we said above) in this respect, is in the possibility
that, when someone realizes these assumptions, in some cases they
will be able to justify them (to themselves) and approve of them
consciously, while in some others they won't.
We are educated to (we are used to) invest value on or to
understand as positive e.g. the image of someone who exhibits a free
mind, is tolerant and more apt to try to understand than to pass
judgement. How does this education take place? To some extent (more
for some, less for others), it takes place in the same diffuse and
unconscious (both for the teachers and the pupils) ways that e.g.
people in India learn to appreciate that language and posture in
their popular films that we regard as ridiculously melodramatic. -
But no, you might say. We are much more conscious of the image of
tolerance being positive; we are aware of alternatives and we advance
reasons why the first image must be chosen. - True; to the extent
that a culture is in favour of change, originality, experimentation
and progress, it is obvious that it will be desirable for stricto
sensu (i.e. independent of common practice) reasons to be advanced
often, so that people can be aware of alternatives to established
practice and rapid change be possible. In such cultures we shall find
strong contrary images and ideologies in fight with each other, so
that reasons shall be advanced as a rule. Yet, it is not everybody's
job or interest in fact (though it may be in principle) to take part
in this activity. And anyway, every interrogation into reasons has to
stop somewhere. In fact, there are particular levels of practical
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reasoning that are rarely, if at all, touched. To the extent that one
could reasonably expect that he shall not need to probe into a
particular assumption, this assumption will be habitually taken for
granted. 36 This does not mean that there are no reasons behind it;
only that one is unaware of them.
Now if one is not aware of the reasons that account for a certain
idea one accepts, one will think that this idea is self-evident. And
if one is not aware of the possibility that it may change, if one is
not aware of a possibility of a coherent alternative, the idea will
be taken as necessary. So this is how it happens for a distinction
like the one between people acting as a rule and people acting
according to a rule to appear as logically necessary, independently
of any normative presuppositions.
(But if two conceptions or ways of thinking are presented and a
choice is going to be made unconsciously, which one shall prevail?
The one that fits better with the already established ways of
thinking.37
The reason why it seems to the reader as an evident truth, the
reason why something seems to light up when it is connected with up
to then more limited in their uses ways of speaking, is precisely the
fact that it fits well with all the rest that the subject has learnt
to accept as fundamentally and obviously true. What causes the
"lighting up" is the fact that various uses of the item(s) of speech
have been connected in a way that explains them - an idea - and which
can then serve for the creation of other such uses. The process of
semiosis is being carried a step further; this is what the light is.)
To conclude, let me say that yes, it is fundamental that
convergence of behaviour does not mean or entail a rule requiring it.
It is self-evident that convergence of behaviour may exist without a
rule. But this "may" is normative. The self-evidence is in the
backing assumption the subject makes, that "the fact that everybody
behaves so, is not a reason for me to behave so; I don't accept it as
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a reason; it doesn't count as one". Consequently, to make the
distinction as an indispensable one for any man in any time and place
(to think of it as universal) is not to describe the way people
understand their rules (and reasons) from their - internal - point of
view. It is to presume a logic, a way of thinking, a form of life,




1. H. L, A. Hart, The Concept of Law, p. 9.
2. And this is not exclusive in English. Compare ' r£gle' (en rdgle gdndrale) in
French, 'xavuv' in Greek, Also the notion of noraality in all Latin and Geraanic
languages.
3. Hart ibid. p. 54.
3a. According to W. D. Lamont (Law and the Moral Order p. 13) "every scientific
improver knows how difficult it can be to persuade cultivators in coaaunities
with a low level of literacy to adopt more efficient practices; and this is
because the old ways are valued... in the context of a whole culture, and so
positively chosen in preference to others". (Compare p,12-3 to this section),
4. Relate the "inspirational conception" of authority, in Raz J., The Morality
of Freedom, p. 31 f. Unfortunately, the author has not related it to this
possibility of identification as a member of a group, although he has mentioned
the latter, p. 54.
5. And the things we like or dislike. In older societies novelty is rather
disliked, since a man need6 rest rather than stimulation. The inverse is true in
modern societies. Relate Milan Kundera, L' immortality p. 123f. (la mAthode
additive). In modern societies originality is sought after. This is not the case
in older ones,
6. These are of course only examples (or should I say parables?) of a general
doubt. Even if these particular fears were disproved it would make little
difference. This doubt is a matter of the difference between theory and
practice. Practice may always bring forth problems one had not anticipated.
7. Compare F. A. Hayek Law. Legislation and Liberty. Vol. 1, p, 18: "'Learning
from experience', among men no less than among animals, is a process not
primarily of reasoning but of the observance, spreading, transmission and
development of practices which have prevailed because they were successful..".
He has a Darwinian account of the emergence and evolution of rules in primitive
societies,
8. Or, perhaps he does not know how to express it. He himself has not been
taught with reasons. He has followed examples. Compare Hayek ibid, that with
regard to learning rules of conduct by example and imitation, "neither those who
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set the examples nor those who learn from then nay be consciously aware of the
existence of the rules which they nevertheless strictly observe" (p.19).
8a. Conpare Haclntyre A., After Virtue p. 42: "(The) concept of authority as
excluding reason is.., itself a peculiarly, even if not exclusively, aodern
concept, fashioned in a culture to which the notion of authority is alien and
repugnant, so that appeals to authority appear irrational".
9. Relate the analysis of authority in Raz J., The Morality of Freedon.
especially his ideas on the justification of authority p. 53f.
10. And in fact, in older societies, people used to be auch aore obedient. See L.
Stone The Family, Sex and Marriage in England 1500-1800, who says for 16th
century England that ",,,for aost people most of the time, obedience caae
easily, even in so critical a matter as the choice of a life partner for bed and
board."
11. The idea of insolence is very well connected to this way of thinking. Compare
the notion of "uppiq" in ancient Greek mythology. Notice that it is not simply a
vice like arrogance in more modern times, but also a source of "sacred terror"
invoking "5£oq". This is so, because such an act places the actor beyond the
everyday structure of practices that identify him as a member of the community.
It is a terror caused by the breakdown of the rules of behaviour that maintain
normality and safety.
12. The internal point of view is not a descriptive one, See N. HacCormick H. L. A.
Hart p.33on. From the "hermeneutic" point of view, which is descriptive, there
is a novelty, but there is not a social rule.
13. Compare Dworkin's interpretivism, The Law's Empire, p. 47on,
14. Which interpretation will simply be a different rule, from the external -
i.e. descriptive - point of view.
15. See the "teleological view of the world" in Hart op.cit. supra n. 1, p. 184f.
16. Compare F. A. Hayek's theory of rules op.cit. supra n. 7, p. 17-9,74-81, See
especially his examples about non-articulated rules, p. 79, He thinks that with
respect to such rules "the distinction between descriptive rules which assert
the regular recurrence of certain sequences of events (including human actions)
and the normative rules which state that such sequences 'ought' to take place",
"becomes much less clear and perhaps sometimes even impossible to draw".
17. N. MacCormick, H. L. A. Hart, p. 30. The emphasis is mine.
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18. See the idea of narrative coherence in N. MacCormick's "Coherence in Legal
Justification" (in Theorie der Normen, Krawietz et aleds, p. 37ff), p. 48 f f.
19. Think of the fashion of the Bogart-figure, the "fila-noir". Bogart and Bakall
in "The Big Sleep", Robert Mitchua, en face, a cigarette hanging froa his nouth.
Marlene Dietrich in her old aovies, Klint Eastwood in the spaghetti westerns.
Nowadays in Britain and USA a saoking figure night look rather tacky, to soae
people at least, but this was not the case a short time ago.
20. See N. MacCornick, H. L, A, Hart, p. 41.
21. There are three aain ways of making a will and various exceptional ones in
the Greek Civil Code, To the best of my knowledge, it is the same in the German
Civil Code,
22. Compare P. Winch, The Idea of a Social Science, p, 52: "All behaviour which is
meaningful (therefore all specifically human behaviour) is ipso facto rule
governed."
23. For a distinction between an obligation and a duty, see N, MacCornick H, L. A,
Hart p. 59.
24. Compare Winch op.cit. supra n. 22, p. 58: "...the test of whether a man's
actions are the application of a rule is not whether he can formulate it but
whether it makes sense to distinguish between a right and a wrong way of doing
things in connection with what he does. Where that makes sense, then it must
also make sense to say that he is applying a criterion in what he does even
though he does not, and perhaps cannot, formulate that criterion.". I do not
necessarily agree though with the rather reduced conception of a habit he seems
to conclude with in p.60-2 and I don't wish to point to the distinction between
a rule and a habit he finally makes, which is based on a naive mechanistic
account of how animals function.
25. Otherwise it would not be possible to adopt any pattern of behaviour through
imitation. We do not adopt whatever pattern of behaviour, There are examples we
identify as good and examples we identify as bad, Of course, the value
connection may be anything, e.g. love of the person we imitate, identification
within a group etc, or even trying something new. It need not be conscious
either,
26. It should then be no surprise that repetition had such a major role in
traditional education, Those methods of education were formed at a time when
change took place slowly, and what wa6 right the day before would be right the
51
day after. Revision being relatively uncommon, one needed not be aware of
reasons, for one would not need rethink about then. In accordance with this,
morality is traditionally a matter of having good habits, as we can see in the
history of the word, i.e. the meaning of acres and ijdi],
26a. Compare Berger 4 Luckmann The Social Construction of Reality p. 70-1, that
habitualization frees man from having to consider each time the infinity of
possibilities and take corresponding decisions, thus allowing for concentration
of energy on important decisions,
27. It should e.g. be challenged by the appropriate person. If challenged by a
negative figure, the pattern might be kept e, g, as a way of identification. At
different times there may be different reasons for the approval of a pattern,
That is it may well change meaning.
27a, Compare what Weber has to say on the type of traditional action: "Strictly
traditional behaviour.,, lies very close to the borderline of what can
justifiably be called meaningfullly oriented action, and indeed often on the
other side. For it is very often a matter of almost automatic reaction to
habitual stimuli which guide behaviour in a course which has been repeatedly
followed. The great bulk of all every day action to which people have become
habitually accustomed approaches this type. Hence, its place in a systematic
classification is not merely that of a limiting case, because... attachment to
habitual forms can be upheld with varying degrees of self-consciousness and in a
variety of senses. In this case the type may shed over into wertrationalitSt,"
(Economy and Society, p, 25).
28. "Randomness" here means that each incident of convergent behaviour is
independent of any other incident of behaviour, within the sequence of people
behaving "as a rule". For my use of the term, see the chapter on probability in
K. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery.
29. See M. Kundera, L' immortality, p, 125,
30. The example of the triangle is from L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical
Investigations, p. 200.
30a. I do feel a little uneasy in speaking of a "modern era". However, Mclntyre
speaks of "modernity" and "pre-modern" in the same way, in After Virtue, Cf,
also the introduction of Lyotard J., La condition postmoderne: "tLe mot
•postmodern*] d6signe 1' 6tat de la culture aprds les transformations qui ont
affects les regies des jeux de la science, de la literature et des arts a
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partir de la fin du XIX* si^cle".
31. For an assertion of this change from a sociological point of view, see e, g.
L. Stone op.cit. supra n. 10. For the situation of the individual before the
change, in 16th century England, he says in p.4-5 that "This was a society where
neither individual autonomy nor privacy were respected as desirable ideals. It
was generally agreed that the interests of the group, whether that of the kin,
the village or later the state, took priority over the wishes of the individual
and the achievement of his particular ends, 'Life, liberty and the pursuit of
happiness' were personal ideals which the average, educated sixteenth-century
man would certainly have rejected as the prime goals of a good society,,.
Individual freedom of choice ought at all times and in all respects to be
subordinated to the interests of others, whether lineage, parents, neighbours,
kin, Church or state.", See also pp. 66-67 that in order to understand such a
society we must rid ourselves of the preconception that "personal autonomy, the
pursuit by the individual of his or her own happiness, is paramount, a claim
justified by the theory that it in fact contributes to the well-being of the
group". As for the change, see Ch. 6, especially pp, 229-232, "..there developed a
head-on clash between two systems of values; the one demanded total conformity
in deeds and words and even in secret thoughts to the collective will as
expressed by the state and the official Church; the other insisted on the right
of the individual to a certain freedom of action and inner belief," (p,229).
For some sociological accounts and explanations, regarding the emergence of
the autonomous individual in modern society, see E. Durkheim, De la division du
travail social, pp, 272-288,
32. And a certain superficiality is attached to the general categories that
constitute the status of the individual. Tou must go behind them to find who one
really is.
Compare Maclntyre A,, After Virtue, p, 33; "In many pre-modern, traditional
societies it is through his or her membership in a variety of social groups that
the individual identifies himself or herself and is identified by others, I am
brother, cousin and grandson, member of this household, that village, this
tribe. These are not characteristics that belong to human beings accidentally,
to be stripped away in order to discover 'the real me'. They are part of my
substance, defining partially at least and sometimes wholly my obligations and
my duties, Individuals inherit a particular space within an interlocking set of
social relationships; lacking that space, they are nobody, or at best a stranger
or an outcast,"
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33. This idea is the most direct presumption of the idea of the social contract.
34. Many comparisons can be made in general, of my contrast between traditional
and modern societies, with various of Weber's writings on authority or the
household v. the office, See at least the idea of separation, in Kronnan A., Max
Weber, p.64 f f. "All legal-rational authority rests upon the principle of
positivity.., which presupposes - or, more accurately, expresses - a sharp
conceptual distinction beween facts and values. Traditional authority, by
contrast, identifies 'is' and 'ought'; from a traditionalist point of view, the
world is assumed to contain the values that endow human life with whatever
meaning and purpose it has." (p. 66).
35. The inverse is also true, It may, equally to some extent, be said, that each
of these assumptions is based, among other things, on the distinction we are
discussing.
36. Not because of an assumed expectation - which in fact does not exist. But
simply because one never needed see beyond the assumption. We examine our
reasons behind the rules, only when there is a question whether we should
perhaps modify these rules, for some - new - application or other.








The epistemological background of linguistic jurisprudence
The Concept of Law is probably the most eminent work in Anglo-
American Jurisprudence of this century. From a certain point of view,
its importance is largely due to the fact that it marks a shift in
the way theoretical reasoning connected with the law takes place, at
least in the awareness henceforth considered necessary of language as
a tool for such theorizing. A great deal of its importance that is,
lies in its method, in the kind of questions the reader is presented
with and the way it sets about answering them.
The method of linguistic jurisprudence is indeed, a significant
change in the discipline. It is part of a general philosophic
movement that claimed to be clearing philosophy from silly
metaphysical constructions, from pseudo-problems caused by certain
misunderstandings about language, or, even if not caused by such
misunderstandings, pseudo-problems at least, that would be shown
clearly as empty of meaning and significance, once these
misunderstandings had been cleared. Philosophers should not consume
themselves in silly questions having to do with what lies behind
words like 'reality' or 'truth', but instead investigate under what
circumstances people say that something is real or true in the
everyday or common use of the language. Philosophical theories should
not be based on abstract definitions of terms in language. One should
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instead reflect on how the relevant terras are used in everyday
situations, in order to see the social rules and conventions that
account for the possibility of the performance of the relevant speech
acts. 1
Of course, the traditional philosophy, primarily against which
the revolution was seen to take place, did not regard its abstract
definitions as definitions of words in language. These were not
definitions of words, which were thought of as appropriate only in
teaching a language, e.g. to a foreigner. They were definitions of
things. From a lingual point of view, a wrong word might have been
chosen to denote the thing defined, but such a mistake would not be a
philosophic one. A philosophic definition did not describe how a word
is used in the relevant language. It prescribed how the denoted thing
is to be understood. As an unintended consequence, it also prescribed
how the word is to be used, in accordance with the truth about the
thing defined, to the extent that this word denotes this thing, the
particular denotation being a contingent fact, irrelevant to
philosophy. It was the already established linguistic turn first,
that allowed ordinary language philosophy to regard all definitions
as definitions of words. And it was the rejection then of the idea of
correspondence as a correct account of the process of meaning in
language - which was based on the rejection of the idea of the
existence of a denoted thing - that allowed ordinary language
philosophy to reject them on the ground of insufficient description
of lingual communication.2 In effect, the characteristic change is
this; whereas before, philosophy started with reflection on the
"self-evident" and the "true", and concluded with a prescription on
how social reality must be formed or how people must think, now such
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an enterprise seemed meaningless and absurd; instead, the only
correct and worthy enterprise would be to see and reflect on social
reality and the ways people think in fact, and describe this reality;
for this is all the reality or truth there is. It is not this that
must be corrected, but the past philosophic theories, as incomplete
accounts of it. 3- 4
If we are to understand The Concept of Law in accordance with
this movement, it is precisely this change that marks it as a shift
in legal philosophy. To begin with, Hart sets about to answer the
question "what is the law". There is nothing new or original about
this; it is precisely the most traditional and, perhaps, old-
fashioned question that has ever tormented legal philosophy. But Hart
thinks of the law as inextricably woven with our everyday expressions
and ways we speak. "The law" in the question to be answered is, to
begin with, a word whose meaning we must search for; not an object
which we must reflect on. The object, the reference, is the way we
think in fact; if we describe this, then we shall have answered the
question. In short, there is a reversal of understanding. The way
people think and talk of the law is the reality to be described by
the philosopher; not one to be corrected, according to the reality it
presumably corresponds to.
Before Hart, the words used in talking about the law were not as
such the object under scrutiny in jurisprudence, except in a most
instrumental way, in order to clarify communication by determining
what the referred to thing is. The notion of an obligation had little
to do with the distinction between 'being obliged' and 'having an
obligation*. The notion of the rule had little to do with the
distinction between 'acting according to a rule' and 'doing something
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as a rule'. If there was a different meaning in a particular use of a
word, it was a problem of language, possibly a defect of language,
but certainly not something for the legal philosopher to be
predominantly concerned with. Because what was searched for was the
reality or truth beyond or under the - superficial - level of our
existing conventions and understandings. If the latter happened to
correspond to this truth, so much the better. Otherwise, we would
need to change them.
Do not confuse the kind of difference I am talking about here,
with a difference between wild idealism and down to earth realistic
thinking. Nothing could be further from the point. This difference
exists equally between Hart and Blackstone, and between Hart and Alf
Ross. It is what the difference in method amounts to in the end, and
what makes The Concept of Law and linguistic Jurisprudence in general
the shift in Jurisprudence I have been talking about. I shall digress
to illustrate this difference.
Imagine looking at a primitive tribe and seeing certain religious
rituals and feasts, In order to explain them one might say that (the
people of the tribe believe that) mighty God Elrond6 will be benign
to them, if they perform these rituals, whereas he will destroy them
if they do not. Someone else might say that it has nothing to do with
God Elrond in fact; that these rituals serve in maintaining the unity
of the tribe, in giving opportunities to its members for diversion
and a chance to each to externalize his wrath safely and revel in
orgy. (Let's call this the "scientific" type of explanation). And
someone else might say that it is not God Elrond; that God Elrond is
just one of the many faces God - or the eternal good or whatever -
takes, one of the many names men have given to The One and Only, and
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that the rituals serve in reinforcing faith and the sense of
belonging for each member, suppress the tendency towards insolence
and strengthen communion and the bonds of love. (Let's call this the
"philosophic" type of explanation).7 It is common in the last two
explanations, in contrast with the first, that a reality beyond what
the people of the tribe say and think is claimed to exist, that what
these people say and think is trivial and of minor importance; it
must be surpassed - and also, it can be disregarded - for one to
reach the truth of the matter.
This is what Hart's internal point of view is all about. To see
with the eyes of a member of the tribe (but suspend belief or
acceptance, since - at this stage at least - we merely try to
understand and describe). As far as its method and general stance is
concerned, we may think of The Concept of Law as being addressed to
legal philosophers, telling them to stop trying to go beyond the
everyday conventions and understandings about the law, but instead
look into them and take them seriously. All we need to understand is
in them, not out of them. To return to my example, think of Hart as
someone coming after the "scientific" type of explanation of the
tribe's rituals has become largely dominant in contrast to the
"philosophic" type, in the activity of observing the rituals of the
tribe, and saying to those who have established the "scientific" type
and excommunicated the "philosophic" as metaphysical and fictitious:
"Wait a minute. We are making the same mistake here. And see, our
models and explanations are simple and reductive. They do not do
justice to the complexity of the tribe's practice. Look at what these
people say and think. There are so many things there, that you cannot
explain with your "maintenance of the tribe" model. We must take
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seriously what they say about God Elrond, in order to understand
their rituals."
Do not be led by my example to think that this is an outrageous
and naive suggestion. You wouldn't, if you were a member of the tribe
and happened to believe in God Elrond yourself (and remember that God
Elrond can easily be transcribed as, e.g., the rule of law, in our
case). Or, if you were concerned with the way political discussion or
the regulation of disputes within the tribe is bound with the
relevant myths; the fact that, as far as such activities are
concerned, the myths cannot be substituted with an explanation of the
"scientific" type, would make such a suggestion much more attractive.
In any case, this attitude need not lead to a naive repetition of
our everyday fictions apparently, and The Concept of Law is a proof
of this. The "internal point of view" can be used in order to further
our understanding of the ways we think and even carry them a little
further. One will probably end with an interpretation of them, that
may well be succesful in that it serves well their comprehensibility
and so their teaching, or even their function, in, e.g., political
discussion. And there will be this crucial difference with the
"scientific" type of explanation: no substitution will have taken
place, in the sense the "scientific", at least, type of explanation
calls for, with its truth claims. Instead, the discussion will have
taken place within the framework taken for granted by members of the
observed community in normal discussion of the "myths". The
interpretation will be one that can be used by these members, and,
without their having to change their old truth with a new one.
But it is not such practical thoughts that back the Hartian shift
(although they may well have a significant role in its subsequent
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wide acceptance and popularity). Behind it there is an
epistemological claim instead, one that is bound with our earlier
analysis of ordinary language philosophy, and is well expanded in P.
Winch's The idea of a Social Science: that this attitude is the
correct way to describe a society, in contrast to the "scientific"
type of explanation (or, indeed, the "philosophic") that ignores the
way the object of description thinks of itself, as if it were a
predictable object bound by mechanistic laws, in the sense this is
true of a stone falling to the earth. The social reality to be
understood and described is so bound up with the people's beliefs,
attitudes and concepts, that we cannot discard them as superfluous,
without ending with a severely distorted view of this reality. Even
more, the social reality is primarily made up of the members'
concepts and ways of thinking. And if the theorist were to apply his
own concepts and ways of thinking to the society he describes, he
would be simply bringing in his preconceptions. His language, his
logic, is valid only in his own social environment, and is bound to
hamper the desired understanding. Can it make sense to wonder whether
what the tribe calls marriage is a marriage in fact? So, it is the
members' concepts and ways of thinking that the theorist must strive
to understand, withholding, so far as possible, the concepts he has
been brought up to think in terms of. 9
In accordance then with the above, the task of linguistic
jurisprudence is to understand and describe the law as an object made
up of our ways of thinking. There is a society, namely our society,
and there is accordingly a social reality, fabricated by our rules
and conventions. In them lies the answer to what "the law" is. The
theorist who, luckily, happens to be a member himself of the social
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group concerned, can look into these conventions and find the concept
of law - and thanks to his privileged position, there is no need for
much empathy and imagination (as would be the case if he were
confronting a different culture), indeed there is not even a need
that he leave his armchair. There is only the need that he withhold
his own political choices, his own opinions on what must be done, on
what e.g. constitutes good law. For what the law is, does not depend
on any practical answers the theorist need give in advance - on the
contrary, such practical deliberation presupposes the knowledge of
the facts. What "the law" is, is a matter of existing social
convention, the theorist can see and describe.
Indeed, The Concept of Law is, among other things, "an essay in
descriptive sociology".10 And consequently, its accounts of the law,
morality, rules etc. are understood to be binding on us, not as a
result of practical, but of pure reason.11
It is these descriptive claims that I intend to clarify and
examine in Part 2. '
Words and things
...the suggestion that inquiries into the meanings of
words merely throw light on words is false. Many important
distinctions, which are not immediately obvious, between
types of social situation or relationships may best be
brought to light by an examination of the standard uses of
the relevant expressions and of the way in which these
depend on a social context, itself often left unstated. 12
...there is also great need for a discrimination of the
varieties of imperatives by reference to contextual social
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situations. To ask in what standard sorts of situation
would the use of sentences in the grammatical imperative
mood be normally classed as 'orders', 'pleas', 'requests',
'commands', 'directions', 'instructions', &c. , is a method
of discovering not merely facts about language, but the
similarities and differences, recognized in language,
between various social situations and relationships. The
appreciation of these is of great importance for the study
of law, morals, and sociology. 13
These hints about the use of linguistic analysis for the
understanding of social reality do not sound unreasonable.14 Still,
in their original context, they are left unexplained. They are
expected to be shown as justified in their application, when some
such insights into language seem to actually reveal truths about
social reality; they are expected, that is, to be shown as justified
by example (as is normally the case with common lawyers'
argumentation). ,s Here, I shall try to explain these suggestions. I
shall try to give a theoretical account explaining why it is
reasonable to say that inquiries into the meanings of words may
reveal truths about social reality.
If we examine the language we use normally, in everyday
situations without thinking much about it, i. e. not the cases of
stipulations in theoretical inquiry for instance, but rather cases
like when we speak to each other in the street, we shall see certain
distinctions of meaning (either on the level of abstract meanings or
senses of different items of speech, or on the level of concrete
meanings or different uses of the same item of speech). 16 Unlike the
cases where we deliberately use words and expressions, in order to
make such distinctions (e.g. with stipulations), the distinctions we
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see when we examine the language as it is, prior to any intervention
from us, cannot be said to be based on the will or way of thinking of
any particular user of it. They are simply there.
Some of the distinctions we discover in language, e.g. like the
one between life and death, could be explained by our knowledge of
brute facts, e.g. that men die. I6* Others though, like the one
between being obliged to do something and having an obligation to do
it, which are equally obvious and prior to our intervention, present
a problem. Having rejected the idea that meaning in language is to be
found in an alleged correspondence with some metaphysical reality, we
cannot use it to explain this independent existence of these
distinctions. In no way are they prior to language itself and its use
for communication. But then, since they are prior to each user of
language, for otherwise we could not find them by mere examination of
language, how come they exist?
This question does not ask for a case by case historical account
of the introductions of these distinctions. This would not be an
answer at all. When we meet these distinctions, they appear to our
minds to be obvious and true by themselves, and not in virtue of
their history which we normally ignore anyway. We must assume
therefore, that their existence now is independent of the ways of
their introduction.
The answer depends on considering that language does not come out
of the blue. It is a product of communication and social interaction.
Its meanings cannot be abstracted from the existence of a social
context; meaning needs such a context, or else it cannot be. And the
contexts within which language embodies the distinctions we discover,
are constructed on a base that is made up of the everyday realities
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of human life firstly, and of human thought as a by-product of this
life secondly. This base contains a) brute facts, e.g. that men die,
b) assumptions about the world, e.g. that there is a merciful and
just God, c) evaluations people typically make, e.g. that it is bad
to sleep with your sister. In accordance with these facts,
assumptions, evaluations, a network of social rules and conventions
is constructed, which accounts for the social contexts within which
meaning can take place. It is in this network that we can find the
cause, the correspondence if you wish, of all the distinctions we
meet in language. It is this network that makes up the differences
between a 'warrior' and a 'murderer', a 'man' and a 'woman', a
'command' and a * request'.'7'17*
Now, obviously, this network is prior to any particular user of
language. Each new user is educated, indeed constituted, in
accordance with the social rules and conventions - and even fictions
if you wish - that form his social environment. In this sense we may
speak of a social reality.
This network is also real from the social scientist's point of
view. Its rules and conventions account for what e.g. baptism, love,
the law, robbery or friendship are in a particular society, and vice
versa. If you want to describe this society, you must take seriously
these notions and interpretations of itself. Ideally, you should
understand them just like a member of this society does. Ie Because
social relations do not - and cannot - exist independently of the
social rules and conventions, within which, e.g. 'marriage', or
'promise', or 'agreement' can have a meaning. What would you be
describing if you refused to take into account these rules and
conventions? And what else is there, but your own ways of thinking,
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your own language, which is valid in your own social environment
only?'* Indeed, . . the social relations between men and the ideas
which men's actions embody are really the same thing considered from
different points of view...".20
We may therefore say that language reflects social reality. The
distinctions language makes are not a product of language itself, but
a recognition in language of similarities and differences that exist
in fact, at least between social situations and relationships. So,
the theorist, having identified a distinction in language, say
between 'doing something as a rule' and 'doing something in
compliance with a rule' , can take it as real and trace it to its
source. He can treat it as an indisputable evidence of social
reality.
It is of course true that only small parts, indeed hints of
social reality can be met in language stricto sensu, where the
Japanese learner of English knows what 'elephant' means, once he is
told that elephant is a quadruped so and so, or is given the picture
of one. Only parts are in this sense reflected in language,
conditioned by the way communication depends on an unstated context.
The distinctions we meet are an abstraction. But their specific
formation is due to the formation of social reality. And their having
a meaning, i. e. their existence, depends on the users' - normally
implicit or even unconscious - recognition of the unstated context,
i. e. the social reality. The more complete the reader's knowledge of
this context, the better his interpretation in language (and the
broader the conception of language we have in mind, the more we move
towards meanings like 'elephant' meaning a huge animal who is -
ridiculously - afraid of 'mice').22 It is the fact that the very
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process of interpretation and understanding in language involves the
knowledge of and reflection on the contextual social reality, that
justifies saying that we can use language to understand social
reality. Because reflection on lingual distinctions and explanation
of them will involve making explicit the context.23 In this sense,
according to which language is the complete system of meaning, thus
including the (necessary for this meaning) context, it is true that
"...our language and social relations are just two different sides of
the same coin. To give an account of the meaning of a word is to
describe how it is used; and to describe how it is used is to
describe the social intercourse into which it enters". 24 It is true
that language is social reality.
It seems reasonable then to say that through the process of
interpretation in language we arrive at a description of social
reality. As we have said, social reality is simply the ways the
people of the society concerned, typically think of objects and
relations with one another; nothing more (as the "philosophic" type
of explanation would have it) and nothing less (as would be the
understanding of the "scientific" type). And these ways of thinking
are imprinted on language. On the one side of the coin, in virtue of
language, there are the concepts of law, coercion, morality, and, at
the other side of the coin, in virtue of social reality, there are
law, coercion and morality as types of social phenomena. Linguistic
Jurisprudence takes basic typical linguistic distinctions as observed
in typical acts of communication (these distinctions are found
through revealing the contexts of these acts, which contexts exist in
virtue of their being assumed by the communicators). It then proceeds
to put them together and relate them coherently, thus resulting in
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general concepts like law, or morality. Or, to describe it from the
other side of the coin, it takes the contexts of typical concrete
utterances, in virtue of which these utterances have a meaning to be
communicated, and proceeds to put them together and relate them
coherently, thus arriving at general types of social phenomena like
law, or morality.24* It answers both the question what 'law' in
general, means (without of course prescribing how the word should be
used; this is not and cannot be part of the description), and what
law, in general, is (without of course prescribing how a system of
regulation of social conduct should be constructed; although such
prescription may be understood to be jurisprudence's subject matter
as well, this method is not enough for it). These answers are
descriptions of fact. They are correct if they depict the facts
correctly, and wrong if they do not.
We can now conclude on the ontological status of these
distinctions that we can discover in language and use as evidence for
distinctions in social reality. They do not have an "a priori"
existence for the theorist, they do not correspond to structural
categories for the possibility of thought. They are not conclusions
of analytic propositions; their truth or accuracy does not depend on
the truth or acceptance of axioms which they derive from. Instead,
they are contingent upon the social reality they reflect. They are
not logical necessities, to the same extent that social reality as we
know it is not. This social reality may be contingent upon various
evaluations, or historically determined because of or in accordance
with them. Still, the distinctions are factual, at least from our
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point of view, because they do not depend on our making the relevant
evaluations. They exist in language and we discover them there.
"A rule is not a habit" in this context
In Part 1 we examined one such distinction that is central to The
Concept of Law (or, indeed, to Hart's theory in general), namely the
distinction between convergence of behaviour in a social group and a
social rule requiring conformity of conduct. We examined it in
abstraction from the above reasoning that backs the method of
linguistic jurisprudence, i.e. the method of using lingual
distinctions as evidence for distinctions that exist in fact in our
society. We saw that it does not depict how conformity of conduct
actually takes place. We also saw that, while some people or
societies may think of their social rules in its terms, others do
not. We concluded that it is not a necessary distinction, unless a
certain way of thinking is postulated or accepted as correct in
contrast with others. Only from a certain normative point of view is
it imposed on us as a necessary universal distinction.
If we see it within the context of the clarifications we have
made here, its status as a logically necessary distinction is
irrelevant to linguistic jurisprudence. Indeed, a priori
distinctions, axioms and analytic propositions in general are rather
foreign to ordinary language philosophy, one of the major insights25
of which was to see everything as contingent on forms of life and
actual practice, while also implying a plurality of forms of life or
practices. Accordingly, the distinction between a rule and a habit is
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not to be understood as a logical, but as a factual one; yet not
factual as describing how people or societies actually behave, but
rather as describing how people think of or understand their reasons
and actions. And finally, it is not meant to describe how all people
on earth think of their reasons and actions; it refers to the people
of a particular society, namely modern Western society, who happen to
understand their behaviour and organization of their rules of social
conduct in terms of this distinction. No doubt, it would be a grossly
inaccurate description of European Medieval societies, or even actual
Japanese society.26 Certainly, in our society, this way of thinking
has been produced together with various evaluations - not all of
which need we accept today - because of certain historical changes -
which some people are naive enough to think they can grasp in a few
pages - or/and vice versa. Nevertheless, it is an indisputable truth
that today, social reality in the West has been formed in such a way
that mere convergence of behaviour is one thing and a rule requiring
it is another. As far as a social scientist is concerned, regardless
of what other normative or factual assumptions back this distinction
in our ways of thinking, it is real and independent of him, as part
of the object he tries to comprehend. Especially the understanding of
systems for the regulation of social conduct is unthinkable without
it, because of its structural character for these institutions of
ours. It exists in the same way as these institutions do. It is
independent of the theorist.
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Introduction to the complexity of the concrete
In Part 1, I gave two distinct contrary accounts of the network
of social reality (or the semiotic universe), in relation to
traditional rural societies on the one hand and modern urban ones on
the other. The first one correlates with the assimilation between a
rule and convergence of behaviour, whereas the second one with their
clear distinction. This would seem to verify the Hartian distinction,
as it is understood here.
However, these two accounts do not mean to be exclusive of each
other or complete, and certainly not to be descriptions of any
particular society. They are semiotic analyses; they trace paths of
thought. The first semiotic analysis is meant to demonstrate the
plausibility of the assimilation of a rule to a habit, whereas the
second one to account for the apparent self evidence of the
distinction today and to reveal the assumptions this correlates with.
It would be wrong to assume that they merely describe how people
think or used to think in fact. It would be a mistake to think that
only one of them applies to each particular society, depending on its
classification, that e.g. there was no individuality or
experimentation in actual traditional societies, because our
corresponding semiotic analysis is hostile to it. On the contrary,
both sets of assumptions, both ways of thinking, can be found, both
in old and in modern actual societies. If talking about actual
societies, the difference is one of dominance of one set of images
rather than its opposite, on a general level.
To put it more precisely and in relation to "our" society, which
the Hartian analysis refers to, we have said that, although we may
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take a particular set of images or assumptions, backing the
distinction between a social rule and convergence of behaviour, to be
dominant in our culture today, they are certainly not the only ones
to be found in the ways we think. If we decide to take a close look,
we shall see that depending on the part of the population or the
activity concerned, different sets of normative assumptions may be
dominant. Which means that: a) different people, depending on their
economic background, education, Job or social role, will make
different normative assumptions in general, regarding what counts as
a reason for action, and b) the same person, at different times,
depending on what he/she is doing and the way he/she structures this
action meaningfully by classifying it as part of a recognized
activity, will also make different normative assumptions, regarding
what counts as a reason for action.
Can we also say, for those cases, where a set of assumptions is
presumed, which tends to the identification of a social rule with
common practice, that nevertheless the distinction between the two is
still assumed or presupposed by the ways the actors think and speak?
That this - not analytic, not based on the observer - distinction
still describes their social reality, their social environment? This
is illogical. Or is it the case that the method of linguistic
jurisprudence only means to understand the ways of thinking that are
dominant in our culture? No, it means to understand social reality as
contextual to language; there is no enquiry regarding what happens
when this reality is in a flux, other than its recognition. 27 Or was
it perhaps a mere mistake to take the distinction between a rule and
a habit as an accurate description of social reality? But then, what
other distinction could we find, more fundamental, more basic in the
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structure of our institutions that actually describe social reality?
What distinction could we use language as evidence for, other than
distinctions based on brute facts, which we already know?
Were we wrong in our account of the relation between language and
social reality? Or are we wrong in concentrating on the "borderline"
of social reality, because this, just like language, has an "open
texture", because this, just like language is characterized by a
"penumbra of doubt"? Is it perhaps true that we should build the
model of our social reality first on the central cases, like when
intellectuals reflect in their armchairs, and distinguish the
borderline cases, like when people identify themselves politically as
part of the catholic community, or as vegetarians?29 I think there is
a better answer.
The social reality
As we have seen, the method of description of the social, backing
the conceptual claims of linguistic Jurisprudence, rests on the
existence of a social reality. This amounts to a network of
assumptions that the members of a particular society take for granted
and on which the contexts of their meaningful utterances are built.
It is real for the members, because it forms their social
environment, according to which they are constituted (through the
processes of learning and socialization in general), and it is also
real for the social scientist, because a) it exists independently of
him, and b) there is no one reality, truth, Reason, in terms of which
this one is to be understood and explained; only various such social
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realities, ways of thinking, rules constitutive of different games.
How did we arrive at this network? By language. Words have
meanings. We use words and we communicate. We speak and we understand
each other. We asserted the existence of a common network of
prefabricated understandings and assumptions, a language as an
encyclopedia, in explanation of the fact of communication.
But does communication always take place? Does it not happen for
people not to understand each other? Can't misunderstandings take
place, even though both poles of the attempted communication are
members of the same society, have been educated in the same way,
speak the same language, and in spite of their both having access to
the same external information? But how can this happen?
It's simple. There is not one context that corresponds to each
utterance, or attempt at communication. There are many and they may
contradict each other. The network, social reality, is not a coherent
interpretation of the world, it is not a theory, it is not the rules
of one game. It is a bunch of contrary assumptions, wishes,
evaluations, some of which are more appropriate for some games than
for others. Each one of us, depending on class, profession,
disposition, picks some of them, normally unconsciously, and rejects
others (thus building his/her particular logic and language, which
may be more or less coherent). Furthermore, we often pick
contradictory ones for different activities or games. 30 I shall try
to give an example.
I drove the car to our destination in the centre of Athens and
proceeded to park it right there, in front. My friend sitting next to
me said "you shouldn't park here" and I understood what he said, not
because of some mysterious internal correspondence of his utterance
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to the car or my possibilities, or of the words to independent
realities, but because I saw the "no parking" sign and I share some
knowledge with regards to traffic regulation, and some assumption
that one must not park where it is illegal to do so. But then my
other friend said from the back of the car that "it's alright; no
traffic-policemen ever come here" and his utterance had a meaning in
virtue of another assumption, that you may park, or that you may take
the risk, regardless of traffic signs to the contrary, if there is
little danger that you'll be fined, and of some other knowledge
regarding the difficulty to find a parking space in the centre of
Athens, the unreliability and inconvenience of the public means of
transportation and the general tolerance as a consequence and as a
part of a general "why bother" attitude. And my first friend replied
"I know, but it's a bus turn here" and his utterance had a meaning,
in virtue of another assumption that you must not park in places
where the inconvenience you'11 cause to others will be more extreme
than usual. All these assumptions co-exist in the seraiotic universe
of car drivers in Athens and they are not rationally ordered or
exclusive of each other; some people will make one of them most of
the time, some people another; most people will make one of them in
general, but will make another one ad hoc sometimes, depending on
specific disposition. Any one of them may be taken to supersede the
others in any concrete exchange. One may mean one assumption to
exclude the rest in one discourse or in one particular exchange; the
same man may mean another assumption to be the only one important in
another discourse, or in another particular exchange. 31
We were right in assuming a network of assumptions and social
rules, constituting our social reality. But we were wrong in tacitly
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assuming that it is simple and non-contradictory, that it is
something like a theory, and that therefore, we can describe it by
making inferences from one assumption to the next. Simplicity and
internal agreement is a desideratum. It is an attribute an argument
or a theory ought to exhibit (at least insofar as it is to be
comprehensible and easy to master). It is not a necessary
characteristic of reality. Yet, by starting with communication, we
postulated consistency and agreement. We postulated that is, that
friendship, love, the law, in our language, each refers to one
particular thing, which exists in virtue of our community of
assumptions and understandings. We brought conceptualism in by having
rejected it. But we make different and even contrary assumptions on
different occasions. And some people make some assumptions in
general, while others make contrary ones. And all these assumptions
pre-exist the individual, for they are all narratives in the semiotic
universe.
This gives us the key to the explanation of change and evolution
in this social reality, or our ways of thinking. Notice that the
epistemology we are examining here, although not only admitting of
the fact that ways of thinking, social rules and concepts change, but
based on a philosophy that constantly emphasizes the plurality of
ways of thinking and "logics", is nevertheless at a loss when it
comes to explaining such a change and to understanding the occasional
gradual passing from one way of thinking to another.31* Indeed, all
it can say, is that in one society, e.g. puritan England, this social
understanding and these social rules obtain, e. g. with regard to
relations between the sexes, and elaborately construct a
consistent, of course - context in understanding the relation and the
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concept of say pure spiritual love, which is distinct from indecent
physical urges. It can also say that in today's society this
distinction does not exist, and in the same way "describe" how we
think of love today, what love is today in our society. It would most
certainly warn today's social scientist that he should not extend
today's measures to puritan English society, that otherwise he would
fail to understand that society, which is what a social scientist
should aim to do. But it would be incapable to explain how it
happened for the one social understanding, relation and concept to be
abandoned and for another to emerge; it would be incapable to show
this evolution. Its descriptions are totally static. It is unaware of
the dimension of time.
But really, how can such a change take place? What happened when
D.H.Lawrence rejected the notion of proper spiritual love, in favour
of a more humane concept? What happens when anyone challenges given
assumptions and social rules? Do they misunderstand the social
relations, their social reality? Is it a mistake? Were they not
socialized well? And how can they do it, how can they be understood?
By divine enlightenment? Well, no. For would it not be absurd to
think that in the actual society we refer to as "puritan English" no
couple ever managed to enjoy sex, without their thinking at the same
time of their act as abominable and of each other as degenerate
perverts? It is simply wrong to think that there is only one
understanding of e.g. a social situation or relationship, only one
concept for it, in the semiotic universe, in the language of any
social group. It is simply wrong to think that there is ever one type
only of social phenomenon to be perceived. Perhaps it will be the
case that one more or less specific concept, one particular
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interpretation will be more prominent, in that on most occasions most
of the people will be guided by it rather than by any other in their
behaviour, will assume this rather than any other in their acts of
communication. But it will not be the only one available to them, it
will not be their only possibility of thought (for otherwise it would
be impossible for them to be conscious of). A semiotic universe
always displays this fundamentally contradictory character. That for
each idea there is an opposite one; that for each conceptual
distinction there is a unity and vice versa (for none would be
conceivable without the existence of the other). Often one idea will
be taken for granted in a certain communication, which regards
something other than this idea; often one idea will be taken for
granted in many or most such communications, in a certain time and
place. We might deem it to be dominant. But everything can be
challenged, everything can change. And the change is always a
reversal of dominance, for nothing can come from nothing and, in this
sense, there is nothing new under the sun.
Language reflects social reality, our ways of thinking. It is
just as many sided. 32 It is not a well ordered game. It is our
possibilities. There is not one concept or meaning for each word or
sets of words. There are possibilities of meaning for us to make and
concepts for us to choose.
A preliminary conclusion
We have thus explained the fact that our ways of thinking, our
given assumptions can change, by rejecting a "strict" descriptive
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model of social reality, according to which there are determined
rules and conventions and so, even though this is contingent to the
particular social group and its logic, social understandings and
relations being concrete and ordered, words have certain references
and concepts are real. We adopted a chaotic model instead, where the
social understandings and relations are diverse and contradictory and
where the words have different meanings, the concepts are results of
opposed interpretations, and even though some are more prominent than
others, they are all real in the same way as far as the social
scientist is concerned, in their being possibilities of thought.
According to the first model, A can only be or mean B. According to
the second model, for every A there is a -A, and A can be or mean B,
C, or D, where B, C and D are not necessarily compatible and where A
is not necessarily distinct from B or C or D. In plain words, the
ways of thinking, the assumptions each individual is educated and
socialized in accordance with, are not simple, but are instead
intricate and fundamentally contradictory.32" There is not one set of
social rules and conventions but many. For each assumption there also
is an opposite one. For each utterance there are diverse contexts and
so interpretations.
This explains perfectly our account of the ways people think
about reasons for action: for any culture at any time, we should
expect to find both the distinction between a rule and convergence of
behaviour, and its negation, interlocked in a dialectic antagonistic
relation (at least if we were to encounter one of the pair). It also
fits with our account of the process of meaning: indeed, this does
not depend on any correspondence with independent external reality,
but on derivation from a constructed social reality. However, it does
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not support the claim that when one takes certain lingual
distinctions and constructs a more general account in which the
lingual distinctions will fit and so by which they will be explained,
one is simply describing the social reality, the ways those people
happen to think. Such an account will be an interpretation, internal
to the social reality "described", which could be defended as correct
or attacked as wrong, depending on which - also internal - point of
view a participant were to decide to adopt.
The argument from the central cases33
However, the strict descriptive model of social reality we have
rejected is not necessarily the one assumed or projected by the
method of linguistic jurisprudence. Linguistic jurisprudence can deal
with the possibility of change, 3* through the distinction between the
central cases of meaning in language, where meaning is fairly certain
and concrete, and the surrounding open texture, where there are
various possibilities of meaning.35 The social rules and conventions
that arise from the base of assumptions are determined only up to an
extent. References of utterances in simple relations of
straightforward equivalence exist and so do corresponding concepts,
but neither for all conceivable applications, nor for all future
applications (since our world is too complicated and so are our ways
of thinking and our reasons for action, our aims).36 For every A
there may be various interpretations B, C or D in an indefinite
amount of applications or contexts, but there also is an equally
indefinite amount of applications (the central cases, or the
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paradigms), where no interpretations can be admitted, where A is B.
The network of rules and conventions is not contradictory as such,
though it can be, depending on the case; it is not the whole of the
possibilities of thought.
Naturally, there are contrary ways of thinking, contrary social
rules and concepts in any given society, because the education and
socialization of the society's members has itself an open texture.
Where there is a contradiction of this type, none of the contrary
possibilities are included in the network of conventions, for these
are understandings that are common among the members of the society,
and it is their common character that is indispensable for the
explanation of communication this network is meant to make. Of
course, any of them might admit of change sooner or later, which
means that indeed there are opposed assumptions as possibilities in
the semiotic universe of the members of the society. Which simply
means that we must not identify social reality and the network of
conventions we have been talking about, with the semiotic universe.
Social reality consists of the ways the people of the society
typically think (and not of the ways they are able to think). Not
every assumption, rule, possibility in general that can be found in
the semiotic universe, is also part in the formation of social
reality. Who will distinguish among them? Well, the members of the
society do it themselves, when they speak with each other and prima
facie, i.e. unless they know differently about how the other party
thinks, take some assumptions, some rules for granted and proceed
from them, even though they may disagree with them personally,
possibly even to reject them in the end. Often it might be impossible
to say that one assumption is or is not real as part of the social
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reality, but this is due to the penumbra of doubt of the issue itself
which assumptions are and which are not common in this sense. The
question what must the percentage of the people of a society who
reveal a certain assumption in their conscious behaviour be, in order
for this assumption to be included in the network, cannot be
answered. But some assumptions that are included can always be
identified, like the ones distinguishing in our society regularity of
behaviour, from obligation towards a certain conduct.
In conclusion, of course there are different possibilities of
meaning for us to make and concepts for us to choose. But certain
ones among them are real, in the sense that the people around us take
them for granted, behave in terms of them, and communicate in terms
of them, although not all naturally of these people, although not all
of the times any one among them. The social scientist, par
excellence, has to take them as real and describe them, because to
discuss, criticize and possibly reject them is a matter of political
discussion, which, although by all means at least equally honourable,
is not what he does. (And what he does is a prerequisite of and not
an obstacle to political discussion, etc. etc.).
So, we have admitted in connection with the chaotic model of
social reality, that in a particular time and place, although various
contradictory assumptions and concepts are available to the members
of the community through their seraiotic universe, some of them are
more prominent in that they will normally be taken for granted.
According to the above line of reasoning, we may rest on this
norm(ality), in order to substitute the picture of a semiotic
universe in which some ways of thinking are dominant over others,
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with the picture of a social reality and its possibilities of change.
Now, with this substitution, and the corresponding change in the
meaning of 'social reality', the descriptive claims we are examining
are seriously modified. For we cannot say that the exceptional or not
dominant assumptions are less real than the normal ones. Think of it
this way: How many Fiats are manufactured every day, and how many
Rolls-Royces? Does this make a Rolls-Royce any less real than a Fiat?
In the same way, we have concluded that not only the distinction
between a rule and the fact of social conformity, but also the
assimilation of the two, can be seen in our ways of thinking, even
though the assimilation may be less usual in our modern world. The
distinction then alone, cannot be said to depict what a rule actually
is, in the sense we have analysed in our exposition of the method of
linguistic jurisprudence.
This is enough to undermine any strong claim of linguistic juris¬
prudence's to a descriptive sociology. If the idea is to be
maintained that the method of linguistic jurisprudence serves for a
clarification of what, e.g. law, is in fact, then the argument from
the central cases cannot be used. Because, if by "the members' ways
of thinking" we only mean their most usual ways of thinking, we can
no longer maintain the claim that in the members' ways of thinking we
will also see what their social relations actually are.
However, even with this more restricted object of description,
the claim is still maintained that we have a mere description, that
linguistic jurisprudence's conclusions do not depend on any
evaluations of the theorist's, that they are results of pure reason.
Although they cannot really be seen as sociological assertions, they
are seen to be descriptions of what might be called the content of
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our existing agreement within language, as this agreement is
presupposed for the possibility of communication.
And this is what makes the argument of the central cases, more
attractive as a model of language, than the chaotic model: the actual
and expectable occurrence of lingual communication is rendered easily
explicable, through its placement within pre-established rules.
Cultural fragmentation
One possible reply to the argument from the central cases (and
one I have heard often being advanced against theories of agreement)
is that it disregards the actual situation of the (post)-modern
world. It may be true that there is a coherent and common network of
assumptions, such as is described in the previous section, in smaller
and simpler societies. However, this is not the case in our society,
because of the phenomenon of cultural fragmentation.
A. Exposition
In any of today's big cities - and in contrast with small
traditional villages - we can experience a radical plurality of ways
of thinking, styles and attitudes. There is an immense
differentiation between people today. Doctors speak and think
differently from lawyers; both speak and think differently from
unskilled workers. Or take teenage gangs in the streets. Athletes.
Lesbian feminists. Reporters. Computer buffs. Politicians. Pakistani
immigrants. Loaded pop singers. Conservative heirs of the old
nobility of the land. Inhabitants of shanty-towns around the big
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city. A network of common assumptions you said?
Maybe, the reason is the extreme division of labour. Maybe it is
the lack of interaction between people. Maybe extreme material
inequality. Maybe the profusion of means of communication or the lack
of time for it. Maybe it is the great numbers of people, the motley
masses of today's societies. Maybe it is the primacy of the
individual, the freedom of choice and self-constitution it entails.
The fact remains that the common ideology and way (or form) of life
that existed in traditional close-knit communities, the coherent
social reality linguistic jurisprudence assumes, has disintegrated.
It is now fragmented in many social realities, constituted in
accordance with different social environments. People in our society
lead diverse lives. To postulate a common network of assumptions in
modern western society, is to assume that both the philosopher in his
Oxonian armchair and the Puerto-Rican teenager in the slums of New
York have been brought up in the same environment and have been
educated in the same way. And this is patently absurd. The social
reality of the law - as well as the concept of law - is quite
different for the two of them, and you don't need elaborate
philosophic and conceptual theories to see this. What you are doing
in assuming common languages and central cases - in your image - in
modern western society, is hiding away the diversity, behind a veil
of white middle-class Englishmen (for the benefit naturally of the
better off).
Explanation of communication through a common language? What
communication, what common language? There is no communication any
more. This is the tower of Babel.
And how curious, that at the end of modernity, at the last stage
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of the extinction of communication (and any remaining general
political participation), all these theories should arise pointing to
a common language, communication, a common social reality, and even
objectivity in practical reasoning. Secluded intellectuals stand on
common language as dictionary, and point to a common language as
encyclopedia, which in fact has disintegrated. They use the
possibility of communication as a means of persuasion - of themselves
- while communication is actually missing. But this is precisely the
point. When widespread communication actually existed, there was no
need for its possibility to be taken into account. There was no need
for one to base one's theory of agreement and stability on common
language. Language and communication were taken for granted. There
were no elaborate philosophies about the meaning in language. Why
should there be? Meaning was a simple matter and abstract concepts
were fairly certain. It is in this century, when our disagreements
have reached the utmost common basis of language, that we have so
much theory on it. (At least now there is still enough agreement for
us to be able to disagree - on a superficial level; for in order to
disagree, one must understand first. Next, there won't be even
this. )37
B. Assessment
According to the above line of reasoning, we must accept the
chaotic model of social reality as a correct description of modern
western society. The chaotic model is not shown to be correct
analytically, as an account of meaning and language. It happens to be
accurate, insofar as we are speaking of the method of linguistic
jurisprudence and its claim that there is one central case of e.g.
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"law" In virtue of our common language, because, the otherwise
acceptable distinction between the semiotic universe and the social
reality, has no effect for our pluralistic society. In modern western
society there are many incompatible such social realities, with the
consequence that merging them in order to produce one body of
assumptions in which to search for the concept of e.g. law, would
result in something corresponding to the picture presented by the
chaotic model.
Consequently, this argument does not examine the epistemological
assumptions of linguistic jurisprudence, that we are interested in.
Despite the rhetoric, the method of linguistic jurisprudence is not
shown to be wrong, only inappropriate for an object like modern
western society. The existence of sets of central cases per language
is not refuted; it is merely asserted that there are more than one
language in our society. We might as well say for instance that The
Concept of Law is contingent on the community of lawyers within
modern western society, rather than on modern western society in
general. The conclusions of linguistic jurisprudence are equally
binding as results of pure reason, insofar as we are lawyers, rather
than insofar as we are - say - Europeans.
Cultural fragmentation is a sociological conclusion. Even though
we may agree with it, sociological observations cannot refute
conceptual philosophic analyses (although they can "show the emperor
to be naked"). They themselves are based on and presuppose such
conceptual analyses. The whole argument is based on the rejection of
one factual premise, namely communication. In order for the assertion
that there is no communication to make a difference for the method
itself of linguistic jurisprudence, rather than for its application
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to modern western society (or its allure for a modern western
reader), it would have to be meant in a different sense; it would
have to be asserted either that communication is impossible (which is
a pragmatically self refuting proposition), 3e or, that it is actually
a random event that e. g. the newsagent - whose social reality is
different from mine - happens to give me a packet of cigarettes when
I ask for one (which proposition is plainly wrong). As things stand,
the sociological observation we have presented is itself in need of a
theoretical analysis of communication, regulating when it is correct
to say that there is no communication and what is meant by this.39
Analytically, the model of social reality that is based on the
distinction between the central cases and the penumbra, still seems
to be superior to the chaotic model, in that, by retaining the simple
character of the network of social rules and conventions, it can
account for and explain the fact, that lingual communication not only
occurs, but can be certain to occur, even across different social
backgrounds. It looks then that everything is turning around
communication. So, it is with communication that we shall now concern
ourselves, having assumed the chaotic model for social reality.
Communication
A. Communication in general
"There is not one concept or meaning for each utterance. There
are possibilities of meaning for us to make and concepts for us to
choose." Is then communication an event that may happen or not at
random?
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Consider these examples. There is the communication I can have
with anyone who speaks French, and there is the communication I can
have with whomever speaks my mother tongue. There is the
communication I can have with a 60 year old peasant who has never
left his village, and the communication I can have with someone my
age who's lived all his life in the city. There is the communication
I can have with someone I meet for the first time, and the
communication I can have with someone I've lived all my life with.
So far, we have been talking about communication as a simple
event that either takes place or doesn't. Communication in general is
a matter of degree, though. There are various factors on which the
degree of communication between any two people will depend, like
common age or background, the existence of previous attempts at
communication etc. And there will always be some degree of
communication, in at least that both poles will (happen to) exclude
certain meanings, even if only by simply not considering them. If we
disregard each communicator's situation, regarding the factors on
which the degree of communication depends, if, that is, with respect
to these factors we pick people at random, the degree of communi¬
cation among them - as far as their first attempts are concerned -
will be random. But the degree of communication is not of course
random with respect to these factors. How is this dependence to be
explained?
By a network of rules, by a base of common assumptions, indeed.
The more the assumptions we happen to make in common, the higher the
degree of communication. Whether we make common assumptions depends
on how similar the lives we've led are and on the extent to which we
(have to) interact, both factors being interdependent. The more we
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play our games together, the more we shall have a common language;
the more I communicate with my computer, the more I shall have a
personal language. Which games we happen to play, how they are
constituted, depends on the requirements the environment places on
us. And our environment not only forms but is also formed by our
communication, our interaction, in that it also consists in pre¬
existing games, in our social reality. 33m
However, the specific community of assumptions guaranteeing some
possibilities of communication will not be the same for any two
individuals living permanently e.g. in Britain. People lead different
lives, people are brought up in and construct different social
environments, How much do I, a Greek bourgeois intellectual, have in
common with Mr Auld who came today to fix my roof that's been
leaking? Should it appear strange that I find it difficult to
understand, when he is talking about slates and copper ties (even
though I (think I) know what a slate is; - from pictures)? And what
if I started to speak of semiotic analyses, or "Le Chien Andalou"
that I watched the other day?
Should we say then that in our society there are many social
realities, e.g. the social reality of the working class and that of
the bourgeoisie, the social reality of the young and that of the old,
just as the sociologist asserts when speaking of cultural
fragmentation? Consider another example.
Mr Yamamoto, an old Japanese tourist in Italy, is walking around
in Palermo. He gets thirsty. He enters a "gelateria" and, a little in
his totally incomprehensible native language, a little in his equally
incomprehensible few words of English, and a little in desperate
puzzling gestures, he attempts to ask Giuseppe, the waiter, who
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understands neither Japanese nor English, for a glass of water.
Giuseppe gives him a glass of water, Mr Yamamoto says "arigatd" and
Giuseppe says "prego".
For each factor on which the degree of communication among any
two individuals will depend, we may speak of another semiotic
universe, another language, another logic, that guarantees certain
possibilities of communication. Indeed, I have a common language with
people my age who have lived all their lives in the city, which I
don't share with old peasants who have never left their small
villages. I have a common language with someone I've lived all my
life with, which I don't share with someone I meet for the first
time. However, I also have a common language with all humans who,
like me, need to eat and drink from time to time (and cannot drink
petroleum for instance), who need to socialize somewhat, who may be
sad or happy, etc., which I don't share with - say - Martians.
Should we say that in "our society" there is not one social
reality but many? Well, we might. But this would not be true in
virtue of the external facts, but in virtue of how we wished to see
them. From one point of view it is true that each person has his/her
personal language.390 From another point of view, all humans (at
least) share the same language. And this is not Independent of the
theorist.
B. Communication in concreto
Before going on, we must safeguard ourselves from the critique
that we have taken 'communication' in a sense different from the one
assumed in the exposition of the method of linguistic jurisprudence.
It is in a sense admitting of no degrees that we spoke earlier of a
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certainty that lingual communication will occur.
Indeed, we also speak of communication as a result, as a success
or a failure. This depends on the fact that there may be some degree
of communication which will be necessary for a certain purpose. From
the point of view of him who - or the game that - poses the purpose,
communication - in concreto - may take place or fail. When I ask the
newsagent for a packet of cigarettes, it is irrelevant with regard to
my or our purpose(s) whether we assume the same views in connection
with the idea and the role of cigarettes in fashion, the danger they
pose for health, or the rights of the non smoker. 40 How does it
happen that we can achieve the degree of communication we need each
time, despite the fact that we (may) have different backgrounds
leading to the formation of different networks of assumptions, of
personal languages?
Well, some of it just happens. But, depending on our anticipation
that the other party may assume or fail to assume certain things
wrongly, depending on our expectations regarding the probable
formation of the other party's language, game, logic, and also
depending on the occasional manifestation of a misunderstanding, we
make explanations, definitions, stipulations, thus excluding or
specifying certain assumptions, and thus making our utterances
relatively more rigid, in order to achieve this success in
communication. We also change our assumptions, by adjusting through
this activity, depending on the degree of communication needed, or
our need for communication in general. Language is not a system of
interconnected boxes, not anymore than it is flowing water.41 We
expand and restrict our ways of speaking all the time, depending on
whom with and what about we are talking.
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Communication in concreto is not pre-established within language.
We use language, in order to achieve the communication we need.
The social group
The idea of a social group has a very important though unapparent
role in the method and claims of linguistic jurisprudence. This is
the point where the search for the concept of law is understood to
have its strong hold on palpable reality, this is where the claim of
uncommitted positivistic analysis and description of the law is
based. The theorist studies the social reality, which is independent
of him, because it is constructed by the ways of thinking relative to
a particular social group. At the end of the day, it is the
independent existence of the social group, that is assumed to
validate the claim, that the results of linguistic jurisprudence have
nothing to do with political argument, but are results of pure
reason. The social group is understood to be a simple safe thing,
which one is ultimately referring to.
We have been speaking quite often of a social group or a society,
as the point to which the arguments were anchored. And so far, we
have taken this notion for granted, as if it were safe ground. Yet
the analysis of communication must have led us to suspect, that this
is not exactly the case.
"The social reality that the theorist studies is independent of
him, because constructed by the ways of thinking relative to a
particular social group". For the purposes of the examination of this
claim, 'social group' may mean different things. On the one hand, it
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may merely denote an aggregation, a bunch of people, in certain
spatiotemporal coordinates. This we shall call "aggregate" (of
people). On the other hand, it may mean a union of people, where the
people are members of a group (this we shall call "society"); or, it
may mean a community, where people can understand each other, they
speak the same language (this we shall call "community"). By
contrast, it cannot be a type of social group, in the sense of ideal
type.
A. Ideal type (distinguishing the Weberian method of sociology)
Having concluded in Part 1 that the distinction between
convergence of behaviour and a social rule is not in any way
universal or analytically necessary (unless normatively presupposed),
we started our examination of the descriptive claims of linguistic
jurisprudence, on the basis of the recognition, that linguistic
jurisprudence does not understand this distinction to be universally
true, but simply contingently accurate as corresponding to the ways
people of modern Western society happen to think. Take this term,
'modern Western society'. Often, when we use it, we do not have in
mind geographical and temporal borders and the actual people within
them, Instead we understand it as referring to general conditions
that we think obtain in these borders, like relative abundance of
food, the primacy of the individual, traffic Jams, specialization in
work, etc., in contrast with the conditions that we think obtain
elsewhere, e.g. in traditional societies or in the third world. Thus
we may say "France is a modern Western society" to indicate what type
of society France is.
Yet, we completely disregarded this possibility throughout this
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Part. We have assumed modern Western society to be a particular
society and not a type of society. We have said that the social
reality linguistic jurisprudence speaks of, is constructed by the
ways of thinking relative to a particular social group, rather than a
type of social group. I shall give my reasons for this here. In so
doing, I mean to distinguish the Weberian method of sociological
analysis, from the method of linguistic jurisprudence. For, although
the Weberian method has been related to the latter through its
prescription of "understanding" as the approach of sociology,42 and
to Hart's notion of the internal point of view, 43 it is not actually
part of the epistemological background of linguistic jurisprudence.
The philosophy prior to Weber's method has nothing to do with
ordinary language philosophy.
The Weberian method is the method of understanding and describing
social change, through the use of ideal types. 44 These are
abstractions from reality (meaning what can be seen, in contrast to
what can be deduced on the base of axiomatic transcendental
suppositions) constructed by the theorist as tools for analysis and
description on an abstract level. As such, although they are quite
elaborate and detailed, i. e. they are not abstract in the sense that
they achieve a wide applicability through discarding unnecessary
detail, they are purified from those details that exist in fact in
any concrete instance - according to Hegel's dialectic46 - and which
tend to contradict what the theorist wants to point at. Nevertheless,
they may be applied to the facts, depending on the theorist's line of
reasoning, and the way this line of reasoning is meant to apply.
Although an ideal type may refer to particular instances, it does not
have to correspond to them; the particular instances will generally
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contain elements that contradict the type, should the type be -
wrongly - taken to be a description of some instance(si.
An exanple: It might be appropriate within some theoretical framework to
classify Margaret's buying a Christmas present for her husband as a
traditional (or perhaps value-rational) action, even though at the same
time a) she has a related expectation regarding what her husband will buy
for her, b) she thinks she should not be so good to him, for he is still
seeing that young bitch with the big boobs, c) she generally hates
Christmas presents altogether, because of the hassle they entail each
time (but, "in fact", because when she was a kid she felt neglected and
jealous, when her younger brother got better (or better in her eyes)
presents from her parents than she did), d) she actually wants to be
noticed and have her ego confirmed by the young clerk who is serving her,
To point out all these contradictions in the actual instance would mean
nothing, either for the classification of Margaret's action (unless some
implication to the contrary were entailed by the theoretical framework),
or for the ideal types of value-rational and traditional action,
Modern Western society as such a type, need not correspond to actual
e. g. Edinburgh society, even though it might be correct to
characterize this particular society as modern Western, in a line of
reasoning that contrasted it with e. g. Marakesh. And so, it might
well be said, for instance, that modern Western society is
characterized by a strict distinction between a social rule and
general regularity of behaviour, even though this distinction does
not apply to the actual behaviour or way of thinking of people in
Britain sometimes, or some people in Britain most of the time. One
might say this in order to point to or try to explain certain
differences from what the case was in older times, even though it
would be wrong to assume that in actual traditional societies the
distinction between a social rule and general regularity of behaviour
never applies to anyone's behaviour or way of thinking.
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The epistemological background of Weber's sociology is not
ordinary language philosophy. The traditional claims to knowledge of
the truth about the reality or the world as a whole rather than the
reality according to this social group, this social group's world,
have not been discarded. 46 This method of sociology does not expect
to get any results from observation of and reflection on social
reality, that are independent of some frame of thought, some logic,
that stems from the theorist as (cognising) subject.47'48 A priori
distinctions, axioms and analytic propositions are not foreign to it.
On the contrary it abounds with stipulations, and definitions that
presuppose a certain logic, a Reason.484 The concepts are not taken
by the theorist from the reality he observes, they are not posterior
to the understanding of social reality. They are constructed and
controlled by the theorist.4011 There is a difference between what the
theorist calls, or refers to as e.g. legal, and what the members of
the society understand as legal (actually or according to their
conventions). We are expected to accept the concept not as part of an
observed social reality, but because based on a certain presupposed
logic. In Gellner's terminology, this method assumes the First Person
approach.49
By contrast, the epistemological claims we examine in this Part
are based on ordinary language philosophy, which tends to reject as
metaphysical any claims to universal truth, based on a logic that is
presupposed independently of its actual participation in and
derivation from a form of life. Social reality then, is here prior to
logic (and tends to become the only reality as far as the social
scientist is concerned). There are as many logics as there are forms
of life and there is no instrument to distinguish one among them as
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correct; there isn't one Reason. There is only the form of life we
happen to participate in, the game we happen to play, our language.
Obviously then, the social scientist is expected to take as prior the
social reality he wants to describe. It is through it that any logic
can be reached; not vice versa. To presuppose a Reason would be to
impose on the people one observes a different logic from their own;
to fail to understand the "tribe's" language; to severely distort the
social reality in one's account of it.so's'
The correct attitude here is to examine actual communication in
order to reach the rules and conventions it presupposes, if meaning
is to take place through/in actual utterances. The logic is not prior
to it, in the sense that the theorist already masters it and applies
it in the process of understanding social reality; it is contingent
to social reality, it is part of it. Understanding this social
reality involves understanding this logic or language. Therefore, the
concepts are not prefabricated by the theorist. Indeed, how could
they be? Where would they be based? If they are to have a meaning
they will need each time a context of assumptions and conventions,
which will be either the one presupposed by the members of the
society observed and - therefore - contingent on the social reality
to be understood, in which case the concepts will be the ones the
people to be described generally use, or some other, contingent on
some other game, in which case the concepts will hamper the desired
"understanding" of this game. What the law is, is how the people of
the society think about it; there is no truth or reality beyond this.
Ideal types have no place in this epistemology. For ideal types
are nothing but a particular category of concepts constructed by the
theorist and based on him as cognising subject, as the Weberian
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episteraology allows. In the Third Person approach, there is no base
for such abstractions from the social reality, because there is no
logic that is independent of it. The abstractions which are allowed
for, are abstractions that exist independently of the theorist within
the social reality already, as part of the way the members of the
social group concerned think.52 Modern Western society cannot
therefore be an ideal type here. It can only refer to an abstraction
that is contingent on some game, language, social reality, presumably
the one we expect to understand. It therefore rests on and is part of
the way the members of the observed social group think, the
assumptions they actually take for granted in their processes of
communication. So linguistic jurisprudence is correctly assumed to
refer to a particular social group and not an (ideal) type of social
group. 63
(What if we discarded the background of ordinary language
philosophy, and understood the social group referred to, as the base
of linguistic jurisprudence's method, to be an ideal type? Then
everything we said on social reality and its chaotic character, on
actual communication etc. would be beside the point. Indeed, the
distinction between a rule and a habit could well be assumed to be
included in the type, which means that, in spite of what we derived
from our exposition of the method of linguistic jurisprudence, it
would be analytic for The Concept of Law. However, in a context such
as Weber's sociology, it would make little sense to begin a search
for the concept of law such as Hart does, in the first place. One
would probably just stipulate what 'law' denotes in one's work. One
might well (need) give reasons too (in terms of the purposes of the
work concerned), why this definition and not some other, rather than
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assume that one is merely describing what the law is in point of
contingent fact. (This should not be taken to mean that Hart in
particular gives no such reasons). Because then, looking for the
right concept would mean looking for one's reasons rather than trying
to match the group's practice.)53*
Bl. Community54
Insofar as we are together, we have things in common. We have
common interests and aims. We have common problems, which we need to
solve in common. We must communicate, reach agreement, in order to
take common decisions. Pre-existing agreements entail common
assumptions, serving for further communication. Thus, we play the
same games, we speak the same language, we understand each other, we
have a community.
However, not everything we have, must we have in common; we may
well have divergent interests and aims. Not every decision has to be
a common one. In a given aggregate of people, some decisions will be
taken by all together, some by particular groupings, some by
individuals. 55 Different degrees of communication shall one need,
with different people, at different times, for different matters. And
in any case, we do not have to agree, we don't have to stay together;
we may choose to go away. To the extent that we need not, or choose
not to, try to agree, we may play different games, speak different
languages, have no community.
Once a community has been the starting point of the theorist's
investigation, the assertion, that there are central cases of
certainty, based on communication, follows with no problems. Not even
the argument, that we are dissimilar and may disagree, can be
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advanced; because it has been postulated that we are the same: the
theorist is looking at agreement.
The existence of a penumbra of uncertainty also follows. Although
we, as members of a community, agree on what is good, what we want,
for every given set of external circumstances, nevertheless, future
circumstances are never predetermined, with the consequence that for
a new set of circumstances, for a new problem, we will not know what
we want. 56 A new problem calls for new discussion, communication,
re-establishment of agreement, decision. And anyway, we may not know
what we want, simply because we want things that appear contradictory
in given applications.
In short, contingent to a community, there will be a simple
reality, a coherent view of the world, a logic, that can be stated
with a claim to accurate exposition. And this reality will change
with time, through new common discussion and re-establishment of
agreement, to the extent that, the environment, the problems and each
individual member, change and change each other.
So, when is there a community around us, that the theorist can
start from, to analyse its language, and "describe" accordingly the
"social phenomena" he is after? Well, always and never. This is not
prior to the viewer. It should be obvious by our discussion of
communication that whether we shall see one community, as well as
whether we shall see only one community, for a given aggregate of
people, is not decided by the external facts. It's like looking at a
triangle on a piece of paper; you can see it either hanging or
standing. 67
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- But isn't this taking the point too far? Sureiy there are
aggregates that constitute communities and where it would be a
violation of the term 'community' to say otherwise. If you were to
deny the application of 'community' to a small primitive tribe for
example, where would you use it?se How much communication do you need
or expect? Isn't this relevant?
No, it is not taking the point too far. One might well think and
say that there is no community in this world at all, without
violating the term (or the facts). This would simply be a result of
one's requiring an extreme degree of togetherness and communication,
which is of course relevant. Which brings us precisely to the point.
There may be a rule setting standards (either in terms of
paradigms or in terms of abstract categories) as to when an aggregate
of people shall constitute one community. This will amount e. g. to a
stipulation, that an aggregate of small size, with a certain type of
proximity of its members, created by co-existence and where the
members participate in common rather than separate activities, shall
be characterized as a community. We might think that such a rule -
i.e. the predetermined deduction of the members' agreement from the
listed facts - might be reasonable; i.e. that there are reasons for
it. For in asserting this, we would be probably presuming certain
(normative) ideas about human nature, regarding what kind of
communication we generally need or achieve, what kind of agreements
we normally require, what degree of communion we seek by and large,
thus making the rule in effect amount to a directive of recognition
of agreement, every time that there is the degree of agreement that
we (think we must) generally need or achieve, or that we (think we)
would normally like.
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Such rules, such assumptions is what a logic, or a language,
amounts to. And indeed, there are such rules, &9 that we generally
follow, there are such rules in our language(s). Yet their mere
external existence cannot be an argument against someone else's
assuming otherwise. One may have different ideas about the human
nature; or one may simply make different choices regarding the degree
of communication assumed to be appropriate or desirable. And it makes
no sense to argue that he is not applying the term 'community' (or
'communication') correctly, because this term simply has a different
meaning for him, in accordance with his different wants of communion.
(In this respect, he follows a different logic, he has a different
language).
Now, such assumptions might indeed be taken to constitute an
argument against somebody's assuming otherwise, regarding the degree
of communication needed. Because we might think that he is misled;
that he thinks that he needs/ wants a highest degree of
communication, but that this is not so in fact, because every man
needs X degree of communication. But in resorting to such a rule in
this way, we do not analyse a logic or describe a social reality. We
follow a Logic, which we understand to be correct, a Logic that is
not contingent on the fact that the members of a social group follow
it. We postulate a Reality, rather than describe the reality of or
according to the social group. And this is of course incompatible
with ordinary language philosophy as our epistemological background..
Naturally, the fact that somebody else might make different
assumptions, does not mean that we cannot use the assumptions we make
as a base, as our reasons for recognising agreement in cases where X
degree of communication is found, or simply as our rules stating when
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we are going to speak of existence of agreement, even though we
acknowledge that there is no reason why this somebody should agree
with our ideas of normality. Yet again, we do not merely analyse an
external logic, i. e. a logic that exists independently of us. We
constitute our language, our game, explicitly, thus bringing out in
the open our assumptions, our choices, which - the external facts
remaining the same - entail our conclusions. As far as he who
declines from making the same assumptions is concerned, we are simply
using the term 'agreement', or 'communication' in a different way.
This term is then a piece in our game; a game he might decide or not
to play with us.
Finally, if we were to decline from constituting a language or anyway
presupposing a Logic, and instead we sought to apply the rule(s) included
in the language of a given aggregate regarding when there is a community,
the chaotic character of this language would entail that we would be
unable to pinpoint a single coherent set of criteria that would be
independent of us, (And of course, if we sought to apply the rules
included in the language of the community, we would be trapped in a
vicious circle).
B2. Society60
We are not in fact separate individuals, we are social beings.
People feel generally quite insecure by themselves. They feel
miserable if they feel alone. They like to feel part of something
bigger and stronger than their tiny selves. They want to be
something; they want their actions to have a meaning. They like to
unite under a flag. They unite under symbols which are understood to
group them together, which structure their possibilities of and
attempts at communication, and which determine their perceived
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similarities and differences. They create societies, and they
identify themselves and the others by the group (society) to which
they are viewed to belong.
(On the other hand, we are non-social too. We hate public
relations and keeping the appearances. We suffocate in constant
company, small talk and gossip. People like to reserve a space to
their single selves and they get upset and react if this space is
trespassed upon. They like to imagine themselves free, survivors and
masters of their selves. They admire independence and scorn the
masses and their need for security and a sense of belonging. They
despise conformity and rebel against old rules and dictates. They
keep a distinct personal identity and resent being looked at as mere
group members. )
Such groupings are a matter of personal identification. An
identification - just like any classification - involves a contrast
(since it follows from it). One cannot be "white" unless there are
"blacks" or "yellows". One cannot be "liberal" unless there are
"conservatives". One cannot be "Arab" unless there are "Jews" or
"Westerners". A society is a matter of us being X (and not Y). Every
X is a symbol, under which the members are understood to be united
(and so make a society). The existence of a society depends on the
regular repetition of activities, wherein X is projected and whereby
the members are identified61 as belonging to the society, (Such
activities may be anything, from fights (or mock fights), to
outwardly purposeless customs, or simple acts, like wearing badges,
speaking with a particular accent, or simply using a certain language
or idiom).
Such groupings have a polarizing effect. They establish
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boundaries between "us" and "them". Think of the Christians and the
Muslims in the crusades, the Mods and the Rockers in the sixties,
Protestants and Catholics in today's Ireland, the Hearts and the Hibs
in Edinburgh. Insofar as insecurity is at the base of their mechanism
of creation, the perceived existence of an at least potentially
hostile grouping is essential to their maintenance. Think of the
capitalist world for communist Russia and the communist threat for
the United States of the fifties.
Societies being unions, they manifest themselves in symbols (e.g.
flags, badges, clothing fashion), under which the union is understood
to take place. Societies being a matter of the individual's identity
and sense of belonging, as well as a matter of the distinction
between "us" and "them", they entail rules for the conduct of the
members. 62 A member is one who a) displays the symbols, i. e. looks
like X, and b) behaves as Xs - unlike Ys - do. 63 Thus, the society
entails a logic, which structures the individual's thoughts, beliefs,
who he understands himself to be. This logic will be more or less
strict, depending on the strength of the society's hold on its
members, the room that is left for difference and individuality. The
more the insecurity and the stronger the perceived threat from
outside, the less this room will be and the stricter the logic. 62
Once a society has been the starting point of the theorist's
investigation, the existence of central cases of certainty in its
language/ logic follows easily. Because then, the possibilities of
the semiotic universe which we found to be contradictory and chaotic,
will be filtered through the function of identifying "us" as a unit
and of distinguishing us from "them". The possibilities in the
semiotic universe will be normatively structured as right/wrong,
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valid/invalid, in accordance with the symbols under which we group;
there will be assumptions you have to and assumptions you cannot
make, insofar as you are a member of this society.
However, the content of the semiotic universe being infinite and
indeterminate, not every semiotic possibility can be structured like
this in advance. Often, some such possibility will be admitted in the
society's language as right or valid, in contrast to its opposite,
simply because it has been proposed in invocation of the unity, as
following from the symbols or rules.65 In other cases, to the extent
that the society can accommodate internal differences, to the extent
that it leaves space to individuality, it may be a matter of
argument, whether one possibility or another must be admitted. Though
the symbol is given, the reasons individual X understands to have for
uniting under it with individual Y, will not be exactly the same with
the reasons Y understands to have; though the rule is given, its
point according to X will not be exactly the same with its point
according to Y. Thus the context, that surrounds the symbols and
rules and determines their specific meaning for particular
applications, will differ depending on individual member - or indeed
"sub-societies" of members (think for example of the Communist Party
of Great Britain divided in "Eurocommunists" and "hard-liners").65*
In either case, we speak of interpretation of the pre-existing
symbols and rules. Which is how the society's language may change
with time. Accordingly, interpretation, as an activity that creates
explanations or readings, is naturally dynamic; but each
interpretation, as reading, will be static; for it will be an act of
allocation of a set of reasons, that render previous practice or pre¬
existing rules/ symbols meaningful.656
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This is where the theorist may see the open texture of the
society's language, the penumbra of uncertainty.
So, when is there a society out there, that the theorist can
start from, to analyse its language, and describe accordingly the
social phenomena he is after? Well, it is a matter of degree. For a
given aggregate, to the extent that people conform, to the extent
that they follow, there is society; to the extent that they rebel,
there are individual persons.
What if we disregard the fact that people rebel and rely on the
fact that they understand themselves to be united?
Well, as we have already said, the existence of a society depends
on people's using some notion as a means of identification of the
members. A member of a society is a member belonging to it. The
society is part of the member's identity. This identity may be either
the identity according to the member (e.g. I am Greek), or the
identity according to someone else (e.g. my son is Greek, or, my
neighbour - who happens to think of himself as Scottish rather - is
British).66 In every social environment there are given ways of such
an identification which one applies to oneself and to others. They
are part of the social reality. These types of identification are not
necessarily coherent though and do not serve for uniform
classification. The way an individual A classifies himself is
generally different from the way an individual B classifies A; the
way B classifies A will be different from the way C classifies A; and
each act of classification may have a different result at different
times. The same classifications will be thought to be sometimes
complementary and sometimes contradictory (in abstract - in concreto
this would follow anyway from the open texture). Let me give some
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examples.
Take the aggregation of people currently living in Edinburgh.
Forget what linguistic jurisprudence would understand to be the
penumbra (e.g. immigrants from South Asia) and stick to the central
cases. Are they British or Scots? (That is, the existence of which
society would be crucial for the claim of the social reality's
independence from the theorist here? the British or the Scottish?).
Or take Louise, who, when asked the other day in the bar, said that
she's not English but Northern English, or rather from Newcastle
(would she think the same in a bar in London, where there would not
be the same underlying context of "hostility" towards being
English?). People in the South East of this island will tend to say
that there is one society in Britain and another in Germany, whereas
people in the North will exhibit a different tendency; and many,
especially young relatively better cultured people in the North, like
to place wider boundaries nowadays and think of themselves as
Europeans rather (the cosmopolitan ideal; the culture of the
tourist), thus distinguishing themselves rather than rejecting the
narrower boundaries.
For a given aggregate of people there will not be only one
society, insofar as those people's ways of grouping under symbols are
concerned. People's ways of thinking, the semiotic universe, are too
complex for there to be a uniform classification in them. If the
theorist were to take this aggregate as a society, he could probably
find this identification in their ways of thinking. However, he would
be unable to use it, unless he also were to abandon the claim to
uncommitted description; because in choosing this identification
rather than another (also existing in the people's ways of thinking)
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he would be taking sides. He would be adopting an internal point of
view (as distinct from the hermeneutic one). The difference here is
that once I have an internal point of view, I can reject all
interpretations in language as mistakes except the one that I adopt
(and have my doubts about incompatible interpretations of the adopted
interpretation), presumably for certain reasons. But if I take a
hermeneutic point of view, there will be many internal points of view
to analyse, each one of which will result in different
"descriptions". 66*
- But surely there are aggregates that constitute societies. . .
Mutatis mutandis, what has been said on community applies here
too.
C. Aggregate
An aggregate is simply a bunch of people in certain
spatiotemporal coordinates, e.g. all those living in Edinburgh today.
This need not mean the exclusion of a community or a society, any
more than it entails their inclusion.
In a sense, the existence of an aggregate of people is obviously
not independent of the theorist; it depends on little else in fact,
than the definition of the coordinates, which is not of course to be
found in the facts. This is not the sense of 'independence' we are
interested in though. What matters is that only the notion of an
aggregate can provide the palpable reality, the positivist needs to
hold on to.
The "social reality", as operative notion for the method of
linguistic jurisprudence, is prior to language. It is the source of
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the lingual distinctions. It consists in the assumptions people
actually make in their social interaction. As such it refers to
actual people, whose ways of thinking it is based on (and on whom it
is contingent, just like the concomitant language). So, for its base,
linguistic jurisprudence assumes an aggregate of people. 57
If we were to start from a community (i.e. a common
understanding), or a society (i.e. a union around symbols), which the
theorist chooses to speak of and which is not understood to
correspond to an aggregate, we would not be based on actual social
interaction, but deriving it, as structured in accordance with
certain rules. We would be simply starting from some network of
assumptions, which would entail how social interaction is expected
and assumed to take place. Which is fine, except that then:
a) Social reality would be posterior to language and therefore, we
would have to discard the explanation of the prior existence of
the lingual distinctions that we started with
b) Social reality could not be called a reality, the way it was in
our exposition of the method of linguistic Jurisprudence.
Accordingly, everything said on the epistemological background of
linguistic jurisprudence about it, as well as the claim to a
description of the law as an object made up of our ways of
thinking, would be inapplicable. Instead, only one possible
concept of law would one be "describing" from within our ways of
thinking, "our" here meaning us as people rather, than us as
idea, as grouped under a symbol, or round a table of the
theorist's imagination.
It is for these reasons that we have denied the independent
existence of a "social group" as community or society, by reference
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to aggregate. It is for these reasons that we have denied in effect
the theorist's possibility to define the community or the society he
is referring to, and expect instead that he should be referring to an
aggregate of people - which, after all, he will also have to define.
If the "social group" - whose social reality is the base of the
existence of law as a type of social phenomenon - corresponds to an
aggregate of people, then we can indeed speak of a description of its
social reality. And in accordance with this, I have assumed the
existence of an aggregate, rather than a society or a community, as
the referred to basis, throughout Part 2.
Which is precisely what enabled us to see social reality as
chaotic and reject the idea that there are central cases of certainty
of meaning corresponding to types of social phenomena, which the
theorist can describe. To put it in a summary form: We take "modern
Western society", as the social group, contingent to which, the type
of social phenomenon we would like to describe exists. We do not
understand "modern Western society" to be abstractions, like Western
rationality or relative abundance of food (in which case we would be
referring to an ideal type). We do not understand it to be our
agreement, i. e. the extent to which the people of modern Western
society (can) agree, understand each other, communicate (in which
case we would be referring to a community). We do not understand it
to be ideals like freedom of speech and tolerance (in which case we
would be referring to a society). We just speak instead of the actual
people within the boundaries we have defined in some way or other,
and of their actual ways of thinking and relating with one another;
we are referring to an aggregate of people. What we shall see then is
a community (corresponding to a - rather low incidentally - lowest
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common denominator) along with its negation, and an infinite number
of various internal communities (e.g. the community of some friends
at school, the community of Edinburgh, the community of the lawyers)
along with their negations. What we shall see then is (perhaps) a
society, grouped e.g. under "freedom of speech" or "democracy" and
contrasted to at least one other hostile/bad society (this used to be
the communists, now it is perhaps becoming the Islam), together with
an infinite number of societies corresponding to an equal number of
opposed interpretations (and interpretations of interpretations) of
e.g. "democracy", along with its and their negation(s) (see for
example the communists and the Muslims within modern Western
society), as well as a chaos naturally of smaller - always contrasted
- internal societies (e.g. the French society and the German, the
right and the left wing, the fans of Liverpool and those of Everton).
All these things together rather than one of them are what
constitutes the language and social reality of modern Western
society, with the consequence that there is not one coherent network
of common assumptions, and so there is never only one concept of law
or corresponding "type of social phenomenon".
If we had presumed the independent existence of a social group,
and had included with it all the ideas that we generally associate of
a union of people, with no further scrutiny, like linguistic
jurisprudence does, we would have never been able to see this. Thus,
I would like to consider the notion, of a social group as an
independent entity, as the ultimate basis of the descriptive
epistemological claims we have examined.
1 14
Conclusion
There is no reason to repeat what has been said in our
preliminary conclusion. I shall simply add that things would be
different with a more traditional epistemological approach. If one
were to presuppose a Logic, independently of actual practice or forms
of life, thus transcending observed debates and interpretations, the
choices would be part of it, and the claim to uncommitted description
could be upheld, with the correctness of the results partly depending
on this Logic, on the constitution of the theorist's game - insofar
as we could say that the adoption of this Logic would not be
obligatory. If one were also to believe the validity of this Logic to
be universal and its adoption obligatory, the results would be part
of Reality (rather than the reality according to this individual
subject or this social group) - and then, the search for the concept
of law would not assume that this should be an account of how people
in our society happen to think, but of what the law actually is; it
would be an account understood to go beyond people's trivial fictions
(or to verify them). On the other hand one could choose a certain
point of view, a certain interpretation among the ones existing
within the social reality concerned; but then, no claim to
uncommitted description could be made. For one would be a political
participant, arguing from practical reason for the choices one was
making. S7*' b
Insofar as the presupposition of a Logic, independently of actual
practice or forms of life, has been excluded, and if the adoption of
a certain point of view among the ones that have been constructed
within the social reality observed is rejected for the preservation
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of detachment and objectivity in the descriptive process, one will
see chaos. 60 It would then be wrong to take any lingual distinctions
as granted and proceed to coherently fit them together, expecting the
result to be the one correct description/ analysis of e.g. law as a
type of social phenomenon, because despite the fact that these
distinctions are indeed real and granted, their negations are equally
real and granted (even if less prominent), which means that the
correct description in this sense would consist of an infinite amount
of contradictory such results, such concepts, chaotically
intermingled and interrelated.
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Although the connection with the later Wittgenstein cannot be exaggerated, I
mostly refer here to the Oxford circle, especially J.L, Austin and generally the
trend subsequent to Wittgenstein, that merged concentration on language and an
orientation towards "common sense" (following G. E. Moore in this respect). It
is with primary reference to this trend rather than to Wittgenstein that I shall
often speak of ordinary language philosophy,
The general substitution of the account of meaning as correspondence, with
the account of meaning as use can be attributed primarily to the later
Wittgenstein. On the linguistic turn, cf. Rorty (ed. ) The Linguistic Turn: see
especially the introduction for a very good account of both ideal language and
ordinary language philosophy as one movement, and for an examination of their
assumptions and disagreements (though an account of the debate on meaning is
missing unfortunately). I have eschewed mention here of ideal language
philosophy, which did regard its abstract definitions as ones of words, of
course, as it was she that started the linguistic turn; on the other hand, it
came equally (or even primarily if we should have the later Wittgenstein in
mind) under attack by ordinary language philosophy, for misunderstanding what
meaning is.
It should be no wonder then that often, the proponents of ordinary language
philosophy claimed to be abolishing philosophy altogether, to be demonstrating
that philosophy as such is a meaningless enterprise. Philosophy is not normally
understood as having anything to do with the description of social reality or
how people think in fact.
If we should leave semiotics apart to see what this means in traditional
philosophic vocabulary, the rejection of the notion of the denoted and
independent of language thing, amounts to the denial that there is one universal
Reason, or Reality, whose validity or existence is independent of social
conventions. Reason and Reality are the same here, except that empiricist
philosophic systems have Reality at their - axiomatic - base, whereas
rationalist ones have Reason, Truth for an empiricist is truth in accordance
with Reality and for a rationalist in accordance with Reason. Ordinary language
philosophy rejects both attitudes as one (often without realizing it), with what
Gellner calls the shift from the First to the Third Person point of view (cf.
Words & Things, p. 120f. ). (I do not agree with him though that this as such is
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cheating - it is just scepticism; the claim that philosophy is a sickness to be
cured from though, is, indeed, ridiculous).
6. I took the name of Elrond from J. R. R. Tolkien's The Lord of the Rings,
7. I do not mean that these types of explanation are respectively scientific and
philosophical. The example is meant neither to illustrate the use of these
terms, nor to reveal any mam features of science or philosophy.
8. Notice that the very use of the notion of a 'social reality' is an indication
both of the difference of this attitude, and of the shift in what is now
identified as 'real', in accordance with the trend of ordinary language
philosophy. In the term itself, the idea can be seen that we are talking of
something different from e.g. the reality of physics. Because the social reality
can be contrasted to - let's say - basic reality. Thus the social reality is a
reality constructed from and within society. But it is of course very real. If
sociology is supposed to understand and describe the society, this is the
reality it is meant to understand, and this reality is, of course, made up by
ways of thinking and common beliefs, In a sense that is, the claim that the
social scientist cannot disregard the "fictions" of the society he observes,
because it is these that constitute the social reality, is a tautology. While on
the other hand, when the "scientific" attitude makes the claim that sociology is
meant to discover what is real, behind the fictions the members of the observed
society adhere to, it is not the reality that is constructed within society
which is searched for (which we presumably already know), but the reality to
which society - as a unit, as an instance among many societies that presumably
(and to a certain extent) follow the same pattern - is bound; i.e. it searches
for a reality that is not in this respect dissimilar from the one of physics.
(This is the case for all great systems of sociological thought, be it Marx's
materialism, or Durkheim's functionalist), or even Weber's thought).
The idea of the "social reality" is similar to those of "institutional
facts", "semiotic universe", "second-order reality", These ideas are all
similar, except for the contexts they have been constructed in, and,
consequently, their connotations.
For a general sociological analysis of social reality in the above sense
(which is there spoken of also as "knowledge"), without abandonment of the claim
to a reality to which social realities are bound, cf. Berger P, L. and Luckmann
T., The Social Construction of Reality.
10. Hart's Preface to The Concept of Law.
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11. This needs a qualification, at least as far as the distinction of law from
morality is concerned. The ultimate reasons Hart offers for it are indeed
practical (ibid. p, 203f. ).
11a. Hart has been criticized before on issues of methodology, and most
particularly for his descriptive sociological claims. See Brendan Edgeworth
"Legal positivism and the philosophy of language" (in Legal Studies 6/2), who
makes some of the points I also make in this Part (even if in a somewhat crude
and simplified form). Also Michael Martin The Legal Philosophy of H.L.A, Hart.
for whom Hart's sociology is inadequate and naive (p. 27-8), and Roger Cotterrell
The Politics of Jurisprudence, for whom Hart is a bad sociologist (p. 104 and
106), See also Mario fori Saggl di Metagiurisprudenza (especially "Hart e 1'
analisi del linguaggio"), who distinguishes in many ways the language that
describes from the language that is being described; see also what he has to say
on Winch and Hart, pp. 62-74.
12. Hart loc. cit. supra n. 10.
13. Ibid. p. 235.
14. And they certainly did not in the days when ordinary language philosophy was
most in fashion. In fact, they were rather taken for granted. Such claims about
the usefulness of linguistic analysis are typical of the trend of ordinary
language philosophy.
15. It is true in general that "Hart has performed... more by example than by
precept" (W, Twining "Academic Law and Legal Philosophy: the Significance of
Herbert Hart" in Law Quarterly Review 95 (1979), p, 577), Nevertheless, it is the
norm for theorists from the Continent to be annoyed by such lack of
methodological clarity and explicitness. Thus, Jori often complains about Hart's
methodological ambiguity, in his Saggi di Metagiurisprudenza. See also p.218-9
on the difference in theorizing between Britain and America on the one hand, and
Continental Europe on the other. On this see also what Cotterrell has to say
about diverse cultural tendencies (in The Politics of Jurisprudence, p, 106).
16. In contrast with ordinary language philosophy, I do not mean to be sceptical
with abstract meanings, I do not even mean to distinguish between abstract and
concrete meanings in this methodological analysis. Of course, and in accordance
with ordinary language philosophy's distrust for abstract language, Hart
believes that concentrating on abstract distinctions is misleading, and that one
ought to see the particular uses of the words. In his Essays on Bentham (p. 10-1)
he uses the distinction between comparing words on one hand and comparing small
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typical phrases where the same word is used on the other, as a distinction
between what is abstract and what is concrete (and indeed, the linguistic
comparisons he makes are generally concrete, by relevance to this criterion). I
think that in any case (even if we were to compare chapters for instance) we
shall have items of speech, which can be considered to be abstract, since they
can always be placed in a wider context, or to be concrete, since there will
always be a more general utterance. The distinction is therefore one of degree
and makes no difference in the theoretical account I give in this section of the
relation between language and social reality. Naturally, it can be a qualitative
one in other more practical contexts, when the actual tendencies people have to
generalize or distinguish, depending on particular degrees of generality of
utterance, make the difference.
16a, The notion of a 'brute fact', was introduced by G. E, M, Anscombe in "On Brute
Facts" (Analysis 18), and thereafter used by Searle in his Speech Acts, and for
MacCormick's institutional theory of law. (But see also Nietzsche using 'factum
brutum' in Genealogy of the Morals 3.24), In its original context, "brute fact"
is defined negatively, as a fact in virtue of which what Searle will first call
institutional fact holds. Thus the same fact can be brute or institutional,
depending on whether it is compared with the fact under or above it, so to
speak. However, when I speak of brute facts here, I do not really mean to refer
to this relationship between brute and institutional fact. For my more limited
use here, a brute fact is a fact whose truth is independent of social convention
or human wish. (The acknowledgement of such facts of course, presupposes the
acceptance that there is one Reason or Reality, a proposition that is not at
home with ordinary language philosophy (see above n, 4). However we needn't
concern ourselves with this here, especially since no ordinary language
philosopher would deny such facts. And in any case, denial of brute facts would
simply mean that no lingual distinction can be explained in any other way than
the one I set out later. )
17, I don't in fact mean to distinguish though, between the base of facts and
assumptions, and the network of rules and conventions. There is only a
distinction of form, which is useful here for reasons of clear presentation.
What is an assumption or a fact, e.g. "people turn their heads in the direction
towards which someone points", in contrast to what is a convention, e, g, "in
order to make someone notice something you may point at it", depends only on the
form in which it is seen, And we cannot say that the rules and conventions
result from the facts and assumptions, anymore than the inverse, Equally, there
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is no difference between facts, assumptions and evaluations, except from our
point of view, who describe this network, and, (in our language or logic) would
understand some of them to be objective and some others subjective (and perhaps
some "inter6ubjective"), Here I shall use the term 'assumptions' to include
everything, from rules to evaluations, and 'social reality' indiscriminately,
for the network and the base, except if otherwise indicated. I am justified in
doing this, at least insofar as the epistemological background of linguistic
jurisprudence can be said to reject the existence of a prior Reason.
17a, Compare what John Searle says about a "network of intentional states" and a
"background of capacities and social practices", in his analysis of language and
thought from the point of view of the individual mind (Intentlonalitv p.141f. ).
18. And this is where Hart's internal point of view fits in,
19. You might of course universalize this language of yours, and on it base the
possibility of the existence of social relations, the possibility of meaning of
e.g. 'promise'. But this would amount to describing not this society, but how
this society is pictured in your social reality. Every language is contingent on
a particular form of life, and just like there are many forms of life, so are
there many languages.
20. Winch P., The Idea of a Social Science, p. 121.
22. The distinction I make here between language stricto and lato sensu is
related to the distinction between language as a dictionary and language as an
encyclopaedia (on which cf, Eco (J, Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language
p.46ff, where also further bibliography) - which is a traditional problem in
semiotics - and to the distinction between the sign as equivalence (p=q) and the
sign as implication (p3q) (cf. ibid, p, 14ff). It should be clear that I do not
mean to deny the idea in modern semiotics that language is not distinct from
knowledge or thought, that language is a process of interpretation (and so an
encyclopaedia rather than a dictionary). At the same time however, this should
not be taken to deny the distinction between language and knowledge as this is
seen in the proposition "my knowledge of the Pythagorean theorem is independent
of the fact that I can speak French" (it should not be taken to deny the
existence of the dictionary), There are two meanings of 'language' here. When we
say that language is not distinct from knowledge (that language is an
encyclopaedia), by language we mean speech as logic. When we say that it is
(that language is a dictionary), we mean words.
23. Obviously then, this method for the clarification of social reality is mainly
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useful to a Member of the relevant society, Its purpose is not to help us
understand something foreign, but to help us realize especially those truths
about the social reality around us, which we failed to see because they were too
obvious,
24. Winch P, op.cit. supra n. 20, p. 123.
24a. See Hart op, cit. n. 10, p. 17, that he expects to provide "a better
understanding of the resemblances and differences between law, coercion and
morality, as types of social phenomena".
25. Or defects for some; see for example £, Gellner, Words and Things.
26, For the current situation in Japan see Deborah Fallows "Japanese women" in
Mational Geographic, 177,4. I quote: ",..a basic truth about Japanese life; the
unquestioned and unquestionable duty to do what is expected of you,.," (p.56),
"The force behind the women's movement in the West - the search for self-
expression and satisfaction - doesn't appeal much to Japanese women; in their
country every man, woman, and child is expected to consider the well-being of
the group before his or her own self-interest" (p, 74),
27, See Wittgenstein L. Philosophical Investigations 1 §77. See also Hart's
discussion of international law (op.cit, supra n. 10, p. 208f,), where he simply
finds analogies and differences with the central case of law he has defined. On
the other hand, one could understand this method as sketching sharply defined
pictures "corresponding" to blurred ones, This would amount to the argument from
the central cases, on which more later, In any case, once we admit that there
are two opposite sets of assumptions, one of which can be said to be generally
dominant, but not even for every activity or sub-group, it becomes problematic
to maintain that this is the (socially) real one, It would be a bit like saying
that, since the number of Fiats on the streets is overwhelmingly greater than
the corresponding number of Rolls-Royces, a Rolls-Royce is less real than a
Fiat.
29. I have in mind Northern Irish politics and the current trend of vegetarianism
among British teenagers respectively,
30. Which activities or games are different insofar as we understand and
constitute them as different. This understanding of ours on the other hand will
most often be causally dependent on their having been constituted in this way,
31. Imagine a man assuming that one may park if there is little danger of getting
fined, when he actually needs to park near the ministry of transport, while a
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minute later he assuaes that one nay not park if there are traffic signs to the
contrary, when discussing in some committee for the revision of the traffic
code. Imagine someone giving excuses to the traffic policeman, in hope that he
might get away without a fine, while a minute later he says to someone else
who's attempting to park in front of his shop: "Hey, haven't you seen the no
parking sign?"
31a. See also Edgeworth op. cit. supra n. 11a, p. 137-8,
32. If I may quote Vaclav Havel (President of Czechoslovakia and speaking about
the lessons to be drawn from the Soviet invasion of '68) here, "...society is a
very mysterious animal with many faces and hidden potentialities, and.,, it is
extremely shortsighted to believe that the face society happens to be presenting
to you at a given moment is its only true face, None of us knows all the
potentialities that slumber in the spirit of the population, or all the ways in
which that population can surprise us when there is the right interplay of
events, both visible and invisible" (as quoted by Andrew Gimson in "Beware the
technocrats boring us into Europe" in the Independent of 16/12/1990).
32a, Contradictory in the descriptive sense that for each A there is a -A; not
incoherent; one can see either coherence or incoherence in them.
33. The distinctions that I rejected at note 17 above, are preserved in this
section.
34. Vet it cannot adequately describe any such specific change, because of its
acceptance of a central case - unless it should happen for this change to
consist of a conscious departure from one central case and creation of another,
which is not of course how language evolves. Linguistic jurisprudence merely
admits of the possibility of change.
35. See Hart op. cit, supra n. 10, p. 4 and 121 f. See also Waisaann F,
"Verifiability" (in Essays on Logic and Language, Flew eds), pp. 119-25.
36. See Hart ibid, p. 125. He does not speak of complexity of ways of thinking
though.
36a. Another advantage of this model is that it does not entail and need not
postulate any - dangerous - generalization of the dialectic opposition, For one
"socially real" A there may be a -A as possibility, for some other no.
36b. For the distinction between the dictionary and the encyclopedia, see above
note 22.
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37. "Too strange to each other for misuriderstanding", (T. S. Eliot, Quartets,
"Little Gidding" v. 104).
38. On "pragmatic self-refutation", cf. Finnis J. Hatural Law and Natural Rights
p, 74, and J. L, Mackie "Self-refutation - a formal analysis" in Philosophical
Quarterly 14 (1964).
39. it is also in need of a methodology of sociology, regulating when it can be
said that this is one social reality and it is different from that one.
39a. In our "social construction of reality" (Berger 4 Luckmann op.cit,).
39b. Relate in linguistics the "idiolect", i.e. the personal dialect each
individual has to some extent. (Cf. K, M. Petyt The Study of Dialect, p, 12,32).
40. Yet all these issues are part of the concept (s) of a cigarette in our
semiotic universe, in our social reality. From the point of view of someone
whose purpose is to describe the concept(s) of a cigarette as part of our social
reality, it makes no sense to stand on my successful communication with the
newsagent and proceed to assert that cigarettes are harmless, From the
theorist's point of view, the degree to which there is communication between two
or more people, the sense in which they share a common language will depend on -
and show - the degree to which they agree.
41. And the same is true for the human mind as such.
41a. Notice that this does not exhaust the importance the notion of the social
group has for Hart's positivism, nor does it explain its overwhelming frequency
in the vocabulary of The Concept of Law. This notion is a supertramp in argument
against the image of the natural lawyer, as a certain prestige from sociology is
borrowed through it and since it connotes in a unique way the separation of fact
from value. " He don't speak of divine laws and moral truths; we speak of social
groups (i.e. empirical facts) and how they are bound together. Anthropology
shows us how different the standards of different social groups can be; while
sociology shows U6 that (regardless of their diversity of standards) social
groups have structures performing functions (see e.g. Durkheim's work). Law is
such a structure; not a matter of what is right - and these are the facts."
Linguistic jurisprudence maintains the aura and vocabulary of positivism, even
while (and as a necessary part of the process of) transcending the distinction
between positivism and natural law.
41b, See MacCormick N., H. L, A, Hart p, 35 that the notion of the social group is
crucial for Hart, yet not examined (of course; it is ideological). See Honord
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T,, "Groups, laws and obedience" and "What is a group?" (both in Making law
bind) for an examination of this notion with the tools of linguistic
jurisprudence, and an atteapt to formally base the theory on such an
examination, rather than on an exaaination of the less simple teras of
'obligation' or 'command', Notice that in both MacCormick's and Honorh's
analyses, the group ends being defined by its rules rather than vice versa,
42. See Winch P. op.cit. supra n. 20, pp, 45-51 and 111-20,
43, See MacCormick N,, Weinberger 0, , An Institutional Theory of Law, p. 14-5.
44, For Weber's method in general, see the first chapter of Econoav and Society.
as well as The Methodology of the Social Sciences. For ideal type in particular
cf. "Objectivity in Social Science and Social Policy" (in The Methodology of the
Social Sciences) p.89f. See also Talcott Parsons The Structure of Social Action
p.601-7 (notice the distinction on p.604f between generalizing and
individualizing concepts; by ideal type I refer here to individualizing concepts
- with generalizing concepts, the grounds I advance for my claim that Weber's
method is not compatible with the method of linguistic jurisprudence, are even
more prominent), J.W.N. Watkins "Ideal Types and Historical Explanation" in The
Philosophy of Social Explanation (Ryan eds) (who uses Weber eclectically in
defending methodological individualism), Carl Hempel "Typological Methods in the
Natural and Social Sciences" in his Aspects of Scientific Explanation and other
Essays (who equates the use of types in both natural and social sciences), and
W, G, Runciman A Critique of Max Weber's Philosophy of Social Science (according
to whom ideal types are not peculiar to the social sciences (p, 33f. )). My
account of Weber's thought is not indisputable, and one could find grounds to
doubt it, even in the above bibliography. However my account of the ideal type
is simple, coherent and fruitful as a base for a generalization beyond the
context of sociology (such that almost every commentator has been tempted to
make), without necessitating a rejection of Weber's general epistemological
stance or of the distinction between the natural and the social sciences.
45. Cf. Hegel's Encyclopaedia part 1, §§79-82 (I used Wallace's translation of
The Logic of Hegel). The point is highly problematic however and in need of much
more analysis (which unfortunately I cannot undertake here), because in Hegel
himself, the dialectic is tightly connected to an idealism that I cannot
postulate, There is always dialectical materialism of course, yet it is hard to
disentangle from the marxist view of history (see however Marx's introduction to
the Grundrisse. pp.23ff, on the identity of consumption and production and
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especially pp. 33ff, on abstractions and the concrete, as well as his "Critique
of the Hegelian dialectic and philosophy as a whole" (from the Paris
Manuscripts, in Collected Worts vol. 3) p.326ff). And besides, as Sartre put it,
"on ne trouve dans la Nature que la dialectique qu'on y a Jiise" (see his
interesting stateaent of the problem in his introduction to the Critique de la
raison dialectique. pp.115-28).
46. On the contrary, there remains here the assumption that we try to see and
describe the reality to which social reality is bound. (See above, note 8).
Thus, in contrast to linguistic jurisprudence, there can be an account here of
the change of the social, of the gradual passing from one type of society to
another and from one characteristic way of thinking to another.
47. Subjectum/ UHOxsipcvov: o uxd t6v Adyov xsipcvoq, o xspl on o Xdyoq, o t6v
Xdyov sxjtpav, Also, o xslpevoq uxb n^v xpdrfciv (xepi qq o Xdyoq), i.e. its
author. Notice that here the adoption or presupposition of a logic is an act of
the speaker, which act is equivalent to and indistinguishable from the speech.
(See Goethe's Faust (verses 1224-37), where Faust wonders what comes first, the
word or the act. Compare E. Gellner, who thinks unwisely that the equation of
the act to the word is a silly move (Words and Things, p. 21-2).) Compare
Luhmann, for whom the subject, traditionally, underlies and thus carries the
world ("The Individuality of the Individual", p,319, in Reconstructing
Individualism. T. Heller et al eds).
48. Now, this logic (this Abyoq), is generally understood to be universal, i.e.
to be obligatory for the listener, either because it is entailed by man's make,
or by God's will, or because it corresponds to Reality (notice that none of
these assumptions excludes another), Perhaps there can be other solutions too.
The point here is not to choose any such solution (nor is it of course to
attribute any one of these solutions in particular to Weber's sociology). What
is important to understand, is that in any such case, even what i6 pictured as a
choice of the speaker's is understood to be the correct one (according to
practical reasoning - in an Aristotelian rather than a Kantian sense), for both
him and the listener. The latter cannot just reply that the speaker's logic
(X6yoq) does not correspond to those people's or his (indeed, if it did, why
should the speaker speak?), To just relate someone else's logic cannot be an end
in itself (cannot that someone speak for himself?), So actual ways of thinking
and their description are not the point. They are seen and assessed from within
logic; they are not logic.
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48a. Also, they are understood to correspond to a Reality. From here onwards, I
speak only of a Reason, instead of a Reason and a Reality, mainly for reasons of
ease of exposition (since concepts are more easily correlated to Reason than to
Reality) and not to make the main text too awkward. Besides, this way we are in
tune with Weber's early methodological writings, and with the fact that it is
Reason that ordinary language philosophy banned as metaphysics, and only
consequently (and most often unintentionally) Reality, However, if we want to
have the complete picture, every time I speak of a (presupposed) Reason (or
logic), we must understand both a Reason and a Reality, that are not contingent
on actual social practice and understandings. Furthermore, Reason is not
necessarily prior to Reality; it can equally well be the other way around, in
one's philosophical assumptions. The relation between Reason and Reality is the
same with that of language and social reality. See above note 4.
46b, See Weber's vivid defence of the construction of clear-cut concepts in
"Objectivity in Social Science,,," (cit. supra n, 44) on pp, 106-10, Notice how
everything is ultimately based for him on the subject (although there is much
less emphasis on this in his later thought); "The objective validity of all
empirical knowledge rests exclusively upon the ordering of the given reality
according to categories which are subjective... in that they present the
presuppositions of our knowledge and are based on the presupposition of the
value of those truths, which empirical knowledge alone is able to give us"
(p. 110). Thus, without the careful construction of clear concepts "the
attainment of a level of explicit awareness of the viewpoint from which the
events in question get their significance remains highly accidental",
49. Gellner E. Words and Things, p. 120ff.
50, It could perhaps be argued that this does not apply to the later
Wittgenstein, who simply pointed to the possibility of different logics,
following logical positivism's rejection of transcendental ideas as
metaphysical, (See at any rate op. cit. supra n.27, §§109-124, as well as what he
says of forms of life, e.g. §241, p, 226e), It does apply however to ordinary
language philosophy and certainly to Winch (see his rejection of Pareto's method
in The Idea of a Social Science, pp, 95-111, and especially 107ff. ),
51, It is not difficult to identify decolonization as the historical cause behind
this attitude. And it is not accidental that Winch - the theory not the person -
is British rather than German,
52. And "law, coercion and morality as types of social phenomena" (H, L. A. Hart
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op.cii. supra n. 10, p. 17) are such abstractions. (But see Part 3).
53. Naturally, ' Modern Western society', or the social group in general referred
to in linguistic jurisprudence, could be taken as a type, i.e. a contingent on
the social reality abstraction, a part of the language we try to understand, In
this case, everything that is said later under society applies, mutatis mutandis
(and with the addition that you could well get a type, where there would be no
core of certainty in the corresponding language(s), e.g. a type like the one
assumed and projected by the theory of cultural fragmentation). Segmentation in
societies is (from another point of view) classification according to types
(there will be an immaterial difference though, if we make the distinction
between uncommitted observation and political participation and apply it to;
'type' (descriptive content) t 'society' (normative content)),
53a. See Part 3.
54. Notice in Latin cocsaunis (common), coaaunicare (to share, to communicate, to
unite, to participate in), comunitas (community), etc. This family of
derivatives, with the semiotic connections we are interested in, is rare in
classic Latin except for Cicero who is probably influenced by Greek, where
xoivbq, xoivavfi, ciuxoivavffi, xotvmvior, xoivoxriq and many more.
55. All together in the village, we shall decide on the methods and times of
allocation of water for irrigation of various crops, In my family we shall
decide on where to place the new big mirror in the house. I shall decide alone
whether to shave or not tomorrow morning.
56. See Hart, op.cii. supra n. 10, p. 125-6.
57. Wittgenstein, op.cii. supra n. 27, p. 200.
58. This has been called the "argument from the paradigm case" (cf. Gellner Words
and Things p. 30 (and notes therein) and J.W.N, Watkins, "Farewell to the
Paradigm-Case Argument", in Analysis 18, 1957-8, who refers to A. Flew's
"Philosophy and language" in Essays in Conceptual Analysis Flew eds). The
paradigm case is not of course different from the central case. Yet the
distinction between the central case and the penumbra, both as we find it in
Hart and as we presented it earlier, ha6 never been used in this way, as far as
I know.
59. In both the senses of the word that we showed in Part 1.
60. Think of society in the sense of club or association, e, g, "the school-
debating society". See in Latin socieias. fellowship, association, union
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(implying union for a common purpose and not a mere assembly), sociare. to join
or unite together, to associate, etc. The route is from sequor I (sequo) (Sanscr.
sak-\ to follow, satis friend - cf. Lat. socius partner - Gr. E*o|iai/(£*e)):
to follow. Notice that the emphasis here is to "those who follow (each other
(and from each other, in the sense of "it follows that")), who go together",
whereas in 'community' it is to "us who share and participate".
61. There are three aspects of the members' identification: a) each member
identifies himself, b) the members identify each other, c) the members project
their identity to non-members.
62. No factual distinction is entailed here between a symbol and a rule. What is
a symbol may be a rule and vice versa.
63, So to breach a social rule, is to place oneself outside the group. "We are
those who act like this; if you do not, you are not one of us, you are one of
them", See Part 1 note 11.
64. Notice that this logic becomes strictest - ossified - once it has stopped
evolving, when the hold on the members will be very weak apparently; see for
example the symbols, rules and activities of identification of groups of
immigrants, when these have stayed in the host country for generations. The
contradiction is only apparent though, because it is not the individual's point
of view that matters for the crucial strength of the hold that determines the
strictness of the logic, but the society's; the issue is not whether the
individual can actually differ, but whether he can differ as a member; and the
point is not how insecure and threatened the individual feels, which simply
determines whether and the extent to which the individual will participate, but
how insecure and threatened the society feels. (Compare autopoietic theory).
65, This will happen most often, when there is a higher degree of insecurity (at
the level both of the individual and the society), amounting to a stricter
language.
65a. Cf. Dworkin's example of the tree in Law's Empire p, 70.
65b. Relate to Dworkin's theory of interpretation ibid. p. 46-73,
66, If it is the identity according to the theorist, we go back to what we said
on ideal type.
Compare what Berger 4 Luckmann have to say about the typifications through









For the distinction between the internal and the hermeneutic points of view,
cf. MacCormick N, , H. L. A. Hart p. 33f.
Even if not any aggregate; because obviously, if we took one person froa each
country on earth and put thea together in a rooa, we would have an unsuitable
aggregate rather than a problematic epistemology.
See Dworkin Law's Eapire p.64, that the theorist Bust " join the practice he
proposes to understand; his conclusions are then not neutral reports about what
the citizens... think but claims about (the practice! coapetiiive with theirs",
Notice the distinction between social science (stricto sensu) on the one hand
where the descriptive claims are upheld (and a subdivision here between
subjective irrationalisa - of which Weber would be an example - and, say,
realism - see Durkheim here), and political argumentation on the other.





In our age of empiricism and positivistic distrust towards
methods other than observation of empirical facts, we are often quite
ready to assume language as such a fact. Thus, language is seen to be
a matter of people's practice of communication through verbal
utterances. Facts about language are facts that the theorist will not
ideally derive from rules, but will observe in the practice of the
people whose language it is. The rules do not exist because they are
(assumed to be) correct - what could this correctness be? - but
insofar as they can be seen in the behaviour of these people. So, the
ideal way to report language would be to collect and statistically
list the facts about people's actual practice of language, together
probably, with what they have to say on correct and wrong utterances,
slips of the tongue, etc. - fortunately, this cannot (yet) be
conceived to be practical. 0
It was in this way roughly, that we regarded language in our
examination of linguistic jurisprudence's quasi-sociological
descriptive claims. We regarded language as a matter of the behaviour
of the people in the social group that the theorist observes. The
expressions the theorist starts from (e.g. "I am obliged" and "I have
an obligation"), were understood to be expressions others utter, that
the theorist uncommittedly reports. Hence, the existence of the
relevant distinctions was seen to be a matter of external empirical
fact, a fact which the theorist could have reported wrongly, but
which did not in principle depend on his own practice of language and
assumptions regarding this practice (except of course insofar as
these happened to coincide with the group's practice and
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assumptions). Thus, with this concept of language in mind, we could
have objected for instance, that this is not what they mean by "law",
but not that this is not what "law" means (unless of course we were
to accept Winch's equation of the two issues). And, accordingly, the
central issue of our Part 2, can be put as "how can linguistic
jurisprudence cope with the fact, that people sometimes speak in one
way and sometimes in another".
However, this is not the only concept of language we have
available. There is on the contrary a rather more traditional
concept, less tuned to scientific description and more central to
philosophy, that allows us to forget actual happenstance and frees us
from the claim of a description of people's lingual practice. This is
a concept that allows us to see, that what the theorist of linguistic
jurisprudence does, is not so much reporting other people's language,
as examining his own.
. . Speaking a language is engaging in a (highly complex)
rule-governed form of behavior. To learn and master a
language is (inter alia) to learn and to have mastered
these rules. ... when I, speaking as a native speaker, make
linguistic characterizations.., I am not reporting the
behavior of a group but describing aspects of my mastery of
a rule-governed skill.
... It is possible. . that other people in what I suppose
to be my dialect group have internalized different rules
and consequently my linguistic characterizations would not
match theirs. But it is not possible that my linguistic
characterizations of my own speech., are false statistical
generalizations from insufficient empirical data, for they
are not statistical, nor other kinds of empirical
generalizations, at all. . .
. . . The mistakes we make and the mistakes I shall make in
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linguistic characterizations in the course of this work
will be due to such things as not considering enough
examples or raisdescriblng the examples considered, not to
mention carelessness, insensitivity, and obtuseness; but,
to repeat, they will not be due to over-hasty
generalization from insufficient empirical data concerning
the verbal behavior of groups, for there will be no such
generalization nor such data.1
This is much nearer to the way we think of language when we
ordinarily argue about meanings of words and expressions. When we
debate about the meaning of law, we do not bring statistics of the
term's use as evidence; what matters is how we - the debaters -
understand law, and what we think it is appropriate and correct for
the terra to denote, given certain rules for its use, and
considerations we think relevant. Even if it is about a word we are
not familiar with, again we do not look for empirical data, but in
the dictionary. If in a student's essay I find the term 'vernacular'
instead of say 'linguistic', I correct it; I do not record it as a
new use of the term 'vernacular', even if I find it in half the
class's essays, and even though I am not a native speaker of English
in fact.
And this is how we must understand The Concept of Law. The
expressions linguistic jurisprudence starts with, expecting therein
to see actual differences between social relations, are not
expressions found in the actual speech of the members of any observed
social group. They are expressions the theorist puts forth, in
accordance with the rules of the language he uses; they are
expressions he has come across before, and has internalised, along
with specific uses, in the process of learning his language. When we
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come across the distinction between doing something "as a rule" and
"in accordance with a rule", it is not a distinction in the language
the social group we observe happens to have; it is a distinction in
the language we use in speaking of this group. And when we point to
the distinction between a rule and a habit, it is not a distinction
that others happen to make; it is a distinction that we make, a
distinction derived from our logic. If someone came and told us that
this distinction is not true, we might try to persuade him that it
is; but not that people make it.
Thus, since it is not the observed language of some social group
that matters here, it is not other people's assumptions that are
crucial, but our assumptions. It is we who assert or deny that the
law is X, who draw upon our ways of thinking, and arrive at what law
means in our language, at what law is in our logic. And so, it is not
a social reality contingent on some group that we understand and
describe. It is propositions about reality that we assert. The
distinction between law and morality is asserted to be real,
regardless of whether the people of that tribe make it or not,
regardless of what kind of regulation of social conduct they have. It
does not follow that their system of social regulation must be either
law or morality. It may be neither. But this has no bearing
whatsoever on what law or morality are, on what I have named law or
morality. When I ask myself "what is law", it is my thought that I
try to clarify, it is my assumptions that I seek to examine; not that
tribe's system of social regulation over there. Which means that I am
doing philosophy and not empirical science (even though each may
depend on the other). And I do not report facts about language
either. I use language to understand myself (and in the process I
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modify, both my language and myself).
- "But wait a minute", I can hear you react. "You have moved from
a moderate and reasonable account of language as a matter of
presupposed rules, to wild statements about reality, philosophy and
knowledge of oneself. We' 11 be climbing the Himalayas with the
Buddhist monks next. And anyway, this cannot have anything to do with
Hart's concept of law in fact, which was precisely a reaction of
common sense, both to obscure metaphysics and to the solipsism of
definitions (in accordance with ordinary language philosophy)."
Indeed, that is what we are told. Every philosophical
"revolution", condemns its predecessors for obscurity and building
castles in the air. In the old times, intellectuals had blind
reverence for scriptures they did not understand; in modern times,
they condemn authorities they do not have enough patience to
understand. But both then and now, instead of using words, people
allow them to frighten them into intellectual conformity, in
following after some banner.
However, we may have rushed a little too much. And perhaps we
have put a little too much weight on the subject's use and control of
language. Is it really the case that the theorist decides and names
what law is? Is it really the case that he looks into his
assumptions, examines them rationally, chooses some among them,
discards others, and arrives at clear definitions and strict
statements of what he believes? Well, no, certainly not in linguistic
jurisprudence. On the contrary, there, the subject does not try to
control its language at all. The theorist lets language take the
lead, and follows where it takes him (or, at any rate, this is what
he tries to do). There are no attempts at strict definitions, that
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would clarify what the writer thinks, and allow him to get rid of
unwanted connotations which might mislead the reader and prevent him
from the exact understanding of the writer's thought. Ideally, there
is no thought of the writer that is distinct from language. The
theorist lets language take all its connotations and ambiguities with
it; he actually loves using them to make his point, rather than
forcing language and putting its words within strictly defined
boundaries of his own.
Is this method appropriate?
This is the question we'll be trying to answer.
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A. AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL GROUND
FOR CONCEPTUAL QUESTIONS
Clarifications on our change of viewpoint
But first things first. We have let too many threads loose, and
it is time we picked them up. What does it mean exactly a) that the
expressions Cand corresponding distinctions) linguistic jurisprudence
starts with, are now seen to arise from the theorist's language,
rather than the language of an observed social group, and b) that
language is a matter of assumed rules rather than observable
behaviour? Which, among the analyses and conclusions of Part 2, can
be retained, and which must we discard? In general, how does our
understanding of linguistic jurisprudence now change?
A. From the group's language, to the theorist's language.
(Or. out with descriptive sociology).
In the terms of our analysis in Part 2, the move from the
language of the group, to the language of the theorist, as the base
of discussion about what the meaning of e. g. 'law' is, means that we
drop all descriptive sociological claims, in this sense: That, having
decided to try and answer "what is law", our conclusion that 'law'
means X (e.g. the union of primary and secondary rules) and/or that
law is X, will not be understood to be a matter of what the people in
any social group (be it the theorist's or not) happen to think and
understand by 'law'. Insofar as actual ways of thinking go, existing
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prior to and independently of our particular discussion, these are,
from our point of view, liable to be affected by, and change in
accordance with, our conclusion; they are not understood to be
described in it. They might happen to fit with this conclusion of
ours, or not; this agreement as such, is irrelevant. Our conclusion
as to what law is, will not be assumed to be contingent on any
particular social group existing independently of us. If contingent,
it will be contingent on us, who ask the question and seek to answer
it, on our speech, reasons, logic. Contingent on and part of our
way(s) of thinking if you wish, yes, but this is not a way of
thinking we merely happen to have (that one could reject on the basis
of "but other people think differently"), but a logic we have so far
adopted and that we put forth as correct (with more or less arrogance
or humility, i. e. with a greater or lesser degree of acceptance that
it might have to change, after we've listened to what others have to
say). X will be understood to be really/ truly what law is, or at
least so shall we be claiming. If somebody thinks differently, if
somebody disagrees with us, it is up to them to try to persuade us -
if they so wish - that their view is correct; but not that what we
say does not fit with what the people of the tribe say about God
Elrond. We might disagree, and one might be right, or we might both
be (partly) right, or we might both be wrong; this does not depend on
the move, from the language of the group, to the language of the
theorist.
So, we are also dropping quite a lot of baggage from ordinary
language philosophy as the relevant epistemological background. First
and foremost, we are dropping the scorn for "traditional" philosophy.
Accordingly, we abandon the idea, that questions like "what is law?",
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or "what is truth?", are senseless, unless understood to refer to how
'law' or 'truth' are used in people's actual games, how 'law' or
'truth' enable the performance of particular speech acts. (But
notice, that the idea that interrogation into particular speech acts
or actual games, might be useful, even in answering questions like
"what is law", is a different idea, and may be retained).
Finally, we are dropping of course, what Gellner called the
"Third Person point of view". Which incidentally means that the
Weberian epistemology is no longer incompatible with Hart's allusions
to an investigation of types of social phenomena, in the sense I
seemed to say it is in Part 2. Our analysis of the ideal type can now
apply to Hart's concept of law (or morality), insofar at least as
this concept does not equal "what the judge must do", but amounts to
a certain method of regulation of social conduct, and is thus
applicable to empirical reality. Curiously enough, thanks to the
abandonment of the claims to a sociological description, a "type of
social phenomenon" is no longer understood to be a social phenomenon,
but an ideal type, i.e. a concept, and so, Weber's methodology of
sociology becomes compatible in this respect with linguistic
jurisprudence.
B. Language as a matter of rules
We now turn to look at the move from the idea of language as a
matter of people's observable practice, to the idea of language as a
matter of assumed rules. This first of all means that, as we have
already said, the lingual expressions linguistic jurisprudence uses
as evidence for logical distinctions, are not observed, but produced
by the theorist, in accordance with the rules he has internalised in
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the process of learning his language. These rules, generally
constitute language, in phrases like "investigation of similarities
and differences, recognized in language, between social situations
and relationships". 2
Thus, it is not a matter of whether people actually say "as a
rule" in contradistinction to "in accordance with a rule", or whether
they happen to speak of an "obligation" as distinct from
"compulsion". So neither is it at issue whether they might sometimes
happen not to make these distinctions. It is rather the case that in
putting forth these expressions, the theorist applies certain rules
of language and/or logic, according to which people must make these
distinctions, and if they happen not to, they may be corrected. 3-"
(Consequently, the expressions are presented not so much as evidence,
but rather as a way of presentation and illustration of the rules).
So the disregard for the lack of consistency in actual ways of
thinking and practice of language, the disregard for the fact that
sometimes people make these distinctions and sometimes they do not,
is not the deplorable outcome of armchair speculation. For it is not
the rules (and concepts) that are expected to fit this practice, but
rather the practice that is judged (and/or constituted) in accordance
with them. The assumption of coherence in language and/or logic,
ceases to be problematic. If the distinctions are ones people must
make, there is no arbitrariness in drawing further results from their
coherent relation. In fact, since the theorist is not describing
other people's actual ways of thinking, but investigating and
exemplifying his own language, incoherence cannot be allowed to
obtain. If he should discover incoherence, he discovers a defect to
instantly remedy. Thus, incoherence in the result sought, is by
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definition excluded; if an interpretation is seen not to fit, it is
automatically rejected, and so never forms part of the language.
C. From social reality to reality
And now, what about "reality"?
We have let this troublesome little word creep in our discussions
about language, meaning and logic, often enough, without much
analysis. And just a minute ago, we seemed to make such preposterous
claims as that there is a reality of what law is, independently of
what other people think about it; that distinctions (like the one
between law and morality) are real and not contingent on groups'
games and speech acts. And, as if that were not enough, we laid these
claims at the door of poor old Hart, whose conceptual work we
insinuated is not an attempt for a clarification of what 'law'
happens to mean in language, but a claim to what the law really is,
regardless of people's actual use of the term.
The thing is quite simple really. We have already spoken of a
"social reality", and a relation between it and language. There are
distinctions we see in language, which correspond to concomitant
distinctions in the network of assumptions, that constitutes our
social reality, 4" But this is so, so long as we maintain the Third
Person point of view, so long, that is, as we see others speaking,
using language, making claims and interpretations of terms, analyse
this process and describe how language works, internalises and
recreates ways of thinking, without taking a stance ourselves
regarding the speech and the claims of these people, i. e. without
Judging these claims as right or wrong (and how could we, in the
process of such a description). We see for example some people
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"trying to win the favour of God Elrond", or "punishing a girl, for
having slept with her brother". We analyse these propositions and
explanations of theirs, by saying that there is in their network of
assumptions, among other things, a certain "God Elrond", and a
certain conviction that "incest is bad and must be punished". In
making this analysis, we make propositions about their social
reality, their way of thinking, what they believe to be true (so as
to understand how such "realities" come about or how this language
has evolved, etc). From our point of view, there is a certain
correspondence between what they say and what they believe to be
true. Now, if we go on to say (either to them or not) that "there is
no God in fact", or that "there is nothing wrong with incest; people
should be let alone, to sleep with whomever they please", we are
leaving the Third Person point of view, the descriptions of their
language and social reality, and move to the First Person point of
view, which allows us to judge and make statements that we assume are
true, and not "true", in quotation marks. Once this move is made,
social reality is substituted with Reality (and language or form of
life, with Logic if you wish), and the correspondence between what
they say and what they think is real/ true, is transformed into a
correspondence between what we say and what is real/ true (according
to us in both cases).6
So, from the point of view of this methodological analysis,
reality (and correspondence with it) amounts to the speaker's claim
that his speech/ assertion is correct. 6 And this brings us to a big
problem.
So long as we maintained the Third Person point of view and the
claims to a descriptive sociology, we could regard the distinctions
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linguistic jurisprudence starts with, as real, i.e. Independent of
the theorist. They were seen to exist in social groups' languages,
and the theorist was understood to describe them, as an external
reality. The distinctions existed as such a reality; what mattered
was whether in some social group law was e. g. the union of primary
and secondary rules, in virtue of the relevant conventions and common
understandings that accounted for language and the meaning of 'law'
therein. Now that we drop these assumptions, and shift to the First
Person point of view and to language as a matter of rules in the
speaking subject's mind, what sense can the claim make that a certain
concept is correct? What kind of a reality is this the theorist is
assumed to refer to? A reality within his own mind? It is alright to
claim that God does not really exist. It is - perhaps - alright to
claim that in fact, people should be allowed to sleep with whomever
they please. But to claim that the law is a system of regulation of
social conduct characterised by the union of primary and secondary
rules, and not e.g. a rational enterprise of resolution of disputes,
to claim that this is the correct concept of law in fact, what can it
mean? Surely "a system of regulation of social conduct, etc." is one
thing, and "a rational enterprise" and so on, another; and whether a
certain word like 'law' will be used to refer to one thing or to
another (given our need to distinguish between them), is a matter of
pure convention, or of one's organization of one's own thought. One
cannot claim that it is true or real, because such a claim
presupposes a common ground (reality) existing independently of any
particular person's recognition. And here it seems, we have no claims
about reality at all; only claims about names.
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Nominail sib
The idea that general terms of language, like ' law' , have no
corresponding reality but are mere names, is called (or rather, will
be called by us here) nominalism. 7 This idea is very easy to
understand, and has a certain plausibility, now that we have come in
so many ways to see the distinction between observed and observing
language, i.e. between - say - the tribe's language and the
theorist's meta-language. Given the fact that the theorist's concept
under word X may be different from either the described group's or
some other theorist's correlative concept, to treat word X as a mere
name that may be referring to different things depending on the
speaker, facilitates the transitions between different observed
and/or observing languages. Take this example.
Suppose that theorist A, having finished with his investigation
as to what is law, speaks of "law" meaning the system of regulation
of social behaviour, characterised by the union of primary and
secondary rules; this is distinct from "(positive) morality", which
is such a system having primary rules only.8 Theorist B on the other
hand, speaks of "law", meaning a rational enterprise of resolution of
disputes, aspiring to the common good; this is distinct from
"(personal) morality", which means those rules of conduct, conformity
to which will secure one's personal achievement of the ideal. A can
of course analyse, appreciate and explain to his students B's
concepts; but this as such, need not have any effect on his own. 9
Furthermore, at a certain place and time, some social group happens
to have some system of regulation of social conduct, which they call
their "law" (or the word which they use for which, is to be
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translated as 'law'); this, partly conforms to either A's or B's
definition, and partly doesn't. Obviously, nothing here need have any
effect on what A or B have named 'law' or 'morality', that is,
nothing changes for the idea of the union of primary and secondary
rules, or for that of a rational enterprise of resolution of
disputes.10 And, furthermore, there is nothing apparently, tying the
word 'law' to one definition rather than the other, to one idea or
thing rather than the other. The phenomenon is in fact the same to
the case where 'jurisprudence' in French means decisions of courts,
while in English it means, well, Jurisprudence. And it is the reverse
to that one, where in different languages different words are applied
to, say, the same animal. ,°*1
Should we then laugh at A's and B's debate on the concept of law?
Should we say that it is mere stupidity and misunderstanding that
makes them go on stressing, the one that "law is not rationality, but
actual - and sometimes quite absurd - regulations of social
behaviour", and the other that "law must be rational - absurd
regulations are not law"?
Well, not necessarily. Their debate might be for instance a
debate on what it is that jurisprudence and/or legal dogmatics are
about (they are about law - what does "law" mean?), or on how
involved or detached the legal scholar must be, what it is the jurist
should be expected to assert when asserting "the law"." Hence, as an
answer to such questions, the assertion (or denial) that law is a
system of regulation of social conduct with X characteristics (and
not necessarily the way one must behave), can make sense. And we do
have a claim to truth, in the same way that we had such a claim when
it was said earlier that people should be at liberty to sleep with
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whomever they please.
(Okay, but again, even so, the problem remains. How can we make
any such claim, at all? There can be no empirical verification of
evaluative propositions; different people will simply have different
opinions. The situation is exactly the same as when different people
use the same name for different ideas. And indeed, it is because of
this that nominalism is correct; if people did not have different
ideas, i.e. different interpretations of general terms in language,
they would not be different. A and B have different concepts,
precisely because they disagree on such evaluative questions. Insofar
as people disagree, they will give different answers to what the law
is. - True, but we should bring something more in the picture: Most
people will have no answer to give, because they will have never
posed the question to themselves. Before one can say what one's
opinion is, before one's difference or similarity is asserted,
reflection is required. For any evaluative issue, I can pose the
question to myself, asking what it is I really want; should I choose
this idea or that one?12 So the subject, the theorist, can be seen to
be asking himself what the law is, what Jurisprudence is about.13 But
most importantly, by posing the question to myself, I can change my
mind. People change their minds this way, even after they have
furnished an answer. People become different or similar, depending on
what they learn, on what ideas they receive from their environment.
Hence we can make evaluative claims, because we can expect people to
(come to) agree with us, after they have reflected on them, even if
they happened to assert different opinions before. Their happening to
be different and disagree - or to be the same and agree - at a given
moment, does not compel them to stay thus; it does not oblige them to
147
stop listening and thinking.)
But then, aren't the arguments that the theorists advance, as
well as the whole language of the debate, entirely unsuitable for an
answer to these questions? Should we not expect political arguments
on the appropriate role of acaderaia and of the courts, instead of
this sterile conceptualism? Should we not at least try to clarify the
language of the debate, to make it strict and stable, even if
artificial, so that confusion at least be avoided and communication
be easy?
The answers here will have to wait. For after all, it is true
that linguistic jurisprudence does not believe in nominalism at all.
On the contrary, for linguistic jurisprudence, there is a reality of
what law is, and law is what it is, regardless of the role of
jurisprudence or of the jurist.
So where shall we look for this reality? But of course, and in
accordance with the name that we've given to linguistic
Jurisprudence, in language. It is time we took another close look at
it.
Our language, and its rules
To say that language is a matter of rules, and not of people's
empirically observable practice, does not mean that it is a matter of
the theorist's rules. And even to say that these are rules the
theorist does not observe in - or otherwise obtain from - others,
every time he presents an example of typical speech from which to
generalise, but has in his mind, does not mean that they are
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exclusive to his own mind. (Language might become a matter of the
theorist's rules - the rules might become exclusive to his own mind -
precisely through the attitude we depicted in the examples under
nominalism). Furthermore, although this understanding of language
does mean that the theorist will pay little or no attention to
people's actual utterances in the course of his investigation (but
will furnish himself with hypothetical typical utterances instead, as
these emanate from his mastery of the skill of language), it does not
mean that other people's practice has no role to play. On the
contrary, such practice has been of utmost importance in the
theorist's learning language - and it still is.
A. Introduction
When I was a kid, and while growing up, I was taught (or anyway I
learnt), through people's practice, or at school, or wherever, to use
words to convey meaning. I learnt to distinguish between different
words, and thereby between different things. And vice versa. A chair
was a chair, and I called it "chair"; a table was a table, and I
called it "table". Just as everybody else around me did. Various
words meant various things, and if I, or somebody else, happened to
mix them up, we were corrected - or we corrected ourselves. As time
passed, I was less and less corrected. I began to correct others. I
had mastered the skill of language; I had learnt its rules. What
rules? Well, rules like a chair is one thing, and is called "chair";
not "house". Yesterday is one thing and is not tomorrow; and that I
cannot "want to do something yesterday" - that this is illogical,
that it makes no sense. 14 Now I hardly ever need be corrected on my
speech. And I do not pay attention any more to other people's speech,
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so as to learn to speak accordingly. I teach my children how to speak
instead. How do I know what to teach? I have it in my mind. It is the
rules I've learnt to follow, so as to produce meaningful sentences,
so as to communicate. But they are not my own rules. They are
everybody's rules. They are the rules of the language. What good
would they be otherwise? So it is not a question of my personal
choices. It is a matter of right and wrong. I may still, on occasion,
be wrong about a certain rule (e.g. I might think that 'myxomatosis'
means a brain disease), and I may still learn from others who are
better educated than me. And I may still happen to make a mistake
through inattention, like a slip of the tongue, that I know to be a
mistake, thanks to my knowledge of the rules.
B. The rules of language
From the point of view of each individual user of language, and
so of the theorist, we may distinguish in the following way. Having
in mind the observable, i.e, actual utterances or scripts produced in
the external world, there is, on the one hand the instances of
language I produce, and on the other the instances of language other
people produce. Having in mind the rules that distinguish right
instances and wrong ones, there is on the one hand the rules I
observe, the rules I form, and on the other the rules other people
put forth. ,s
In either the rules or the observable, the differences between me
and the others may be immense or minute, or anything between the
two. 17
My attitude towards these differences in general may range from
correcting the others, thus trying to bring about uniformity in
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accordance with my rules (and practice), to following them, thus
adjusting my practice (and rules) to theirs.'8
What generally happens however, is that people live in lingually
settled social environments (and even an unsettled social environment
will tend to settle with time),19 where every new individual
(typically an infant) starts by following and adjusting itself to the
others' practice/ rules (in the process of forming itself), and with
time (once formed and orderly rather than unformed and flexible)
comes to adjust less and less, but to judge and correct more instead.
Thus, at any given moment there will be a certain uniform practice of
observable lingual instances and a more or less accordant uniform set
of rules,20 that certain formulations are right and certain others
are wrong. Each individual will understand the rules it follows to
exist independently of itself; each individual will understand its
own standard practice as conforming to and being the practice of
everybody or of the group. 21 Consequently, each individual speaking
to people of its own lingual group, understandably assumes that they
share the same rules with it, the same standard practice, in such a
way, that if discrepancies were to occur, these would be due to
somebody's (perhaps the speaker's, perhaps the listener's) not
following the rules, not speaking correctly. And should there occur a
disagreement, i.e. should it happen for a certain problematic lingual
instance (or type of it) not to be understood by its producer to have
been defective right away, either the producer has mistakenly learnt
the relevant rules and should if necessary be instructed accordingly,
or he is more advanced in the relevant learning than the others (who
happen conversely to be mistaken) and can instruct them. At any rate,
each one speaks, and expects, if one should be mistaken, to be
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corrected. One does not rely on any statistical evidence, but on
one's (so far assumed to be accurate) knowledge of the rules (i.e./or
ability to act upon them). The theorist is one such individual.
Nothing more, i.e. he may be mistaken and corrected just like
everybody else, and nothing less, i.e. he is not to be considered any
less an authority as far as knowledge of his language is concerned,
he is not expected to base the utterances he puts forth on anybody
else's practice.
Thus, the theorist is not referring to a reality in his mind. He
is not referring to a reality of some social group he observes
either: he is not referring to a reality in their minds. He is
referring to the reality in our minds. 2,*'b
What does linguistic Jurisprudence believe In?
In our introduction of nominalism earlier, we mentioned different
definitions of the word 'law' and said that there is nothing tying
this word to one definition rather than the other. For linguistic
jurisprudence, this is probably correct, provided we understand it to
mean that there is nothing tying this word to one definition rather
than the other. Yet it is wrong to think that there is nothing tying
this word to anything. On the contrary, there are the rules of
language, tying it to certain uses, certain typical utterances if
nothing more, which will probably display a certain family
resemblance at least.
Let's start with an example. Suppose somebody said "I'll use
'law' to denote a heap of dirty socks". Is this possible? Yes it is,
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I do not want to say it isn't. Still, my reaction that this is not
what law is, that a heap of dirty socks is one kind of thing and law
another (even if there might appear someone to whom the latter seemed
to resemble the former), is not any less reasonable.
It is possible for people to take the attitude of using general
words like 'law' as abbreviations for the stipulations they have
attached to them. It is possible to look at such words as mere names.
It may on occasion be desirable too. Yet this does not - and must not
- make them mere names, it does not make them like 'Johnny', a word
that can be attached to various people regardless of whether they
display any "Johnniness". Words, no matter how general, no matter how
abstract, always have a certain meaning in our common language, and
this is how they can manage to convey ideas, and not just sounds.
This meaning is something everybody has to rely on. Even a
nominalist. After all, each definition - even each explanation - will
contain words or signs of some other sort, for which another
explanation can be demanded. As Wittgenstein has so many times and in
so much detail shewn, there is no escaping from having to rely on
existing practice of communication, there is no escaping from having
to take for granted at some stage, as does the reader, that a certain
sign is clear enough - clear in virtue of certain rules, rules in
fact quite inarticulate, that you never even think about, but merely
act upon, with the greatest precision and certainty too.
Furthermore, this meaning does not depend on anybody's political
ideas, arguments, or choices. It is already established before any
related thought takes place. It is the means in fact, whereby any
such thought is formed. We do have a reality here; and it is
independent of the theorist. Not because it is not in his mind, but
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because it is in our minds, or rather what our minds and our
communication stand on.
Thanks to this reality we can know what it is other people are
saying. Thanks to this reality we can speak about things. And
although naturally, what things one is talking about, does depend on
one's own speech, thoughts and volition, what these things are does
not. Law is what it is, and this in no way decides or is decided by
what scholars in legal dogmatics say or should be doing - one may
perfectly well say "law is what it is; and jurists should be
abolishing it"; or that "today's legal scholars have very mistaken
ideas about (the nature of) their object of study"; there is no
mistake in grammar or difficulty in understanding these statements.
Every thing is what it is, and its nature should be determining which
discipline studies it and how; not the other way round. It is this
nature that linguistic jurisprudence seeks to determine in the end,
with regard to the law.
Different languages, different concepts
- But isn't standing on this reality - the reality of meaning in
common language - a little dated? Although people have for ages
believed it to be quite firm, today's linguistics and awareness of
the existence of different languages has revealed this reality to be
rather shaky and ambiguous.
Indeed, it is a well established conclusion in modern linguistics
that different languages make different divisions in the outside
world. The example of the different basic colours in different
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languages has been cited all too often to make the point. We are well
aware today - or so we should be - of the fact that different
languages may have different and also incompatible semantic
structures, and that between our different ways of speaking about
things, translation can be a very difficult matter.22-22*
Still, the variety of semantic structures does not make much
difference to the argument on the relation between words and things.
It simply means that words of different languages, which words may
happen on occasion to be equivalent, may denote different things. A
grandfather is one thing apparently, and a 'maili' (in Njamal, some
Australian language), another (any relative it seems, away by two
generations).23-24 In the same way, law may be one thing, and Recht
(in German) another: thus law might be distinct from morality, but
Recht not so; or they might both be distinct from and related to
morality at the same time, but in different ways (and the same goes
for morality/ Sittlichkeit obviously).24*
Naturally, this might seem an important difference for anyone
concerned with Jurisprudence, especially since it is true that
linguistic jurisprudence does not take it into account, but is
instead allowed by the English language's imperialism, to forget,
that distinctions different from those, one is accustomed to, can
always be drawn. However, in any case, the theorist follows the rules
of his language and makes conceptual claims from within this
language's semantic structure. What else can he do?25 If he is aware
of this possibility of difference, he will assume this practice,
these rules, to be the ones of the group rather than everybody. If,
on the other hand, the actual audience, the other individuals within
the group, should have different lingual backgrounds (as they
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certainly do in discussions of jurisprudence today), they may respond
by introducing different distinctions and concepts, i.e. by speaking
about different things (if they think this to be relevant or
interesting). I could say for instance that "yes, what you have just
said about the law is correct, but it does not apply to the Recht"
(in either language). And we can of course use definitions,
stipulations or whatever, to make ourselves understood. After all, I
could do the same thing, even if I knew of no language with the
distinction I wanted to draw already established. Nothing changes for
the idea that the theorist stands on a certain established practice
of communication, a language, a certain set of rules, providing for
what is right and what is wrong. Besides, do not forget that these
facts about language do not only apply to the English language as
distinct from the French, but also to the language of the jurists as
distinct from the one of the doctors. And there are rules even for
making stipulations and the like.
It is true however, that these considerations result in watering
down the possible claims of linguistic jurisprudence's, as of any
idealism's. They make it very difficult to speak of Plato's truth in
the ideas, And, together with the Wittgensteinian emphasis on the
underlying rules as presuppositions for thought and communication,
they also undermine any strong abstract contrast between these two
attitudes of the theorist's towards his language: a) using the
language as the theorist finds it, with no attempt to control it
(descriptive attitude), b) deliberately constructing the language he
uses through stipulations, in an effort to make what he thinks and
says absolutely clear and unambiguous (prescriptive attitude).
Because it has to be acknowledged that the two attitudes may have to
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be accepted both, and that each one may have something to offer that
the other one does not.
As for The Concept of Law and the considerations of linguistic
jurisprudence in particular, one might argue that, even if it does
not destroy the method and its conclusions, the existence of a
variety of relevant concepts (law, Recht, droit, SCxaiov), seriously
reduces linguistic jurisprudence's importance and relevance. Yet Hart
could reasonably argue, that the idea of the different semantic
structures is somewhat misleading here, insofar as it might be
understood to imply something different in effect from the idea of
the open texture of language. That despite the possible differences
between our various languages, the central cases as regards notions
like law or morality are roughly the same throughout the modern
Western world, in virtue of the strong political and other
similarities, which are more important as a contextual background
than the lingual differences.26 (Hence the idea that linguistic
Jurisprudence tries to understand types of social phenomena). And
that finally, insofar as differences remain in the penumbra of our
different terms among languages, his conceptual analyses, if assumed
to be correct for the English language but not for some other, do not
preclude anybody from pointing this out, if he should think a
different concept (e.g. Recht rather than law) to be more
enlightening for our social condition. The conceptual analyses the
method of linguistic jurisprudence results in, do not pre-judge but
clarify our political issues and discussions, by helping to clarify
the language, in which political issues are formulated and debates
are carried.
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Linguistic jurisprudence is a conceptualise27
But let us forget for the time being the above arguments on
linguistic jurisprudence's importance and relevance, as well as the
problem of the possibility of many similar concepts. For we have yet
to clarify what exactly we understand linguistic jurisprudence and
its claims to be.
We may start by saying that in this Part, linguistic
jurisprudence is generally understood to be a conceptual Ism, viz. to
be posing and trying to answer philosophical questions of the old
fashioned type "what is (the concept/idea of) law?", "what is
beauty?", "what is a straight line?". For truly, it seems to me that,
despite all the rhetoric against "traditional" philosophy's
"metaphysics", that was so characteristic of analytic philosophy, the
basic ideas underlying the method and enterprise of linguistic
Jurisprudence, are those of any good old Platonic idealism.
Linguistic jurisprudence is basically a conceptualist school, as - I
would like to add - is ordinary language philosophy, for the most
part.27* And the vocabulary of "social groups" and "types of (social)
phenomena", rather than "natures of things" or "essences" or "ideas",
is largely there as decoration, to gloss (over), in a manner
appropriate to our modern age of science, our need for the persist¬
ence of our derided philosophical past.
- Then what about the idea of a family resemblance? Of the
variety of possible uses of terms in language? The rejection of a
definition as an attainable goal? Or indeed, the open texture?
These are all tied up with the descriptive rather than
prescriptive attitude of linguistic jurisprudence (and ordinary
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language philosophy) towards actual lingual practice, and to the
related attention to detail. Linguistic jurisprudence is extremely
reluctant to condemn actual practice as irrational or incoherent. It
is reluctant even to treat it as trivial, or irrelevant to the
philosopher's effort to pinpoint and understand the things he wants.
It has instead the wisdom to try to learn from it, and, most
importantly, to teach from within it.
This attention to the details of ordinary lingual practice is
something of a contradiction to the basic conceptualist enterprise.
It amounts to an introduction within conceptualist thought of some
sense of its own limits and relativity. And, this descriptive
attitude has the effect of rendering the philosophical conclusions,
both easier for diffusion, and capable to survive longer, in our
times of rapid change and relative instability, even at the most
basic institutional foundations of the social, like language; but, at
the cost of making them less clear and less deep. (Like the cheap
plastic that has today replaced stronger and more reliable, but less
versatile and functional materials). Before we see their role within
linguistic jurisprudence as a conceptualism, we shall have to return
to our analyses of language, in order to understand more precisely
what a concept is, and what conceptualism tries to do.
Concepts
Unless uninfected by ordinary language philosophy's slogan that
the meaning is the use of language and not correspondence with
reality, the careful reader will have perceived a sophism. He will be
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thinking, that - perhaps in my rush to see linguistic jurisprudence
as a conceptualism - I passed a little too fast, from the uniform set
of rules we find at a given stable social environment and the basic
meaning utterances have in virtue of those rules, to natures of
specific things, corresponding to specific words. At one moment we
were speaking of the fact that even very general words like 'law' are
not mere names but have some meaning in ordinary language, and at the
other we were assuming them to be referring to specific things. Are
we entitled to make this move and how is it made? Besides, given the
fact that we have taken reality, and hence these things, to refer not
to what is empirically verifiable, but to amount simply to the speak¬
er' s claim that his assertion is correct, what are these things?
Where did the speaker find them?
My answer in short is this. These things are the concepts, in the
speaker's mind, which he has (re)constructed, as a necessary part of
the process of thought and of learning and developing (his) language
and logic.
We were left with the idea of a lingually settled social
environment, where there was a uniform set of rules, in accordance
with which each individual's attempts at communication took place.
Thanks to these rules, we could say that, regardless of how vague the
word ' law' , or any item of speech, regardless of how varied the
lingual instances it can be put into and the attempts at
communication it can be used for, regardless even of an absolute
liberty of stipulation, there is a limitless range of attempts at
communication for which it is not suitable. (Thus, I could not say
"law" instead of "heap of dirty socks", or "law to these rules"
instead of "thanks to these rules", insofar as I wanted some other
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speaker of English to understand what the second propositions mean).
Take the legitimate lingual instances. We know that their number is
not closed, but infinite. We know that is, that an item of speech can
be used successfully (in terms of the aforementioned rules/ practice)
in an infinite number of utterances, in an infinite number of
contexts, that cannot be specified in advance. To keep it within
words for simplicity: We know that a word can be placed among other
words to form an infinity of lingually correct phrases; and that we
cannot give in advance a list of these phrases, but only with such a
phrase given, to recognise that it is okay. The same is true, mutatis
mutandis, for the range of illegitimate placements and uses of the
word. 2e
Now let's go back to our individuals. Obviously, each individual,
will, at any given moment, have encountered already, a finite number
only, of correct phrases including this word. The question is, how
can this individual construct a phrase it has not heard before, in
such a way too, that there is no guessing involved, but merely the
individual's certainty, that the word has been used correctly <or
not), and that the listener, if paying attention, will receive the
information he is supposed to?
I think that the answer has to be in terms of generalisations
from the concrete situation, phrase, or use of the item of speech,
i. e. in terms of items of apprehension and thought, i.e. in terms of
concepts. 29
Assume a subject confronted by a range of legitimate meaningful
utterances, containing the same recognised repeated item, e. g. the
same word. In order for the subject to be able to place this item in
a legitimate meaningful utterance it has not encountered before, the
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item, the sound, must be abstracted from its context in the given
concrete utterances, linked in the subject's mind with an item of
thought, an idea, a concept, which is then related to other such
items logically, before the new utterance can be produced.
This is the model I have in mind. The subject, insofar as
thinking, abstracts,-29* from the concrete situation it experiences,
important (i.e. meaningful, significant)30 features, which are put
together as an idea, a concept (and distinguished from other such
ideas), so that generalisation (a rule) can take place. The subject,
when attempting to understand other subjects and communicate with
them, seeks and furnishes suitable explanations of the other
subjects' behaviour, by matching its own ideas/ abstractions with the
ones of the others', altering its own if it has to. The subject, when
confronted with communication structured through signs, insofar as it
recognises the repeated use of signs A, B, C, etc. in various
concrete situations, seeks and furnishes suitable explanations for
these signs, tying certain significant features together under sign
A, under concept A, and distinguishing them from other such features,
under sign and concept B. Finally, these received concepts structure
the subject's thought, and are applied in the subject's perceiving
certain features of its concrete experience as significant, in the
subject's realising that these features of its concrete experience
are important/ meaningful. In this way the subject learns, by
(re)creating and maintaining order in (its) language and reason (i.e.
in (its) logic).
This is the way (or one of the ways) we learn language. I detect
that this object is the same as that one, through detecting that my
parents use the same word for both - they are both chairs; it doesn't
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matter that they are of different height for instance. And, I also
detect that this utterance is the same as that one - both 'chair' -
through detecting that they have the same meaning (in both cases this
kind of object was asked for); it doesn't matter that they were
uttered by different persons, that one voice was shrill and the other
coarse, or things like loudness, intonation, urgency etc. Naturally,
these detections of mine will need be confirmed, or disconfirmed
subsequently by further experience, and most importantly in practice.
So, we can understand the rules and standard lingual practice of
each individual user of language to depend on concepts and be partly
composed of them. These concepts are first of all abstractions from
experience, depending on and including, the element of (perceived)
importance/ meaning from the individual's point of view. At the same
time, insofar as the individual, in the process of understanding and
communicating with others, receives language from them and adjusts to
their practice, they are categories for experience, on which the
individual's perception of importance/ meaning in the concrete
experience will depend.
To the extent that the individual wants to talk or has been
talking to others, these concepts are linked to communicable signs.
These correlations are the semantic rules of its language. Or of
everybody's language (in the group). Because, we can pass from the
individual to the group here too, in the same way that we did so for
language in general. Part of the uniform rules of language are the
concepts, and part of the standard practice is uniform thought.3°*
These concepts, these abstractions of important, of meaningful
features from experience, these categories providing how to
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experience what, are the things making up the reality in our minds we
have been talking about. These are what conceptualism investigates,
and these are what linguistic jurisprudence's types of social
phenomena are.
The indeterminacy of concepts
But if at the end of the day the concepts are a matter of our
common language, if language provides us with them, if they are part
of its uniform rules, what do people disagree about, when they
disagree on the concept of law? What is there for conceptualism to
investigate?
A. Detour: More on the one uniform language
First of all, do not be tempted by this question to think that
either concepts are provided by the uniform rules and practice of
language, therefore there is nothing for conceptualism to
investigate, or that concepts constitute language, therefore, to the
extent that they diverge, there are different languages. I explain.
We spoke of uniform rules of language, standing on the fact that
the rules are perceived by the speakers of the language to be
uniform, in such a way, that if discrepancies were to occur, these
would not be seen as a matter of different people speaking different
languages, but rather as a matter of the diverging subject's making a
mistake (or an innovation from which to learn). Here we need not, and
will not, take any decision on which degree of difference is needed
for a linguist to speak of a different language. Let us remind
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ourselves, that, as uninterested observers, we could equally well
decide to see, either merely lingual instances, which have to be
different from one another, as different events, or, the act of
communication among people, which is the same, for everybody at all
times and places. In what we called uniform rules and standard
lingual practice, many differences in fact, among the individuals or
even for the same individual at different times, might one detect -
like varying pitches of voice, different intonation and prosody, or
uses of different words and characterisations, in front of the same
event; a bathroom I call "dirty", my offended flatmate might call
"reasonably clean (for a student flat)". Hence, uniform rules and
uniform practice, means simply this: that the differences one could
ordinarily perceive, are not overall significant from the perspective
of the specific speakers and participants. Thus, there is one
language, and the people disagree about which the rules of their
language are. Since we understand each other to be speaking the same
language - or, which is the same, to be able to communicate - we may
disagree over what "law" means (especially in a phrase like "the
judge must apply the law"), just like we might disagree over 'law''s
spelling, or about standards of house-keeping.
Indeed, the above is true not only for words, but for things as
well. And this is why. If we understand "language" in the traditional
way, just as we do in our ordinary speech, i.e. as distinct from
thought, it is true that concepts as such are a matter of thought
(and reality) rather than language, which is a matter of statable
signs (the "vehicle of thought"). Assuming then that language is less
important than thought, and that therefore, as far as language is
concerned, ease and certainty of communication is relatively more
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important than fidelity to one's own intuitions (regardless of one's
pride or humility, i.e. tendency to imitate or depart), there is
greater allowance for our disagreeing over what law is (i.e. over the
concept of law), than over ' law''s spelling. This however does not
mean that our putting forth different concepts merely amounts to our
thinking differently, in contrast to what the case is with language
and its rules. On the contrary, just as we said earlier when we were
speaking of language, actual difference may (be seen to) depend on
someone's having made a mistake. Not only how one speaks or writes,
but also what one thinks and what one says may be wrong. And where
before we spoke of rules of language providing that 'lor' is not how
to spell "law", here we shall speak of Logic, or Reason, providing
that law is not morality, and hence the judge need not bother with
the rule about turning the other cheek (even if there is no question
on this rule's validity).
Are you still tempted to speak of merely different languages and
ways of thinking or forms of life? What if two people were present at
the same car accident, but disagreed over what happened? This would
not make you say that in fact they were not present at the same
accident, but different ones. And yet, what counts as the same event,
is not any less dependent on one's definitions, than is what counts
as the same language or logic.
B. A way in which concepts may (have to) differ, even though thev
are the same
So we return to our original assumption that the concepts are
provided by our common language (logic) and are part of its uniform
rules. We also return to our original question, what it is that
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people disagree about when they disagree over a concept.
Concepts we said are abstractions of meaningful features from
experience, and at the same time categories providing how to
experience what. Let's take one aspect at a time.
A concept is an abstraction, from the concrete experience of the
subject's, a recognition of certain characteristics. These
characteristics then form the concept, the idea, which is detached
from the concrete case, generalised and applied to other concrete
cases, in such a way that all these cases are seen to be instances of
the concept, and as such are named from it. Which features of the
concrete case will be paid attention to and abstracted, this will
decide and depend on what generalisation is taking place. I see for
example a certain object, a chair, and I notice e.g. that it has four
legs and a back and people use it to sit on; this is an abstraction
from the concrete object, which happens to have a back decorated with
flower patterns, is made of beech wood, has certain particular nicks
and marks on its body, etc. From this abstraction I generalise and
assimilate this particular object with other objects, which are all
seen to be and named chairs, regardless of the fact that they are not
in the same place, that not all of them have these flower patterns,
or those marks and scratches. I even see them to be nothing but
chairs, paying no attention to their specific constitution. And I
contrast them to other objects, which I see to be and name tables, on
account of certain differences like the one that at a table I sit to
eat. On the other hand, a different abstraction and generalisation is
also possible, which assimilates all the above objects as furniture,
and contrasts them to another kind of objects, say people. Or, to
give a less obvious abstraction, I could stick to the flower pattern
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of our original chair, and assimilate all objects presenting this
rococo style; I could even stick to the scratch on its front right
leg, and create the concept of "artifact-with-scratch-on-front-right-
leg", equally applicable to chairs, tables and buildings on pillars.
The above example must have made obvious what any good lawyer
steeped in Judge-made law will tell you, namely that for every given
concrete event or specimen, you may have a range of levels and
possibilities of abstraction, each one allowing for a different
characterisation of it. Confronted in law with a decided case, a
possible precedent, one may have a range of relevant or irrelevant
features, a range of possibilities of abstraction, each one allowing
for a different pronouncement on what the decided issues were, and
amounting to a range of rules, each one entailing a different
decision for the case to be resolved. Thus, from the much referred to
in books on legal reasoning case of Donoghue v. Stevenson, we can
draw a bewildering variety of descriptions of the facts, at various
levels of generality: Did it matter, and is it relevant, that there
was present in the bottle, a) a dead snail, b) a snail, c> an
unpleasant foreign body, d) a foreign body, or el an unexpected
quality? Or perhaps the presence of f) a hairless recoiled object?
Did it matter and is it relevant that the above presence was caused
by the negligence of, a) the defendant who was a manufacturer whose
goods are distributed to a wide and dispersed public by retailers, b)
a manufacturer, c) a person working on the object for reward, d) a
person working on the object, or e) someone dealing with the object?
Or is it perhaps the negligence of f) a red-haired long-nosed
individual?3'
So just as there is not only one description of the fact6 of a
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decided case that one could possibly make, so is there not only one
abstraction that one could make from a concrete experience. Yet
possible abstractions are one thing, meaningful abstractions are
another; possible characterisations are one thing, sensible charac¬
terisations are another. Although one might speak of Donoghue v.
Stevenson as a case about dead snails in soft drinks, and although
such characterisations and groupings of precedents are not entirely
uncommon among common law lawyers, this case is not about snails; it
is irrelevant whether it was a snail or a cockroach, dead or alive,
in beer or tomato juice. How do I know this? Because these differ—
ences would make no difference to me, had I been in Mrs Donoghue's
shoes; because such differences make no difference to man. In the
same way, I am not interested in distinguishing between different
rococo patterns in furniture; all I care is that I don't like them.
And I have no reason to distinguish between pieces of furniture with
scratches on this leg, and ones with marks on another; (I see no
meaning in/ have no use for these distinctions - so far as I am no
carpenter repairing furniture); whereas it makes some difference to
me whether I can use a certain object and how.
This does not mean that noone might happen to pay attention to
and abstract from such an unimportant feature; one might indeed
happen to think of Donoghue v. Stevenson as a case about corpses in
drinks. It means that we might help them come to see that this
abstraction, this characterisation is unreasonable; that there is no
sense in this naming.
- And why does it matter what my interests are? Why does it
matter what makes a difference to me?
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What else could matter more? I am the one making the abstractions
and the generalisations; I am the subject making the concepts, as a
part of my thought, in accordance with my purposes and/or condition;
for me, not for the objects. I am the one distinguishing what is
material from what is irrelevant, I am the one understanding certain
things to have a meaning, and others to be of no significance.
The subject abstracts from the concrete experience and
generalises in accordance with what it understands to be significant,
what it understands to be relevant to its own self. The subject's
concepts depend on and include an estimate of the subject's
condition.
(So, of course, man is the measure of all things. (fldvTwv
Xpijpdtwv p£xpov dvQpomoc,). )
(The subject's condition as the context Notice that this condition is
naturally nothing other than the context, which is so often spoken of in
aodern theories of meaning31* as the creator of meaning. We too have said
that there is no meaning independently of a context; now we can see why
this must be so. Whether an abstraction is meaningful or not to the
subject, whether a characterisation looks sensible or not, this is a
matter of the underlying understanding of the subject's situation. The
recognition of certain features in the concrete as significant, and their
abstraction from others that are irrelevant, is a matter of what the
subject is doing, what its place is, and therefore of the use it has for
the generalisation being made. If I were a carpenter, different scratches
on pieces of furniture might be quite significant; the same goes for the
variety of rococo flower patterns, had I been studying them. )32
It is important however to realise that the subject's condition
may include and even be determined by the subject's membership in a
group, working for a common purpose, or generally being active
together. This membership will often entail the abstraction from the
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details of the specific individual, in exactly the way we spoke of
above <it is irrelevant whether my hair is blonde; what matters is
how strong I am, etc. , and so what job I can do better in the
building of the house). These details are generally abstracted from,
in speech tending to a community. 321 So what matters in the end, is
not my own interests, or what makes a difference to me personally
here and now. What matters is my nature as a human being, in
accordance with the understanding of which nature I understand and
construct myself, thus achieving harmony.
(Hence the ultimate question of philosophy's "what is a human
being?"). 32b
It is for this in the end that we have a common ground existing
independently of any particular person's recognition. It is because
of this that we can speak about reality, in the sense of independence
from the theorist (though not necessarily in the sense of
independence from our community).33
But let's not rush. "The subject's concepts depend on and include
an estimate of the subject's condition", we said. How then does the
subject construct and realise its condition? How does the subject
understand who he/she is and what he/she wants?
Through the concepts it has received from others in the process
*
of learning language and accordingly understanding and forming
itself.
Concepts are categories, received with language during the
subject's interaction and communication with others. They are
established abstractions and generalisations, allowing the subject to
order its experience through their distinctions, allowing it that is,
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to perceive similarities and differences. They are ideas, structuring
the subject's thought, providing the subject with an identity, a
sense of who he/she is and of its place in the surrounding
environment; this sense is the subject's perception of its condition,
in accordance with which the subject understands what it wants. They
are names, what the subject understands to be meaningful, what the
subject understands to have a sense. They are the glasses, or rather
the mind, through which the subject sees the world and itself in it.
Thus the fact that I see this object as a chair, the fact that I
contrast it to tables or to people, is a matter of my having learnt
what it is, while learning language. The fact that I see certain
abstractions to make sense and certain others to be of no
significance, is a matter of my having, in the same way, realised who
I am and what makes a difference to me. The fact that I understand
the presence of a dead snail in Mrs Donoghue's beer as contrasted to
the presence of a live cockroach to be irrelevant, is a matter of my
having realised who I am <a judge, not a biologist) and what I am
doing (trying to resolve a case in court, not studying the
decomposition of snails). And it is also a matter of the existence
already in (what I understand to be) the law of certain rules,
relating ideas like the ones of a judge and of resolving a case in
court, or those of a purchaser, a contract, negligence etc., and so
prescribing what to pay attention to, what makes a difference, and
what is on the other hand, irrelevant.
Yet although many possible abstractions and characterisations are
clearly senseless, there may remain a number of mutually incompatible
ones - given the specific context and demand for action -, all,
seemingly at least, sensible. Thus, to pick again from Donoghue v.
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Stevenson and its snail, it was not so clear whether we should speak
of a case about the presence of an unpleasant foreign body in a
chattel for human consumption, or the presence of an unexpected
quality in some object.
This brings us to something any good Continental lawyer knows,
namely that existing categories and the rules made of them, may
afford divergent interpretations, when the subject is confronted with
a concrete case, a concrete object to which the category is supposed
either to apply or not. Thus, it was not apparently clear, when the
United Kingdom's Race Relations Act 1968 prohibited discrimination,
with regard to the disposal of housing accommodation, "on the grounds
of colour, race, or ethnic or national origin", whether it prohibited
discrimination on the grounds of legal nationality or not. It is not
clear, assuming a rule "no vehicles in the park", whether an
electrically propelled toy car is such a vehicle.34
It is not accidental that lawyers perceive such problems and
speak of them as ones of unclarity in the pre-established rules, in
the law, and especially in the language of the law. It is not
accidental that we complain about the unclarity of language, when we
find in front of a particular situation that our categories do not
clearly distinguish what we have to. The subject, used as it is (or
to the extent that it is so used) to have its surroundings, its
world, orderly structured and its place and actions in it
predetermined through the categories in its mind, feels it should
have been provided by these categories, i. e. by (its) language, with
a structure that can be applied here too, and tell it which
difference is important and which one is irrelevant. Why? Because it
has to distinguish here and now, and act. Thus the subject re-exam-
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ines its concepts, what the relevant names mean or must mean, so as
to find and recreate the needed order.
Should we approve of this attitude? Shouldn't the subject just go
on and act, in accordance with what it feels it should do? I don't
know, We cannot however condemn this attitude as unreasonable right
away, and this for two reasons, besides the fact that the subject
cannot just ask itself what it wants to do, since it is precisely the
categories in its mind that provide it with a sense of its place,
what it wants, what it is supposed to want. First and foremost,
insofar as all this concerns the way the subject must in the end act,
this is an action, often a common action, that is supposed to be seen
as the correct one, not just by the acting subject, but by an often
indeterminate number of other subjects as well. Insofar as they see
themselves as acting or supposed to be acting in accordance with
common standards of Tightness, it is to these standards that they
have to turn. If I am a judge trying to solve a case, I am expected,
and I expect myself, to do, not what I want or feel like doing, but
what my and everybody else's idea of a judge requires, what the
others expect of me, and what I would be expecting of them, had they
been in my shoes: namely what the law says; I am just (hopefully
temporarily) bewildered as to what it is the law says. Hence, I try
to clarify it. Secondly, the subject has happened in the past to
abstract and generalise in accordance with what seemed sensible at
the time, but found later that it was not sensible in fact, through
learning from the common practice and language (i.e. through growing
and adjusting to its social environment). This may well happen again.
But if the subject pays more attention to the existing categories, it
may see the truth - in the past the established categories seemed
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again unclear, but then it understood them better. Previous
experience of the community is bound to be wiser than the one
individual. (Besides, what the subject wants, who the subject is, is
this fixed and unshakeable? Certainly not. It changes and evolves
with time, through the subject's learning. 3S) - In short, what is
meaningful, what is reasonable, is commonly so; only what seems
meaningful is confined to the individual's thought and decision. It
is the common standards, the common truth, that have to be resorted
to; they cannot be bypassed.
Regardless however of whether we shall approve of this attitude
or not, regardless that is of whether we shall opt for careful
thought and planning or for instinct and spontaneity, we can now
resolve the paradox how it can be that concepts are a matter of the
rules of language and yet people can disagree about them. In the same
way that people can disagree about the meaning of a certain word in
language, or the meaning of a legal rule, they can also disagree over
reality and truth: They advance different interpretations of them. 36
We can also understand what investigation into concepts is about.
Just as the lawyers perceive the rules to be unclear, when these
allow for more than one decision, but still assume that if they look
more carefully - perhaps in what has not become explicit yet - they
will find one right answer, so the philosopher speaks of a haziness
of the concept and attempts to clarify what e.g. the law is; and,
when they give up, they escape, saying, the lawyers that there isn't
one right answer or that the rules are indeterminate, the philosopher
that ordinary language is inherently vague and ambiguous or that
meaning is not correspondence with reality. Just as the lawyer tries
and makes elaborate and attentive distinctions in his speech, in such
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a way that past decisions be grouped under rules that re-establish
the order and determinacy of the law while providing him and his
fellow lawyers with justified solutions for the disputes in view, so
the philosopher, when asking what is time or what is law, tries to
order and clarify (his perception of) the world, so that he
understand his place in it, himself, his role and needs as a human
being, and teach his fellow human beings accordingly, what they can
and what they must do with their knowledge skills and experience.
And, just as the lawyer seeks the rule, so the philosopher looks for
a definition.
We can also understand what disagreement and argument regarding
concepts is about. It is about different orderings, different views
and explanations of the world, different instructions as to what one
should specifically do; just as the lawyers' dispute is about
divergent views of what the law values more, divergent
interpretations of what action the law requires of them. And yet the
concepts are still a matter of a common language, a language that
evolves with us and our debate. For ask yourself this: When we are
confronted with many interpretations of the statute do we have many
statutes? When we have many views on the bearing of a precedent do we
have many precedents? You might say that we do, one in each speaker's
mind, but neither would this clarify anything, nor would it help
towards the solution sought. It would only make us see less of a
group seeking a common direction, and more of individuals each going
its own way. Indeed, one of the roles of our asking questions like
what is the law, on the assumption that it is not different things in
our different minds but one thing for all, is to emphasise our
similarities as human beings (or as lawyers, or whatever: in the same
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condition contextually underlying our speech) and to (.reiproduce
agreement and community. 36* You might work on an opposite assumption,
but not in a common enterprise.
Family resemblances and old fashioned conceptualism
I have spoken so much about concepts, so that, by substantiating
their existence and role in language, thought and (philosophical)
argument, we could come to realise the role and usefulness - or even
necessity from a certain point of view - of questions like "what is
the law?", understand what the conceptualist's work is about, what
conceptualism tries to do, and so retrieve "traditional" philosophy
from analytic philosophy's proscriptions - the idea finally being
that we be able to see linguistic jurisprudence positively as a
conceptualism itself. 37
This does not mean that we shall disregard what differentiates
linguistic jurisprudence from traditional conceptualism, or that we
shall throw away ordinary language philosophy in toto. Nor does it
mean that we shall (have to) reject the description of the operation
of language, that is so central in it.
Indeed, it is a truth about language, that the uses of a word
that conform to its rules, need not all be alike in conforming to one
and the same definition. The things a word is made in language to
refer to, need not all share the same characteristics, which
characteristics we might put in a definition thus giving the answer
to what it is the word signifies, what the concept is that
corresponds to the word. The instances where a word applies, might be
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linked together in various different ways, where certain features in
the concrete experience are important for some instances, and certain
others for other instances. And, we can have expansions of a word's
applicability in cases where previously central denoted features do
not obtain, extensions that is through metaphor. Thus, to take an
example from Hart, we may have the "foot" of a person, and the "foot"
of a mountain. 30 Or, to pick from a page in the dictionary at random,
a "hero" can be "a man of distinguished bravery", "any illustrious
person", "the principal male figure, or the one whose career is the
thread of the story", "a man of superhuman powers, a demigod".
Ordinary language philosophy was very well aware of these
properties of language. And in its days, a change was effected in the
main paradigm of how expressions work. Whereas before the paradigm of
a word's meaning was in terms of concepts, now we have the idea of an
often indefinite range of possible applications of a word,
characterised by a family resemblance'. This is the situation, where
there is a variety of features, some of which obtain in some
applications and some others in other applications of the word, in
such a way that some applications resemble each other more, some
others less, and that there may even be applications at the distant
ends of the range of applications, having nothing in common (except
of course the applicability of the same word). 39
There is a certain understanding of the idea of the family
resemblance - probably the most fruitful one in fact - that we shall
not be dealing with, as it is not even remotely entertained by
linguistic jurisprudence. This understanding dispenses with
denotations of the sign itself completely, in favour of a total
dependence on the concrete lingual instance and its context, for a
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determination of the sign's meaning, which meaning is therefore
(potentially) different from the one the sign has in any other
concrete lingual instance; the idea is that there is a family
resemblance among such instances, i. e. among the utterances of the
sign. With this understanding we are not speaking then about types/
kinds of use or application of the sign, but about its specific use
here and now. 40 Notice that in a sense, one cannot but accept this
idea, in the same way that one has to agree that this thing here (say
a chair) is not the same as that one over there (another chair).4'
The idea of the concept does not entail that there will not be any
difference among instances; only that these "differences" make no
difference, i.e. that they are unimportant, insignificant,
irrelevant. Equally it does not mean that the complete - if you wish
- meaning does not depend on the specific context, the pragmatics of
the utterance and whatever; it is an abstraction from and of
significance, and an explanation of it. But I am not saying this in
order to make this understanding of family resemblance and the
rejection of the denoted thing, i.e. the concept, sound trivial. For
it may amount to the statement that everything is significant, that
everything is relevant (related, relative), that one must look at the
complete picture, that ultimately one should not judge. Hegel's
instruction that we must look at the concrete and Lao Tzu* s advice
that we dispense with concepts, knowledge and judgements, are here
relevant.42 - Anyway, by the idea of family resemblance among the
uses of a word, we shall understand here the idea that the same word
may have a variety of types of use and accordingly a variety of
denotations and corresponding concepts; we shall not be identifying
the denotation with the lingual instance.
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Our acceptance now that the possible denotations of a word may
present a family resemblance rather than conformity to one and the
same concept, raises two questions. The first one is, how, if at all,
this idea can be accommodated in the descriptive theory of language
and thought that I introduced as a part of the explanation of what a
concept is and what conceptualism tries to do. We shall deal with
this question elsewhere, as this is a rather complex issue,
elaboration on which is of little relevance to our main concerns.
(Let's just notice here that the adoption of more than one possible
denotations per sign, cannot mean that we are no longer justified in
assuming the existence of concepts, from a descriptive point of view.
After all, a concept is nothing other than a category, a perception,
an idea; so to say that it does not exist, would amount to saying
that thought at least does not exist, that there are no thinking
subjects. We do not always think before we act or speak, but
sometimes we do. ) The second question is what difference this
acceptance makes to the "traditional" philosophical attitude we have
retrieved. And the answer here is simple: None whatsoever.
We have an item of speech. Either it will correspond in all its
possible uses with one and the same concept, i. e. one and the same
idea, or it will not. (Obviously, sameness amounts to the differences
being in-significant, to the differences making no difference). If
the subject sees it not to so correspond in all its uses, it will
distinguish the uses that correspond to one concept from the uses
that correspond to another one. After all, each use cannot but be
identical with itself. If needed, the subject will also use
definitions, stipulations, or whatever other explanatory comments, in
the process of expressing itself, of saying with words what it has to
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say.
In the same way, the philosopher is concerned with the things,
not with the words. So it is the things that must be expressed; not
the signs that need denote one and only thing in abstract each. If a
sign, an item of speech can be used in different ways, if it may on
other occasions convey different meanings too, this might at worst
entail that our philosopher might have to be more careful in his
attempts at communication. It is of no consequence to what he has to
say. Both the foot of a human being and the foot of the mountain are
'foots*. Granted that the foot of a human being is the thing I want
to talk about, and not the foot of a mountain, the other uses of
'foot' in the English language are at worst a slight annoyance. At
any rate, the uses of 'foot' in the English language are no concern
of mine.
Our old fashioned conceptualist is not trying to describe
language. Nor is he learning a foreign language, thus having problems
with distinguishing between words and their uses. Instead, with one
eye towards the established practice, language, categories, and
another towards his own experience and thought, our philosopher seeks
to perceive what exactly the things are in fact, i.e. which features
are meaningful, which abstractions order thought and the world best,
in view of man's place, needs, aspirations.
The traditional conceptualist seeks definitions. Yet these are
not definitions of words. They are definitions of things. Not what
'law' in the English language (or the lawyers' language if you
prefer) means, but what law is, this is what is asked. It is
irrelevant whether a word's entire function in language might be
impossible to encompass in a definition. What is looked for is the
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abstraction one should make, the category one should use, the
appropriate understanding of the instance and generalisation from it.
The definition is needed in order to provide precisely which features
are significant. The definition is needed not in teaching a foreign
language, but in teaching one to reason.424
The definition sought, will have to be clear, precise and strict
- by definition. Otherwise it will be unsuccessful in fixing the
limits that distinguish one kind of thing from another, it will be
unsuccessful in determining what e.g. law is. 43 Lack of clarity and
precision will mean that one has not yet clarified the concept, that
one does not yet know what matters, what is significant. It will mean
that the subject is still (to some extent) confused, that the subject
does not know who he or she is and what he or she wants. (Notice that
a definition need not then take the form of abstract terms in a
proposition. The definition sought is the determination of the
(significance of the) thing, which can be made in many ways, even
through examples.)44,44"
It should be obvious then by now that our traditional
philosopher, once he believes he has seen the truth, will have a
prescriptive attitude towards people's practice. Actual speech and
thought (\6yoq) of others - as well as previous speech of his own
probably - if incompatible with what he sees to be the case, will be
errors. Even hitherto standard and established usage. After all,
people do happen to make senseless abstractions and generalisations,
people do happen to talk nonsense. (The philosopher himself has
happened to do so in the past, before learning better. Perhaps what
he says now is also incorrect. Then, let whomever knows better stand
up and speak. ) As regards actual common practice, the philosopher
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tries to improve it, by teaching the others.
However, the philosopher is concerned with the way people think,
as well as with what people say. He is not primarily concerned with
rearranging language, i.e. the words and their uses. He distinguishes
between things and uses words to do so. If these words are otherwise
often used without such discrimination, this is unfortunate to the
extent that these distinctions are needed and that their lack is a
sign of confusion - but generally this aspect is not important.
Still, as a result of the philosopher's seeing and distinguishing
clearly, his standard lingual practice, his language, will probably
change - for the better. The same might happen to everybody's
standard lingual practice, to everybody's language, as a result of
his saying what he has to say. Philosophy does rearrange language
too, just as every activity involving thought and communication does,
without that is its being directly concerned with it."16"*®"
Linguistic jurisprudence is a philosophy (rather than a
sociology) and a conceptualism (rather than linguistics). Thus it
too, seeks to perceive what exactly the law, morality, obligation
etc. are in fact, not Just what the words mean in language (or in
some group's social reality). It too will adopt a prescriptive
attitude once it has reached its conclusions, and so maintain that
law is distinct from morality despite the fact that others happen to
make contrary assertions. However, with this conceptualism, there is
a considerable departure from the basic understandings of philosophy
that we have depicted. Linguistic jurisprudence understands the fact
that a word may not always conform to one and the same definition in
its actual uses, to be of some relevance. It does not apparently look
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for a definition - for a strict one at any rate. It does not try to
control language, to make it express the things it should; it tries
to describe it, to be taught of the things by it. For linguistic
jurisprudence, what the words mean in language is identical to what
the corresponding things are in fact.
We shall now go on to see what this divergence means.
The paradoxes of linguistic jurisprudence
A. The limits of the definition
...The supposition that a general expression can be
defined in this way rests on the tacit assumption that all
the instances of what is to be defined... have common
characteristics which are signified by the expression
def ined. 46
For linguistic Jurisprudence, this "tacit assumption" is
unreasonable. For linguistic jurisprudence, it is possible that all
the instances of what is to be defined, do not have common
characteristics signified by the relevant expression. All the
instances of what is to be defined as e.g. law, and thus
distinguished from e.g. morality, need not have common
characteristics, such as are signified by the term 'law'.
Does this make sense? No. It is of course true that it fits with
family resemblance as a possible property of the uses of lingual
expressions. An expression may have a variety of uses that display no
common characteristics. Yet we saw, that from the viewpoint of what
conceptualism tries to do, uses of lingual expressions, and their
family resemblance rather than conformity to a definition, are
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irrelevant. The philosopher does not really care to have all these
uses fit in his definition. The philosopher will discover the
characteristics that are significant (by examining both language,
i.e. the pre-established categories, and his own perceptions of
significance). If the expression does not appear to signify them, and
if it also appears to signify other insignificant characteristics
too, the philosopher will either use another expression, or make this
one signify what it should, i.e. what in the given context it is
needed to signify.
- But according to linguistic jurisprudence, all the instances of
what is to be defined, need not have common characteristics -
regardless of the expression being used. 47
But this makes even less sense. Any given instances can be seen
to be the same; they can be seen to be different too. It all depends
on whether the characteristics that they share (e.g. all events took
place in the same millenium)40 will be seen to be significant or not.
If the shared characteristics are significant - given the context,
our condition - the instances will be grouped under the same
category. Otherwise they will not; they will be distinguished, i.e.
placed in different groups under different generalisations.49 What
matters are not the instances. We are not trying to describe them. We
can see them; they are right in front of us. What matters is the
characteristics and their significance: the abstractions, the
concepts. After all, we are concerned with the concept of law, aren't
we? Not with any specific collection of statutes.
Of course, the collection of instances linguistic jurisprudence
is concerned with, is provided by ordinary language. Linguistic
jurisprudence takes an expression and notices that it applies to a
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variety of instances (or, more accurately, types of instances). These
instances are then seen not to contain any common set of significant
characteristics. And linguistic jurisprudence assumes that it should
not try to alter language, but be taught by it. So it says that the
instances of what is to be defined share no common characteristics.
We cannot disapprove of this humble attitude towards established
common language. We have seen that the subject is typically taught
through language. It is through the already established categories
and generalisations that the subject perceives similarities and
differences, understands what is significant, what its condition and
identity is. Yet what this means is that the subject, when faced with
this collection of instances that is provided by the application of
the same expression for all of them, may come to understand that they
are the same, that the characteristics they have in common are in
fact significant. That the instances may seem at first sight not to
contain any common significant characteristics, does not mean that
there aren't any. Perhaps, if one looked more carefully, one would
find them. Thus the philosopher can indeed let language teach him,
rather than try to control it. Nevertheless, the fact does not change
that in the end, the instances will either share the same significant
characteristics and be ones of the same concept, or they will not,
and be instances of different concepts. The only situation where this
is not necessarily seen to obtain, is when one has not yet examined
and clarified one's thought and categories, i.e. when one has not
done what the philosopher is supposed to be doing.
Nevertheless, linguistic jurisprudence has an explanation for
this paradox. It is another paradox, that of the central and the
borderline cases. We have finally arrived to what was perhaps the
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most important insight of ordinary language philosophy, that is, the
open texture.
B. The open texture
Linguistic jurisprudence does not really believe in the family
resemblance as the paradigm of how language works, any more than it
does in the strict definition. It prefers a paradigm combining
somewhat the two: There will normally be a definition, corresponding
to an abstraction, a concept. This can fully depict only some of the
relevant instances though; the central ones. For there will also be
instances only partly fitting the definition, only partly
corresponding to the concept. There will also be instances on the
borders of our categories; the borderline cases. Thus, there are
instances in between the ones that our categories classify,
displaying some of the properties that are significant for
classification under one category, and some of the ones that are
relevant under another category. It is because of this that all the
instances of what is to be defined do not share exactly the same
significant characteristics.
Again, we may ask: If we must classify these instances that do
not fit our established definitions too, can we not create new
categories? Surely we can make new abstractions of significance. All
we have to do is look at these instances, rather than the established
categories in ordinary language, abstract the characteristics that
are significant, and place the instances in their own genus.
Well, we could of course, except there are also characteristics
that cannot easily be said to be either relevant or irrelevant, but
are rather of some importance, and some unimportance. Because our
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categories that provide for what is significant, i.e. what is to be
abstracted from the concrete case, do not distinguish between the
characteristics the way we find them in the concrete cases.
- What does this mean? You have got in a vicious circle: Our
perception is unclear and does not allow for a complete
classification of the instances we are confronted with, because our
categories that provide for what is significant do not classify them;
and our categories do not classify them, because our perception does
not allow for the instances' classification. But obviously this must
change. And surely it is for the provision of further clarity, and so
change of our categories and perception where needed, that we enter
into philosophical reflection. If all were clear already, we would
not be reflecting over it. You speak of degrees of importance and
unimportance. Well, at the end of the day, isn't precisely this the
issue over which we must decide? Who we are, what we want, and so
what degree of importance of the characteristics is needed in order
for them to be relevant?
- This means that we have not decided over them yet; probably
because we have had no need for it so far. And we do not know how to.
For we cannot exactly tell, who we are and what we want. (And because
not only are we, but we become too; we grow). We are ambivalent, we
have doubts. (We change). Our world is not in perfect order. There is
some disorder too. (And change). It is for this that our ordinary
language, that is ordinary logic or common sense, has to be unclear
and imprecise to some extent, is bound to display family resemblances
too and not only conformity to strict definitions. Only artificial
languages dispense with this phenomenon, by eliminating, not our
doubts, but our perception of them. Only the logic of the fanatic's
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is clear and strict, because the fanatic,49* has no doubts; and
doesn't allow himself to change.
Hence our concepts will always be - to some extent and some more
so than others - open textured. But this is not necessarily a defect.
Because the open texture of our language matches the change and
unpredictability of the world. It matches our restricted knowledge of
it. We cannot be aware of every possibility in advance. We may be
surprised. So our allowing for some ambivalence and disorder, allows
for some applicability of our concepts, of our language, in
unpredicted circumstances. The introduction of some degree of open
texture in the theorist's language, amounts to the introduction of
some flexibility in them. And the theory of the open texture of
language is an allowance for the idea and possibility that everything
is in a flux, that everything flees.
In the end, we cannot reject this description of our established
language and concepts. We must in fact acknowledge linguistic
jurisprudence's wisdom, in the understanding of its own relativity.
From the point of view of "old fashioned" conceptualism, we can only
restate the contradiction.
C. The contradiction, its role and its usefulness
If investigation into our concepts is about clarifying our
perception and knowledge of who we are, what we want to be, and
finally what is reasonable and what we must do. If the definition
sought, in being a distinction between kinds of things, is also an
interpretation of what law is, and therefore of what it is the jurist
is expected to pronounce, or what legal dogmatics is about. Then,
shall we not say that the theory of the open texture, interesting and
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illuminating though it be, and also correct as a description of the
language of our community, is nevertheless irrelevant to the
conceptualist' s work? That the conceptualist is not just relating
what we know anyway our words happen to mean, but what, according to
him, we must understand them to mean (in view of our common
activities and decisions)?
Okay, the world changes and it may surprise us. Okay, we have
doubts. Is then surprise something bad, to be avoided? Is it good to
have our doubts - perhaps also our (potential) disagreement - hidden
behind fuzzy concepts and hazy language? And if the circumstances
should change, why have the same old concepts applied in the new
circumstances, which they were not made for? Are we not supposed to
reflect on them anew instead, and evolve our language, in
consciousness of our choices, of what we understand our condition to
be? (So, in general, should we not each time try to render our
concepts as strict and unambiguous as possible? Should we not aspire
to an ideal language, rather than fall back on the haziness of
ordinary language and be content with it?)
The answer here depends on how much need we have for specific
reflection on the new conditions and for consciousness of our choices
regarding them. We may not always have the time needed for reflection
before action. We may not always have the patience needed to listen
to the philosopher who has provided the strict definitions, and
related clarification, of an already past condition. The concepts
will be applied to the new circumstances they were not made for,
because these are the concepts we've got, when the new circumstances
come about.
190
(So, in what regards the issue of the ideal language, and its
lack of haziness, well, you can't be serious. Why learn a language I
shall need to change tomorrow?50 Of course, haziness and ambiguity
can be a defect, and depending on how much the clarity is needed in
the specific context or enterprise, how much time we have, what our
general predisposition towards careful thought and planning before
action is, and how much effort we are willing to undertake in view of
what it is about, we may try and approach higher standards of
clarity. So we shall have more clarity the more we find the
underlying issues to be e. g. important, limited and stable, and the
more we who speak are fond of careful thought before or rather than
action. Indeed, this is I think a property of language as it stands,
'triangle' for example displaying less haziness than 'art', at the
moment.)
As for our doubts and disagreement now, isn't it time somebody
paid attention to the fact that there is also something we believe
in, that there is also something we agree on, still?
This brings us to our social condition in our modern times, as
the most interesting explanation behind the paradoxes and the
contradiction of the conceptualism of linguistic jurisprudence.
Indeed, behind the introduction of the idea of the open texture in
conceptualism and the related descriptive attitude towards
established language, behind the abandonment of the ideal of the
strict definition, lies the present condition of our world. Because
today, the world is changing too fast, for us to have the time to
reflect on our condition; too fast for us to aspire to have our
(perception of) reality and our actions orderly structured and
predetermined. Because today, the world is perceived to change too
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fast, and we do not have the patience for it; we do not have the
patience to listen to the theorist, consider his proposals for our
common understandings and advance our own. And how could we listen
anyway? There are much too many theorists, with much too many and
(apparently) incompatible viewpoints, speaking past each other.
Because today, we are too diverse and too apt to perceive our
difference and to disagree; we are too reluctant to learn from each
other and alter our personal concepts, our personal languages, for
them to come to match each other closely.
Thus, the abandonment of the search for the strict definition,
corresponds to an emphasis on agreement and its reproduction. It
tailors the necessity of accommodation to some extent, rather than
rejection of contradictory viewpoints. Because the speaker cannot
hope to influence and alter those who hold them, as his voice is lost
in the noise - and is part of it. The descriptive attitude towards
language and the identity of the ordinary meanings with the things
sought, is, besides its reasonableness and relative advisability, a
matter of the theorist's having to stand on language now, and say
"but we do have a common language; we can communicate". Otherwise his
saying (even to himself) that "we can agree and move on to do what is
right", will not sound convincing.
I am not saying all this, in order to scorn this modern
conceptualism though. For, I don't know, but perhaps we've had too
much disagreement, too much diversity, too much of the individual
asserting its difference on the one hand, and pulling for the others
to conform with it on the other, for the philosopher to do it too.
Perhaps we've had too much contempt for obedience and too much praise
for originality, for common enterprises, i.e. for politics, to have
192
any remaining sense of purpose and direction. Too much of the
individual thinker perceiving, abstracting and generalising for
himself, and too little of his ruminating the established and
adjusting himself and his concepts to the others around him, Too much
of the individual being, and too little of it becoming.
At any rate, the attitude of linguistic jurisprudence, precisely
because of its paradoxes, is wise. Because this way, instead of
forcing the reader to exchange his language and conform with yours -
which he will hardly do; you cannot control him today, if you ever
could - you let him evolve his own language, the way yours has.
These paradoxes are missing from old fashioned conceptualism. The
old fashioned conceptualist is indeed (by definition) expected to try
to provide strict definitions and classifications, that leave nothing
(significant) unaccounted for, in penumbrae or borderlines.50" The
old fashioned conceptualist gives interpretations of what our reality
is, bearing on what action is therefore sensible. If, besides
intelligence, he also has the wisdom to have doubts (to see that he
knows not), he says so; SOb he doesn't say that language must be
unclear.
Yet the old fashioned conceptualist had the luxury of the
assumption of a group, where each one speaks and expects, if one
should be mistaken, to be corrected. The old fashioned conceptualist
spoke on the assumption "if what I am saying is incorrect, let
whomever knows better stand up and speak". This is a luxury
linguistic jurisprudence cannot afford, because already these
assumptions are Utopian. For, where do you think you are? Walking the
streets of Athens next to Socrates? Today in New York, nobody is
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going to reply, and if somebody tries to, they'11 only be imagining
they heard you.
The old fashioned conceptualist did not have the burden of having
to reassert the existing agreement all the time. The existence of
agreement and common understandings was too obvious, too evident, for
people to even notice it, let alone threaten it. Hence he could offer
strict definitions and interpretations, of what he thought is
correct, regarding the borderline cases, without thereby
contradicting - or rather being seen to contradict - his assertion
that we agree, that things are what they are because we are the same.
He had never had to make this assertion in the first place. By
contrast, ordinary language philosophy is, when it starts, confronted
with the opposite assumption: that we are different, and so our
judgements diverge; things do not look the same, if they ever were.
And so, before it can give its definitions and interpretations, it
has to convince, itself first of all, that they correspond to
everybody's ideas, that they fit everybody's perceptions. It has to
rediscover and assert our agreement. Yet we assert our disagreement
too often for ordinary language philosophy to be able to put it in
relief. It has to accommodate it within our agreement, to hide it in
the letter's penumbra. So, from the viewpoint of the traditional
conceptualist enterprise, the picture will have to look somewhat hazy
in the end, and shallow; because from this viewpoint it was precisely
the penumbra that needed to be carefully lit, and it was the
borderlines that should be sharp and in focus, for the accuracy of
the picture to be easy to check and for the resulting design to bring
an improvement when put to use in the organisation of our community
and common enterprises. But now that the very existence of our
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community is in doubt, now that its degree is so low and our
enterprises are full of organisers talking past each other, the
question is not so much one of improvement of organisation and
achievement of greater order, but rather one of maintenance and
preservation of their remains.
So finally, the open texture is not that irrelevant to the work
of this conceptualist here. Because, unlike traditional conceptualism
perhaps, linguistic jurisprudence is much more concerned to relate
what we (should) already know our words happen to mean. And the
accusation that linguistic jurisprudence hides our disagreement
behind hazy language is not very well placed. Because, as our common
language is not so obvious anymore, linguistic jurisprudence is
rather more involved in (re)establishing and clarifying that
background of rules, that we (may) use in forming and discussing our
disagreements too, and less concerned with offering complete and
consistent views regarding the latter.
A summary comparison of linguistic jurisprudence
with traditional conceptualism
One difference between linguistic jurisprudence and traditional
conceptualism is first of all, that traditional conceptualism was
clearer in its assumptions and position. Traditional conceptualism
thought that each word refers to one thing, and did not speak of uses
of language or family resemblances and the rest. In fact, it spoke
very little of language; it spoke right away of concepts (or ideas)
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instead. If a certain concept was unclear, traditional conceptualism
did not go into the actual uses in language (.except of course in
illustration), which were assumed to be trivial; because if a certain
use were to diverge from the concept, the utterance was defective,
illogical, unclear, i.e. to be corrected (unless of course there was
no reason to bother).
Linguistic jurisprudence on the contrary, as ordinary language
philosophy that it is, maintains both the conceptualist assumptions
(thus law is one thing, morality is another, regardless of each
person's choices and volition), and a non-rational view of language
with attention to uses and maintenance of inconsistencies between
them, as this is seen in the idea of the family resemblance. There is
a certain incongruity between the two, which is accommodated thanks
to the idea of the open texture. This last idea allows for some
change in language and ways of thinking, because of which change
there is a constant gap between the logic conceptualism aspires to on
the one hand, and actual practice and ways of thinking on the other.
Insofar as the idea of conceptualist reflection is to effect a
service in actual ways of thinking and alter them if found to be
defective, i.e. unclear and illogical, insofar as the idea is to
improve common language and thought towards the ideal of logic and
limpid clarity, and so to improve ourselves towards self-
consciousness, awareness and order (i.e, towards knowledge of what we
are saying and doing), traditional conceptualism is better. The
maintenance of borderline cases and the attention to the specific
uses in language as paradigms to be followed, even if they seem
contradictory, has the effect of retaining a measure of irrationality
and lack of awareness. And insofar as the philosopher is expected to
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deliver an interpretation towards a greater order of our common
activities, talking of borderline cases and open textured concepts,
is of little relevance.
On the other hand, linguistic jurisprudence's departure from the
understandings of traditional conceptualism, brings with it a greater
flexibility. Also a certain wisdom, in that this conceptualist here
does not overlook his own limitations and his small size, in front of
history and actuality. Thus, his more modest thought and conclusions
will be easier communicated and accepted. And, they will keep longer
and have deeper effects, given the same social conditions.
It is interesting to notice that the traditional conceptualist is
more at home in older times, with smaller communities, where each
subject can respond to a greater percentage of the whole, and with a
slower pace of change, where it will take longer before a
conceptualist service of language will be dated. But I won't rush to
say that linguistic jurisprudence is perfectly suited for our times
either. Its results are indeed more flexible and persistent, and so
more difficult to overturn, because they are less prone to look, not
only dated, but also hostile. This endurance however, is only in
principle certain. From the point of view of today's actual social
facts, I suspect that nothing can really surpass the obstacle of
cultural fragmentation, or survive our age's frenetic change.
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Intermission: Ret ar-get t ± rig.
It has been a long and difficult discussion. At the end of it, we
find that we have given a decent epistemological ground, to the
undertaking of linguistic jurisprudence, and a meaning to its
research. We have now substantiated the idea Part 3 is based on, that
linguistic jurisprudence's distinctions and results are not
descriptions of how people happen to think, but indications as to how
we must reason. Paradoxes and the rejection of strict definitions
apart, we have given a sense to the search for what law (or morality
or whatever) is, what it is in fact not words, for we are no longer
afraid of using words like 'fact', 'truth', 'reality', when speaking
of concepts.
A part of our work here is thus ended; a part which began with
our passing from "social reality" to "reality", and which was meant
precisely to resolve the problems this passing created. We have now
completely clarified - I hope - what we said in the introduction on
how we must understand The Concept of Law, as well as our departure
from our understanding of it in Part 2. And there is nothing looking
fishy anymore about the theorist's relying on presupposed rules,
which are in his mind, yet do not thereby preclude the possibility of
objectivity in his pronouncement that "law is X, not Y".
We shall now forget our recent quasi-sociological analyses, as
well as the idea that linguistic jurisprudence is not searching for a
strict definition. We shall especially forget the conclusion, that
linguistic jurisprudence is more concerned with relating and
reproducing our agreement, and not so much with offering complete and
consistent views regarding the ambiguous and problematic issues.
198
[The purpose of The Concept of Law] is to advance legal
theory by providing... a better understanding of the
resemblances and differences between law, coercion and
morality, as types of social phenomena. 51
We are now clear on what we are looking for. Our concept of law
will be an ideal type, an abstraction from the concrete of what is
important and significant, not according to some observed social
group, but according to us, and for us to use as a category in our
organisation of thought and perception. s'*
But how do we go about it? How do we determine, how do we see
that concept X is the correct one? How do we produce it? By looking
in ordinary language we are told. There can the resemblances and
differences that we want to understand be found. We should not try to
control and correct it; we should not try to eliminate its
ambiguities. We should use them instead, to help us see more clearly.
Thus linguistic jurisprudence is not very keen on the theorist's
distinguishing and naming things in accordance with his perception.
The theorist will see more clearly, if instead he adjusts his
perception to the names and the distinctions already before him.
These ideas are neither obvious, nor without problems. It is to
these problems we shall now turn, for an examination and assessment
of the method of linguistic jurisprudence.
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B. THE METHOD OF THE ATTENTION
TO LANGUAGE AND X TS PROBLEMS
The search into language and the distrust of abstraction
One of these problems is linguistic jurisprudence's attention to
details of language, and its concomitant partiality to picturing
diversity rather than unity. The discussion thereof, will help us
form a clearer view of the method of linguistic jurisprudence, and of
what it means to search in the language to find our concepts.
Let's see the problem in detail. We have already seen, that, in a
certain sense, the idea that we may look into our language and so
understand the similarities and differences between things, is
obviously true. Everyone receives concepts and ways of thinking from
organised communication, from pre-established language, in the
process of learning. The subject, when faced with various lingual
instances it perceives to contain the same unit, abstracts from them
and comes to understand the unit to denote a concept (and so can then
use the unit in new instances). Hence, in applying the idea that we
must search into language in order to find what law is, we can look
into the apparently diverse cases where the given unit 'law' (or
'rule' - or ' as a rule') is typically encountered, and proceed to try
to understand it, i.e. to generalise from these cases, to form a
concept that explain the various uses, and a theory that unify them.
Yet, linguistic jurisprudence follows precisely the inverse
procedure. It does not strive towards further abstraction,
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generalisation and unification, starting from apparently diverse
cases. On the contrary, it looks for differences and distinctions
behind the apparent uniformity of the same lingual unit. Thus it
starts with 'rule' for instance, and then goes on to assert that
there are two distinct concepts behind it, not one - which concepts
it correlates to lingual units that are larger than the original,
namely 'as a rule' and 'a rule requiring certain conduct'. Indeed, we
are told that one should be suspicious of small one-word units, and
prefer looking at bigger ones, which are less prone to mislead(^p We
are told in ordinary language philosophy to avoid abstract meanings
(even sometimes that there are no such meanings) and keep to the
concrete use. Yet it is precisely an abstraction (a concept) we are
af ter.
Furthermore, linguistic jurisprudence does not stick to the one
crucial term. Hardly ever does it take instances of it into account.
If its method were simply to abstract from lingual instances
containing the same unit, we should expect lists of such instances
and abstractions, followed by propositions of the type "abstraction A
is incorrect, because inapplicable to instance q". But nothing like
that happens. Instead, it looks at other words. In order to
understand 'command' it looks at 'order', 'request', etc.; in order
to understand 'rule*, it looks at 'standard', 'principle' etc(^ It
constantly points to differences between similar words and ideas. It
looks as if the point were to diversify as much as possible; not to
unify at all.
So we can easily see that the search into language means
something other than what one does when merely learning language. The
instruction to look into language, has the meaning to look into the
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richness and diversity of language.
We do not look into language just for the sake of abstracting.
Language is not used as a pool of permissible generalisations. After
all, people do not use language only to generalise. We do not always
speak in the manner of science, e.g. of "bodies" related to each
other by "forces". We use language to describe the concrete too, to
convey the impression of a specific historical instance: Instead of
saying that "every body is subjected to the force of gravity", I
might be speaking of my son who is falling from the roof! We also
speak in the manner of literature, viz. of the specific case, without
equating it with any other case. There is an infinity of degrees of
abstraction or detail, and language possesses an immense richness to
afford our coping with either. Besides its general terms that
abstract more and can be more widely applied, there are special terms
too, that transmit greater detail and are applicable to more limited
ranges of cases, regarding which however they convey greater
information. Still, this does not mean that the more specific terms
do not denote concepts, that they are not abstractions. On the
contrary, "my son" in the above description for instance is an
abstraction, for it is equally applicable whether he cut his nails
before starting to fall or not. Language as such is abstraction)^®^
thought as such, perception as such is abstraction. Abstraction of
significance. Abstraction of what matters. Which brings us to the
point that not only the great all-encompassing concepts deserve our
attention, but also the smaller ones. And that when we are asking big
questions, like "what is law?", when, that is, we are trying to
define great concepts, it pays to look into the smaller ones first,
to see there what is significant, so as not to forget it in our more
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aloof definition. Because significance can be lost in abstraction,54
just as it may be lost in details and trivialities.55
For the same reason, it may be useful to look into various
similar concepts, to see what distinguishes them from the one we are
mainly concerned with and are trying to define, so as to see what is
most peculiar and characteristic of the latter, and so what is most
important about it. Significance is a matter of contrast. It is a
matter of what makes a certain type of thing different from another.
So it is easier to see the precise meaning of a certain term, when it
is compared with various other similar terms. The corresponding ideas
will then look clearer.
The meaning of the search into language is to look into language
in order to take into account the various aspects of significance
that we might overlook if we kept our eyes on the general concept
only. It is to try to perceive the specific conditions and
situations, the context, that create significance. So, of course, we
must pay attention to the concrete uses of the words. And naturally,
in our doing this, both aspects of the model of thought that we
presented in the analysis of what a concept is, are included. We do
not just look at the established categories that provide us with a
sense of what matters, but abstract also and understand them in
accordance with our own perception of it.
The reason behind the instruction for a search into language, is
that perception of significance will be easier for the theorist who
looks into his ordinary practice and reactions to varieties of
situations (which practice and reactions is what language here
amounts to in the end). Because this practice and these reactions are
wider and more complex, than what his perception affords when he is
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looking exclusively at his big abstraction.
(- But isn't the very meaning of abstraction to discard
specifics? To forget the details of the concrete?
Yes. However, an abstraction is the right one, only if it can be
applied to each and every concrete case it purports to cover, and
only if it is enlightening with respect to these cases, as depicting
what is important in them. Thus everything of relevance in the
concrete cases, must be covered in the generalisation. Or else, the
latter is wrong. To say that something is to be abstracted from, is
to say that it is irrelevant, i.e. insignificant. Yet how can you
notice that something is significant, if you do not see it? To put it
in other words. The definition we are looking for, is supposed to
include, what is important and so groups certain cases together
despite their unimportant differences. This is at the same time what
makes a difference, and so distinguishes these cases from other cases
that are grouped in the same way. But how can we then see what is
important if we do not look at the cases?
And how can we see that something is insignificant, if we keep
our eyes on it? For truly, if the theorist does not look around at
the variety of cases, that the as yet undefined and so vague idea
purports to (or should) cover, chances are he will just furnish
himself with one or two paradigmatic cases (the current paradigms of
the idea's application), and generalise what at first sight appears
striking about them. (To illustrate. There once was a very bright
boy, who, upon the visit of his uncle, the mathematician, at home,
was asked what he had learnt at school a triangle to be. The boy did
not remember much at that time, but he did remember a picture on the
blackboard, of a closed figure with three equal lines. So he answered
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right away (cause bright boys are ready to answer): "A triangle is a
figure in Geometry with three equal lines".) Only after we have
looked at many instances, and so put the most obvious ones, those
that first come to mind, in their proper perspective, does it make
sense to proceed with generalising. Only after we have finished our
work, only after we have reached the correct definition (i.e.
determination of the until then vague idea), can we dispense with the
details of the concrete cases (and thereafter treat these cases as
mere instances, unimportant in themselves and only useful as
examples, viz. useful in exemplifying and illustrating, for the
purposes of teaching, the concepts and distinctions we have created/
discovered).)
This paradox then is resolved. It is precisely in order to be
more exact and to provide a most accurate and strict definition, that
we must look at the concrete cases and applications that provide the
context for our seeing the significance of what we want to define. It
is precisely when we are trying to form a concept that unifies the
apparently diverse cases of application of the same lingual unit,
that we must search not only into those typical lingual instances
that carry the crucial term, but also into such instances of other
similar and/or more specific terms, that will afford us an insight
into what is important at the level and type of abstraction we are
interested in. After all, it is obvious that when trying to define
the law, we should look into ideas like duty, obligation, authority,
wrong, justice, Judge, morality, as well. Because the concept of law
will need fit with, and probably explain in part, these other ideas
too.
The search into language does not have the meaning of a check,
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whether language possesses a way of unifying two cases, or a way of
distinguishing them. (In fact, it will generally possess both). We
look into language in order to see the significance of either
unifying or distinguishing. We look into language in order to see
when it makes sense to unify and when to distinguish.
The method of linguistic jurisprudence is not just to look for
diversity behind the apparent uniformity. Linguistic Jurisprudence
looks in the diversity, before it can perceive the uniformity. It
most certainly searches for a unification. But it is careful not to
hurry into the latter, and so to manage to achieve greater clarity
and perception through it; not less.56
As ordinary language philosophy, linguistic jurisprudence has
been accused of an obsession with detail and distinctions and of an
obstinate refusal to abstract.57 This accusation is not very correct,
if addressed to the method that we analysed above. Although it is not
entirely unjustified either, even in this respect. Because it is a
defect of this method that one may get lost in the detail and become
unable to notice the similarities. Especially the practice of
bringing in many similar terms, like 'command' and 'order' for
example, and pointing to what is peculiar to each, does not help
abstraction and unification. So significance may be lost in
trivialities here. But it does not have to. In fact, the problem is
more a matter of the times and fashion on the one hand, and the
speaker's own competence to apply the method successfully on the
other. (After all, there is only one method in the end: the move from
the most concrete to the most abstract and vice versa).
It just so happens that historically, there was in ordinary
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language philosophy an actual tendency to diversification rather than
unification, in comparison to more traditional philosophy.S7* This
has a series of explanations. One explanation is of course that the
English language and corresponding style and tradition of education,
does not help one abstract and unify, but breeds a certain tendency
towards useless details and trivialities.se Another one is the
historical contrast with ideal language philosophy, which tended to
accuse ordinary language of mixing different cases;59 ordinary
language philosophy was trying to show that ordinary language can
distinguish as much as any notation, and even more. A third one
finally is the breakdown of agreement and its general perception: By
emphasizing diversity rather than uniformity, the provocative
appearance of flattening abstraction and generalisation is avoided;
diversity (plurality) and complexity is asserted too often in our
times, to be passed over as insignificant.
The search into ordinary language
and my favourite understanding of linguistic jurisprudence
Yet why should we look into language at all? Why should we trust
the words to show us what is significant? Why not look directly at
the things?
Naturally, the expectation to find the concept we seek, by
looking in language, does not refer to the words in the language,
meaning its morphemes. By "language" here is meant received ways of
thinking, received perceptions and judgements of what matters.
Whereas to "look directly at the things" would mean to trust one's
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own perceptions and to disregard received judgements. Furthermore, by
ordinary language is meant ordinary logic, speech, ways of thinking,
i. e. not those of the scholars in their work.
We keep speaking of "language", in accordance with linguistic
jurisprudence and ordinary language philosophy in general. The fact
that ordinary language philosophers spoke of language in this
respect, was largely due to the contrast of ordinary language
philosophy, with ideal language philosophy. Under ideal language is
meant (or this is what we shall understand it to mean here) use of
notation and/or strict stipulations, i. e. attempt to control and put
into strict boundaries one's speech, logic, way of thinking. By
insistence on ordinary language is meant rejection of this tendency
to strict control, and maintenance of everyday language for the
theorist's expression.
So we can see that we have three problems here. The first one is
whether it is reasonable to look at language, i. e. received
perceptions of significance. The second one is whether it is
reasonable to investigate ordinary speech, logic, ways of thinking,
in particular. And the third one is whether we should abstain from
deliberate efforts to control our philosophical speech and make it
strict and by definition unambiguous. Our concern now is with the
first two problems. Our discussion will generally bear on the third
one as well, which however will not be treated extensively in itself.
A. General reasons for the search into ordinary language
A certain justification for the attention to received ways of
thinking, can be drawn directly from our epistemological ground. What
matters depends on my condition, i.e. who I am. Who I am depends on
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the community in which I have been formed. (Who I am depends on the
society to which I belong). This is where my condition has been and
is being determined. And, insofar at least as the research is one for
a common problem, insofar as its results are meant to improve common
activities, my condition in accordance with which, significance is
determined, is a matter of abstraction from those particular details
of mine, that are irrelevant to these activities. I thus have to look
at our agreement, our common ways of thinking, to find it.
Furthermore, insofar as what I say, I say to others, as correct, that
is as something to which they must agree (and not choose to agree by
adjusting themselves to me and my logic), the standard of
correctness, reality, is our pre-established rules of language, our
uniform practice - not my decisions and stipulations.
A further justification can also be drawn from what we have
already said; this is also a justification for the subject's general
adoption of the attitude of looking at the community to find itself
and the answers to its problems. Even in my particular details, and
the points where I tend to dissent and feel unsatisfied with the
established, I am not exactly unique. On the contrary, countless
individuals, with my passions, dilemmas and hopes, have lived and
spoken and disagreed before. Our common standards today have evolved
and have been formed in accordance with their successes and failures.
It is silly to imagine that what I think or hope for now, noone has
thought of before. And on the other hand, there will be a good deal
in people's past experience (and also in other people's experience
today), that I may learn from. In short, previous experience of the
whole community is bound to be wiser than the one individual.
The above justifications however do not address directly the
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specific issue of why we must look in ordinary ways of thinking, in
the sense of a contrast with the ones of the scholars and
philosophers. Why should the unsophisticated everyday speech, which
one would probably expect to be characterised by ignorance, have such
a privileged position, in contrast to the erudite speech of our more
reflective moments?
One answer follows from the above. There is more agreement and
community in ordinary speech than in scholarly speech. Reflection and
intelligence breed diversity and disagreement. Thought and critique
as such, lead to individuality; for when we do not think we imitate
more (and vice versa). So the certainty of communication, the
uniformity of our rules of language and ways of thinking, are in
principle to be encountered at the lower level of normal everyday
speech rather than the upper level of careful reflection and great
knowledge. Intellectuals tend to differentiate themselves, because in
their arrogance they tend to assert their individuality more.60
(Before moving on, it is interesting to notice that the above
considerations do not exclude their opposites, and so the opposite
conclusion. For one might choose spontaneity and individuality. One
might prefer to bring in new concepts, one's own logic, and
disagreement with the established uniformity. Insofar as addressing
others, one might hope that they would choose to follow, 61 that they
would see themselves as disagreeing in the same way. As for the
wisdom of the past, new conditions may sometimes be seen to render it
useless. And of course it is not true that there is no disagreement
at the low level of everyday attitudes, and no agreement at the high
level of intellectual talk. (After all, is it not said that great
minds think alike?). So the above considerations are a matter of more
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or less, rather than yes or no. And accordingly, for what concerns
our more specific problem here, a theorist would probably (need)
display a little of the opposite attitude as well, and it is true
that linguistic jurisprudence is not entirely free from attention to
and use of philosophical rather than ordinary speech. (After all, as
we have already seen, in the existing ways of thinking it is always
possible for one to see either the one answer or its opposite. Which
is a way of restating the obvious, that, at the end of the day, the
subject will have to trust its own judgement.))
B. Regarding linguistic jurisprudence in particular
The above considerations however are all of little relevance to
the method of linguistic jurisprudence in particular. If we forget
the general idea that we should look into and allow ourselves to be
taught by language, and stick instead to linguistic jurisprudence's
search into language, as was understood in the previous section, the
only reason that we need take into account is that significance
depends on context and may be lost from view through abstraction. Let
us remind ourselves that language is a matter of rules in the
speaker's mind, which rules are (assumed to be) the same with
everybody else's. The theorist is not learning language; he (assumes
he) knows it. In the idea then that the theorist must look at
ordinary rather than scholarly speech, ordinary speech is not others'
speech, as far as linguistic jurisprudence is concerned, but the one
of the same theorist, in moments when he is not specifically
concerned with the abstraction he is now after. In everyday speech,
one has greater awareness of the specific situations one is
addressing, and of one's hopes, wishes and general position with
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regard to them; speech is adjusted to the specific problems and to
what is significant at the particular moment. When trying to answer a
question like what is law, i. e. when seeking a concept, an
abstraction that unifies, explains and justifies a series of
particular applications and ideas, it is good to look at these
applications and ideas, because otherwise you might forget to include
in your abstraction something of significance from them.
Thus, in looking at ordinary language in order to see the
similarities and differences he is after, the theorist ruminates his
own logic and ways of thinking, before further rationalising them at
a more abstract level.
(To give a model of the process of the search into language: "In
my (our) ordinary speech, I (we) make a distinction here (e.g.
between a rule and a habit). Why? Because there is a significant
difference in this respect; which difference therefore I (we) must
not forget in the account of what e.g. law is."
Let me remind you that the above proposition "I (we) make a
distinction here" is identical to the one "I (we) must make a
distinction here" (or the one "I (we) normally make a distinction
here"). It is an assertion following from the rules, rather than
observation.)
Notice one thing. The theorist looks at everyday speech, i.e. his
ordinary reaction to everyday situations. He does not necessarily
follow it in his generalisation. He may perceive his ordinary
reaction at a certain point to have been wrong. (After all it may
well be found to be contradictory). He simply looks at his
unreflective speech, because it is easier this way, at the more
concrete level, to perceive significance. It is in accordance with
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this perception that he shall form his theory in the end. And he may
well perceive his ordinary ways of thinking to have been wrong in
some cases. There is a sense of course in which his ordinary logic is
followed in his abstraction, and this is in the sense that this logic
is the normal practice, the rule, which, as we have seen, generally
constitutes correctness. Not everything in it can be seen to be wrong
(not at the same time anyway) - otherwise one would end without
language, However, certain more or less limited habits may be seen to
be mistakes, if noticed, typically because they do not accord with
the rest of the practice, the whole, or more accurately, one's
perception of it,
Therefore, when the theory is presented, the examples from
ordinary speech are from the reader's point of view, exactly this:
examples. They mainly help the understanding of the theory; they
simply promote a certain "reader friendliness". For they are backed
by the assertion of the writer's that "this distinction here is
important". As arguments themselves, they have a very weak role. They
merely pose a presumption in favour of the distinction they
exemplify; for if the reader can see in this example an apparently
significant distinction, is it not reasonable to keep it in mind, in
case it is needed for the abstraction? And of course they help one
remember the complexity and diversity of our world, thus guarding
against hasty reductions.
The search into language, as understood and practised by
linguistic jurisprudence, is not meant to offer any guarantee of
correctness, in the sense of an obligation of the reader's to accept
the conclusions because warranted by language. 6'*•b The examples from
ordinary language are mere indications of significance. And this is
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only natural, because, even if we should assume that it is reasonable
to expect language as such to authorise one only abstraction in the
end, regarding what law is, the theorist could not possibly take the
whole of language into account in order to find it. He could never
produce a list of all possible related lingual instances.
About the accusation of conservatism
We can now see a certain discussion and accusation of the method
of linguistic jurisprudence to have been somewhat misplaced.
The instruction that we look at ordinary language, has been
discussed on the basis of whether the established distinctions and
ways of thinking are good to keep. On the one hand is considered the
evolutionist argument that ordinary language embodies "the inherited
experience and acumen of many generations of men", and on the other
the progressive one that ordinary language embodies "superstition and
error and fantasy of all kinds", as it pictures the mistaken and
unscientific beliefs of more primitive and ignorant men. 62 The
fashion in the days of ordinary language philosophy was - naturally -
favourable to the first "conservative" tendency; or perhaps we should
simply say that arguments in favour of "ordinary language" were not
questioned very much. Nowadays fashion seems once again rather more
favourable to the opposite "progressive" tendency. And linguistic
jurisprudence is accordingly accused of an inherent conservatism, and
a tendency to maintain the established views of the world and reject
new and challenging ones, which tendency it covers under a facade of
objectivity, woven by "the power of language to confuse and mislead",
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and maintained by a blindness to the change of language.63
We have seen quite extensively that linguistic jurisprudence is
indeed incapable of perceiving and explaining the change of our ways
of thinking. However this is irrelevant, once we picture linguistic
Jurisprudence correctly, as a philosophy rather than a sociology.
Perception of change is missing from every conceptualism - indeed
more so from the more traditional type - and this is not a defect; it
is a consequence of the very posing of its questions. When I am
asking or relating what the law is, and not what people think the law
to be, I am not concerned with conceptions and how they change;
neither am I concerned with social reality, viz. others' equivalent
names, anymore than I am concerned with fellow philosophers' mistaken
answers. The issue is what I (we) must understand law to be, here and
now, according to (my/our) logic, in virtue that is of who I am (we
are) and what I (we) (must) want. The correctness or wrongness of a
definition in my (our) Reason, does not in principle depend on the
actual change of definitions. (Once I have finished my conceptual
interrogations, I may then use my definitions for perceiving social
change - if I am interested in sociological research. Or I may go on
to instruct the people in my community what e.g. they should
pronounce as law, or in general how to understand, promote and
improve our common enterprises, our politics. )"•
As for the method of the search into language now. There is truth
in both the evolutionist and the progressive arguments, which to me
sound equal in principle. Nevertheless, they are largely irrelevant
to the instruction that we search ordinary language, in order to find
the answers to our conceptual(ist) questions therein. It is
irrelevant whether old distinctions and ways of thinking are in
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general good to keep. Because in searching ordinary ways of thinking,
the theorist searches his own ways of thinking. He looks into the
rules in his mind, perceiving significance that unifies and binds
them. If a certain perception/ interpretation is outdated, or in
general does not accord with the theorist's perception of what is
important, it will be rejected - if noticed at all. Thus 'healthy',
in the examples of a "healthy complexion" and "healthy morning
exercise" will be understood to apply to the different cases of a
cause and a sign of health6* (and so to denote two concepts - two
kinds of things, linked in a family resemblance way); it will not be
seen to apply to the one and the same case of what goes with,
accompanies, or anyway is seen together with health (one concept -
one kind of thing). Because the theorist, in accordance with his
times and social environment, will make the current typical
assumptions with respect to the issue, which difference makes a
difference. He will make his normal and usual judgements on what
difference carries significance. In doing this, he is applying the
main categories and distinctions that order his logic and way of
thinking. Obviously then, if his way of thinking is conservative, he
will make conservative assumptions with respect to the issue which
difference makes a difference; if his way of thinking is progressive,
he will make progressive assumptions. And accordingly, through the
search in language, he will procure older or newer concepts and
ideas, by promoting the ones he sees to be correct, and discarding
those he thinks are wrong. (In fact it is true that through attention
to language, both "old" ways of thinking can be recovered and "new"
ones arise).
- But isn't it true that with the attention to language the
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established and dominant distinctions and concepts will be easier to
see than peripheral and less commonsensical ones?
Of course it is true. It will be rather difficult obviously to
notice distinctions and concepts that are very different from the
dominant assumptions of the times and social environment. For this,
unusual imagination and discernment is needed, as well as more
search. But this is not due to the search in the language. It is the
case regardless. What matters to us in the end, is that the theorist
asserts concept or distinction X to be correct. It may be an
established distinction or a challenging one. This makes no
difference. It means neither that X is correct nor that it isn't.
We can now see in fact, that the idea that attention to ordinary
language will tend to a maintenance of old and incorrect ways of
thinking, is, with respect to the instruction that we search in our
everyday speech in order to perceive the similarities and differences
between the phenomena, entirely unjustified. If in fact we bear in
mind that in comparison to older ways of thinking, modern ones are
generally characterised by more distinctions and differentiations, we
shall see that, as regards linguistic jurisprudence, the opposite
idea is more true. Because, by paying attention not only to the big
abstraction, i.e. the general word (e.g. 'rule') which may well have
remained the same despite historical change, but also and more so to
its more concrete applications and the differences therein (e.g. 'as
a rule' - 'rule of obligation'), one avoids precisely the maintenance
of dated views and ways of thinking. One avoids precisely the
"superstition and error" of older times.
Notice here one more thing (which is of great relevance to the
issue of the ideal language). One avoids. One does not confront. 66
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Confrontation would equally cloud your thought, by forcing you to
extinguish, to ban, what you perceived to be wrong. ss Thus your logic
would become more rigid and less capable of adaptation, once history
and change had made your ways of thinking look "superstition and
error".67
(And a final note. Language in itself has no power to confuse or
otherwise. A speaker may use language in order to confuse or to
teach. And his speech will reflect his confusion or wisdom or both. )
About the diversity of semantic structures
We have already said that the investigation by linguistic
jurisprudence of ordinary language is not by itself a guarantee of
correctness. The fact that a way can be found in language to express
an idea, even the fact that this way is encountered all the time in
everyday speech, is not obviously a proof that the idea is correct.
So the fact that the languages of the world have different and
often incompatible semantic structures, does not as such entail a
rejection of the method of linguistic jurisprudence. The fact that
the concepts of law, rule, morality, obligation etc., in the semantic
structure of the English language, may be quite different from their
rough equivalents in Russian, Iranian and Chinese, is no reason for
us to condemn the theorist's search into his language in principle.
Because the claim is not that "this is the correct concept according
to language" <you've only struggled with (some) English; at best this
would have been the concept the English language happens to have).
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The claim remains that "this is the correct concept according to me".
However, we cannot say that the variety of semantic structures
and concepts is of no consequence to linguistic jurisprudence or
conceptualism in general. First of all, it conditions the theorist's
attitude, through its implication that there might be an infinity of
real (i.e. potentially sensible)67* distinctions and concepts. Should
we then insist on the descriptive attitude towards language - in the
sense of the subject's refusing to name things in accordance with its
understanding of its condition, but leaving itself evolve instead, in
accordance with the categories it encounters - we should forever hold
our peace. We should forever withhold judgement (which may in fact
amount to wisdom (it amounts to the Tao)>. If then it is assumed that
we have to judge at some point, because e.g. we have to act, 68 a
compromise is needed. There will be some naming in accordance with
our understanding of who we are (some pride, some order), and some
evolution of this understanding (some humility, some flexibility).68
Secondly, at any rate (viz. regardless of the infinity or not of
real concepts), if human languages are not for the purposes of our
conceptual research interchangeable, and given especially linguistic
jurisprudence's method, then there is not one, but many ordinary
languages we might profit by looking into, and neglect of the
concrete uses in which, might make us overlook what matters. This
makes the theorist look very small and incompetent in front of the
actual diversity (which - what an irony - was precisely what ordinary
language philosophy was so much in pain to point at). Yet curiously
enough, the friendliness of presentation and lack of strict control,
most of all the lack of clear and absolute definitions as to how
things are, that characterise linguistic jurisprudence, become a most
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important asset therefore, and one we should perhaps admire rather
than scorn. Because what is, is then rendered unimportant, in favour
of what it becomes. And the reader is by the theorist's attitude
invited more easily, and helped, regardless of his background, to
adjust and adopt the pertinent (and from the point of view of being,
questionable) suggestions. 70
Naturally, in response to the problem of his small size, the
theorist might decide to reinforce the authority of his claims, i.e.
their alleged property of being true regardless of what anyone else
may think, by reducing their range of alleged applicability, and so
his field of research. He might decide for instance to say that he is
speaking not of (and to) humanity, but of, say, the people in modern
Western society (or Britain, or the Oxford law school). In doing
this, he understands and decides who he and his group and their logic
is, rather than leaving this to be determined and evolve in
accordance with the categories to be encountered. The possibility of
those outside the pronounced group, identifying with and adjusting to
his suggestions, is thus in principle reduced, in exchange for his
claims being (rather than becoming) more correct, viz. in exchange
for a reduction in the possibility of a need of change in his
conclusions. The theorist (in opposition to the Tao) closes himself
up in his group and reduces the relevance and possibility of outside
intervention. Becoming is suppressed in favour of being. (Still, the
theorist is supposed to see and say how things are; if he were
following the Tao he would not be one; he would have dropped all
concepts and ideas).
Anyway, modern Western society is a rather big and elusive group,
as we have already seen, and of course comprises quite a number of
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languages on its own. If we are to determine here a position for
linguistic jurisprudence (and to the extent that we have), it should
be this middle and simple position, I think. The theorist - small and
incompetent though he may seem - looks at what he can, at the
diversity he is capable of noticing, and makes suggestions on what he
thinks is the case regarding what he can speak of, i.e. first and
foremost himself, without presuming to represent anyone else (if they
disagree, let them speak for themselves; he will (try to) listen). He
speaks about the law, not das Recht, hoping that what he says might
be of some relevance to those who can speak of the latter. He would
love to be able to look further, and does not in principle reject
contrary suggestions from those who can, nor does he generally
disqualify their speech if they do not belong to a particular group.
However, he will assess these suggestions in accordance with who he
understands himself to be, and who he understands we ought to be, and
reply accordingly, yet without having his condition and understanding
strictly predetermined and irreversible.
Perhaps this position is naive, given today's world. All the
same, it is one I feel comfortable with. And besides, should we
reject it, we should stop talking (as Lao Tzu advises).
Introduction to the problem of awareness
With respect to the methodological analysis of linguistic
jurisprudence, we could finish here. We have furnished an adequate
and reasonable, even if somewhat more traditional, interpretation of
the search into language, which avoids the trap of taking language to
221
be something like a proof of reasonableness, and keeps the reader's
eye on the substantive rather than methodological claims. If it is
true that the best method is one that noone notices, then this is I
think the best interpretation of the idea that we should search
ordinary language for an answer to our conceptual questions. At any
rate, it is the one I feel most comfortable with. 71
However, this reading seriously underrates ordinary language
philosophy's anxiety to follow common, i.e. shared, sense, and to see
our conceptual problems as a matter of our established and uniform
rules of language, rather than one's normative assumptions.
Consequently, it is not very faithful to the background assertion
that there is common language and agreement. Hence our use of it to
discard as irrelevant the accusations, regarding a tendency to
maintain established views of the world rather than offer new and
challenging ones, was perhaps somewhat unfair to those who made these
accusations (except of course for the fact that there is nothing
wrong in principle with a view's being established rather than
challenging). But what's most important, in our analysis so far, we
have not paid any attention to the fact, that the theorist does not
examine the assumptions he makes, but takes them for granted. The
implications remain to be clarified, of the theorist's understanding
the distinctions he discovers and bases his conclusions on, to be
obvious and necessary requirements of correctness, independently of
any normative decisions he takes.
It is these issues that we shall go on to discuss now, through a
rather more simplified picture of the search into language (but one
that pays more attention to its common character). This discussion
will bring us back to a problem, that has been lurking in the
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background, ever since the end of our discussion about the rule and
the habit in Part 1: The lack of an explicit awareness of the
theorist's choices and of his reasons for them.
Rules of language, rules of logic
Earlier on in Part 3, we began a descriptive analysis of the
existence of a common language and its rules, on which the speaker is
based when making claims to truth with respect to assertions of the
type "law is X (and not Y>". We shall remind ourselves of that
elementary analytical scheme, and take it from there.
From the point of view of each individual user of
language, we may distinguish in the following way. Having in
mind the observable, i.e. actual utterances or scripts
produced in the external world, there is, on the one hand the
instances of language I produce, and on the other the
instances of language other people produce. Having in mind the
rules that distinguish right instances and wrong ones, there
is on the one hand the rules I observe, the rules I form, and
on the other the rules other people put forth.
In either the rules or the observable, the differences
between me and the others may be immense or minute, or
anything between the two.
My attitude towards these differences in general may range
from correcting the others, thus trying to bring about
uniformity in accordance with my rules, to following them,
thus adjusting my practice to theirs.
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What generally happens however, is that people live in
lingually settled social environments, where every new
individual (typically an infant) starts by following and
adjusting itself to the others' practice/ rules (in the
process of forming itself), and with time (once formed and
orderly rather than unformed and flexible) comes to adjust
less and less, but to judge and correct more instead. (Thus,
at any given moment there will be a certain uniform practice
of observable lingual instances and a more or less accordant
uniform set of rules, that certain formulations are right and
certain others are wrong and so the speaker can rely on his
general knowledge of the rules, without having to abandon his
idea that they are independent of his person - okay).
Accordingly, for each and every individual, the relation between
what it observes on the one hand, and the rules it follows on the
other, is typically neither that the observable always accords or has
to accord with the rules, nor that the rules are a mere description
of the observable to be adjusted if the latter is found to depart.
There is an interplay instead between rules and actuality, typically
progressing through an idea of correctness and/or a feeling for
things like ease, symmetry and elegance. 72 Thus, an individual may
find, either its own and/or others' practice, or its own and/or
others' established rules, to have been defective, to be in need of a
change (without of course a related realisation being a prerequisite
for the change), typically through education; this is largely what
learning is.73 And backing this idea of a need for change, there will
be some consideration of correctness, or a feeling for elegance, etc.
Now, feelings for ease, or elegance, etc., as such, are none of
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our concern here. It is the idea of correctness we are interested in,
for it is on this idea that linguistic jurisprudence's distinctions
are seen to be based, insofar as they are assumed to be correct
rather than nice. It is here that the claims to truth or reality are
based. This idea is logic; a standard both instantiated within
language, and to which language and/or one's speech is expected to
conform. 74
'Yesterday' is different from 'tomorrow'. It is incorrect to say
"I shall go to the cinema yesterday". This is a rule of language. Why
is this so? Because the past and the future are two different things.
What happened yesterday cannot change. It is impossible to do
something in the past; it is possible to do something in the future.
This is a rule of logic.
The rule of logic explains the rule of language. It furnishes the
reason (the logic behind the fact) why one must distinguish between
yesterday and tomorrow, and why in language 'yesterday' must be
different from 'tomorrow'. In saying so, I am not making propositions
about my personal language or choices. I am speaking of Logic. And
insofar as I (think I) am correct, I expect everybody to agree (or to
show me that I am wrong); not to say "this is your way of thinking,
this is your language".
In the same way, I have in front of me 'doing something as a
rule1, and 'doing something in accordance with a rule'. And, the
distinction between regularity of behaviour, and a rule/reason for
it, is presented in explanation, as a rule of logic, which can be
seen in language, in our ways of speaking.
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We are back again to our favourite distinction. This is, indeed,
a logical distinction in Hart's theory. It is characteristically
analytic for his concept of law, in contrast to the way we tried to
see it in the second Part. It is a proposition of the theorist's
logic, part and parcel of the categories that regulate his perception
of the world. 7**
- Need we reconsider its necessity? Or are you implying that
logic is deceptive in general, and that e.g. the distinction between
yesterday and tomorrow need not be true after all?
Neither. (Only our example above is a little deceptive). But let
me explain. We start with the rules of language. What are they?
Mostly conventions of course, habits. Yet some of them, some
distinctions for instance, are indeed backed by logic, our standard
of correctness, in the above manner. These distinctions are
established perceptions of significant differences - and logic
provides for their significance. Thus, the difference between
yesterday and tomorrow, is - say - a matter of man's general
incapability of acting yesterday, in contrast to tomorrow. This is
the reason why this difference is significant, this is the logic
behind its making a difference. This reason does not obtain for, and
this significance is not shared by, e.g. the difference between time-
before-three-days-from-now and time-after-three-days-from-now. Yet
imagine an important occasion, which you must prepare for, three days
from now, and this last difference becomes significant, in a manner
equivalent to the one between yesterday and tomorrow (and the logic
is that only before-three-days-from-now can you make your
preparations, and not after).
Without an insight into the reasons why a difference is
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significant, this difference will either appear insignificant, or
self-evident, a matter of fact. In the second case, it is an
established perception of significance, in one's rules - viz. habits
- of language, in one's rules of logic, viz. habits of thought. 7<b It
is a perception one has often, as a rule. To merely present it, in
language, i.e. to put it in words, is not to present its logic, i.e.
the reasons behind it.
(Everything is different from everything else. All you need do is
conceptualize something as X, and something else as Y, and they are
different. Yet if then you conceptualize them both as Z, they are the
same.
Without, either a reason, or a habit, (i.e. without a rule),
behind the subject's seeing them, they are both and neither.75)
About the analvticity of logical truths: Logical rules and distinc¬
tions are often said to be analytically, or conceptually, and therefore
absolutely, true. Do not let this confuse you. Analytical truth (of a
proposition) is truth that follows froa (the analysis of) the concepts
related (in the proposition). Insofar as the concepts are given, their
logical relations are also given. Once I have determined (i.e. defined)
the abstractions that have significance (in view of our place, who we
are), the propositions in which I relate them will be right or wrong by
themselves, viz. without my having to look elsewhere for knowing this,
viz. in abstraction froa any wider context, My logic/ language makes and
is made by my concepts, and my concepts are thus made, that logical rules
are analytically correct. Yet these concepts are not finite, at least to
the extent that perceptions of significance may shift, in accordance with
the change in the environment and ourselves. What (I thought) mattered
for ae yesterday, aay not matter for ae tomorrow, 76
Accordingly, the distinction between regularity and a rule requiring
it, is certainly correct, and indeed absolute, insofar as regularity is
one concept and a rule another. Yet this does not exclude the possibility
of a third concept, that is their synthesis. In order to find reasons and
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construct a logic (X6yo) that determine the correct choice between the
distinction and its negation, we aust look outside the propositions
asserting the distinction and the negation. (We must look at what we need
the distinction or its negation for).76*
The lack of awareness
So we shall merely repeat the conclusions we drew about our
precious distinction in Part 1. Far from being the only possibility
for coherence, far from being necessarily imposed on the observer as
human intelligence, far from reflecting the way all people think or
understand their actions, the distinction between a social rule and
convergence of behaviour, depends on, and is part of, a way of
thinking, a form of life, by no means universal or necessary, but
instead one depending on our acceptance and allegiance, or rejection,
on each one's decision towards humility, stability, peace and
uniformity, or towards pride, change, fight and variety.
Furthermore, what's most important, no such decision is normally
explicitly taken by the subject - certainly not by the theorist in
linguistic jurisprudence. Instead, this distinction depends on
assumptions the subject habitually takes for granted; it is in fact
itself one such assumption among the rest.
And indeed, it is this habitualness that is put forth by
linguistic jurisprudence's insistence on language. Looking at the
rules of language to see true distinctions, the theorist looks at his
habitual practice of making them - for if there is something that is
taken for granted as existing independently of the theorist, this has
to be the rules of language. And how funny, that one is standing on
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the identity of the rule with the habit, in order to assert their
separation. For certainly, if there is a level of consciousness where
the rule is indistinct from the habit, this must be the level of the
rules of language.
And of course, the language the theorist looks at, is not his own
personal language. It is the language he has received from others, it
is everybody's language. So are the distinctions and his habitual
practice of making them; it is everybody's habitual practice.
Searching through ordinary language, the theorist ruminates our
habitual ways of thinking. His various detailed perceptions of
significance - which are to be unified in the concept he seeks - are
ones we make habitually. Without thinking about it.
And this is precisely what it means to take a descriptive
attitude towards language. It is this that is entailed by the
decision not to try to name things in accordance with your
perception, but to adjust your perception to the names already before
you.
Follow your habits. Don't think too much about them. 77
The theorist is not aware of the choices he makes. He does not
make any choices strictly speaking. Because he does not stop to
realise that there may be other ones possible, among which he need
decide. He just takes things for granted, just as everyone else
would.
Not exactly the most typical image we have of the philosopher, is
it? Not exactly our most central conception of knowledge, either. Or
of Logic. For it is the observer's (e.g. of social groups) or the
actor's (e.g. the judge's when deciding what the law says) Logic,
that is being here determined, according to the answer to "what is
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law".
It Is probably this that made so many critics of linguistic
jurisprudence complain about a tendency in it to retain and ratify
our established ways of thinking. That, contrary to the way we are
used to think of the philosopher, instead of questioning our habits
and our fictions to lead us to knowledge and truth, the attitude of
linguistic jurisprudence is to ruminate, what we should expect a
philosophy to examine and offer rational grounds for or against.
And it is this that poses again an early question, the answer to
which we had postponed: Should we not expect political arguments,
instead of this sterile conceptualism? Should we not expect reasons,
instead of a mere presentation of taken for granted distinctions?
A brief comment on the demand for awareness and control
Well, we do. We do expect reasons, logic, justifications. Mere
regularities, existing habits, are not enough. We want to see
reasons, that provide us with the knowledge whether and why our
existing patterns of action (and thought) are correct, or whether
perhaps we must change them.
What is a reason then? Let's see. There is a significant
difference between time-before-Sunday and time-after—Sunday, because
Sunday is Easter Sunday and I must fast, etc. Sunday is Easter, this
is the reason for this difference.
But what makes this an Easter Sunday? Why not some other Sunday?
Why not second Tuesday from now? Why have Easter at all?
Well, it is a habit of course; a social convention.
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So I have not offered logic in fact, justifying the difference
between time-before-Sunday and time-aftei—Sunday. I made an
assumption, unaware of it. I took it for granted, just as everybody
else does.
But of course there are reasons why we should (or should not)
have Easter and why it must (or need not) be this Sunday. If I am a
good philosopher I must exhibit an explicit awareness of them; not
stand on my habits.
So I ponder upon them. And so Sunday has passed, and I have
wasted my time.
Why should we expect one not to stand on conventions and habits?
Why should we want to be aware of and question them instead?
One answer could be that there are always reasons and choices
behind our habits, whether we are aware of them or not. When we take
our truths for granted, without examination, even if they are true,
even if they are correct, we do not notice the reasons behind them,
that account for the correctness of our choices. So when the times,
and we, and so our - conscious or not - reasons for these choices
have changed, it is more difficult for the discourse over them to
take place. Because they appear to be self-evident; they have become
ideology.
Yet a reply would be here due, that it is awareness in fact and
conscious decision regarding what reasons we have and what choices to
make, that result in inflexibility and obstacles to smooth transition
in the end. To make a conscious choice, for reasons we are aware of,
is to ban the alternative (from the habit we thereby institute). It
is to render it difficult for the change to have a voice when its
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time is near. To make its expression senseless, illogical, in
exchange for a clear and strict establishment, which in its turn need
be demolished rather than adapt. Whereas, when the old does not
impose itself as decided truth, the new is its mirror and takes its
place with just a laugh, at the old's foolishness and blindness,
which it shares. No. It is awareness and true knowledge that becomes
ideology.
And besides, what an unreasonable expectation, that we be aware
of our habits and know our reasons for them. Why, there is no end
here. Everything can be questioned, everything can be placed before
the arrogant demands of logic. But nothing can be done, and nothing
can be said, without assumptions. Every interrogation into reasons
has to stop somewhere. Or have I, who dare accuse others of a lack of
awareness of their choices, not made assumptions in the course of
this work, without interrogation, in accordance with the dominant
trends of my time? Have I not made the assumption of a circular
pattern in history? Or indeed, that everything changes? They do not
even look correct once you notice them.
And yet, despite all this, the lack of awareness, the ignorance
of one's reasons behind one's proposals, still sound grave defects of
one's speech. It still seems impossible to come to terms with the
idea, that "you don't know what you're talking about", that "you
don't know what you're doing". It is probably man's intimate need for
rational control, for the feeling that he knows what he is doing,
that makes the theorist's realisation so vexing, when he sees that
what he took to be rock bottom unquestionable truths, were nothing
other than his habits.
We want our logical rules to precede the ones of language; we
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cannot bear the idea that our logic is just language, i. e.
convention. We want mind's control over and determination of action
and habits. 79 (We want freedom).79 In the end, we want to shape our
world, not be shaped by it. We want to shape the times, not adapt to
them.
Is this noble aspiration, or is it immaturity? (Or is it both)?190
Yet, have we, who want to control and shape the world, been
shaped according to Reason? Are we not constituted by habits and
convent ions?
We want control and order, yet we are children of randomness.
(In the end, is this rational control to be valued? Must we
demand it?
To the extent that we value the individual subject's knowledge
and awareness, progress, innovation, choice, freedom, yes. To the
extent that we value its happiness, community and peace in it,
friendliness, stability, security, no.)
Concluding remarks
- Okay. In the end then, assuming we want knowledge, awareness
and rational control (as much as possible at any rate), assuming in
other words that we are doing philosophy, 01 we must be suspicious of
our habits, and avoid their mere invocation. We must be sceptical
with the distinctions and concepts we encounter in ordinary language
(the province of habit), and far from looking at them as indications
of truth, we must always try to control them, and provide reasons for
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our use of them. And linguistic jurisprudence is to be condemned, for
its failure to do this.
- Well no, not necessarily. It may be quite useful, to reflect on
the concepts we receive in language, and so grasp perceptions of
significance that already exist and hence are common, even on the
assumption that we must be sceptical with established distinctions
and ways of thinking. For, besides the fact that at some point we
shall want to speak to and teach others and so need retain the
communicability the established offers, we need be taught too, who we
are and what reasons we have. We need learn the habits and
conventions that constitute us, and our contexts. Of course, we can
assume, that the concepts and distinctions we receive, were
originally made for certain reasons, even though we are not
necessarily conscious of them now. Whether they are still valid, i.e.
whether it can be said that a particular conceptual distinction is
obligatory for the thinker and user of language, this depends on
whether one still has these reasons - or, perhaps, others - in the
particular context. But it is generally much easier - and even more
enlightening perhaps - to try to find how a concept has already been
constructed in the language, instead of trying in abstract to find
what kind of reasons there are for this or that construction. After
all, what construction will you start with, to investigate? The
possibilities, in abstract, will be i'nfinite. (And you will notice
none, unless you receive it with language. At any rate, there will be
many more for you to see in language, more than you can imagine, even
if you think you already know language.) And how will you identify
your reasons for the construction? Do you know beforehand what you
want? Or the reasons you have for wanting this or that? Our reasons,
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what we want, who we are, change too, along with our concepts and
distinctions (our perceptions of significance). Which is only
natural, since our reasons (i.e. our logic, our speech) are nothing
other in fact, than perceptions of significance (i.e. concepts and
distinctions).
And truly, if our reason for wanting knowledge and awareness is
that we want control of who we are, that we want to shape our times
and environment rather than be shaped by it, does it make any sense
to close ourselves into our personal "ideal" languages? This way, all
we can achieve is to end communication, to avoid people hearing what
we have to say.
No, I do not think we must condemn linguistic jurisprudence on
the basis of methodology, or lack of awareness. If there is something
I might be tempted to condemn, this would be the expectation and
attitude, that in order for one to speak, one must be based on
absolute, obligatory, unquestionable, necessary truths, that the
listener, willy nilly, has to accept. 82 It is better to try to tempt
the listener and draw him towards you. For in the end, all you can
do, is present your propositions, i. e. proposals, and hope that the
tide will move your way.
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NOTES
0, But perhaps, even this qualified sigh of relief is too hasty, For see Martin
M. , The Legal Philosophy of H, L. A. Hart p. 134; "My general point is that,
although the empirical investigation of the sorts of claims about legal language
that Hart has made would not be easy, it would be well within the scope of
present empirical science,"
1, See Searle J. R,, Speech Acts, p. 12ff. I should probably point to the fact,
that in its original context, "linguistic characterisation" is not primarily -
if at all - meant to apply to the kind of distinctions linguistic jurisprudence
starts with. However, I do think that Searle would not object to this
understanding of his text, and anyway, the rationale (which is what matters for
us) is the same,
Relate also Stanley Cavell's "Must we mean what we say?" (in Ordinary
language ed, Chappell) pp. 85-9.
2, Hart H. L. A,, The Concept of Law, p, 235,
3, There is a difference however between language and logic here, as we shall
see later, To illustrate: There are certain rules of language, according to
which, 'obligation' may be used differently from 'compulsion'. There are also
certain rules of logic, that explain and justify this difference, and, according
to which, one must make the distinction,
4, Or, if they happen not to make these distinctions, they have another
language/ logic, different from the one within which the question is being put.
(They are not like us, they do not belong where we belong).
4a, Our "knowledge", in Berger's and Luckmann's terms (as well as "reality").
Compare their Social Construction of Reality for my use of the term 'reality'.
5, - Are we then saying that meaning in language is not a matter of its use, but
correspondence with reality?
The place is not suitable to make either this claim or the opposite, Let's
just say for the time being, that we are taking up the idea of correspondence,
for the purposes of our discussion, insofar as it fits with the above
explanations. Notice that in these, language is equivalent to a specific speech
and logic, i.e. to particular statements asserted to be true, and to a
particular system of interpretation and organization of information from the
external world; language is simply the speaker's ideas, The idea of language as
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a natter of communication between possibly conflicting speeches and different
logics/ ways of thinking, is not relevant to the above explanations. Besides, we
concerned ourselves only with statements; we have not gone into declarations,
promises, jokes, commands, and the like. And correspondence with reality for us,
is correspondence between what I state, and what I believe to be true; this is
not necessarily correspondence with anything empirically verifiable (or
falsifiable). (But I cannot keep myself from saying that meaning as correspon¬
dence is indispensable for the possibility of change of both language and ways
of thinking).
It is worth noticing however, that my use of 'reality' and 'true' is, indeed,
heretical, in view of the fact that today, only empirical verification is
normally accepted as the base of truth claims and that expressions like 'it is
true' or 'in fact' are accordingly assumed, either to apply figuratively only to
evaluations and the like, or to have a different use in such cases. I hope that
by the end of Part 3 my use of these terms will seem less arbitrary. But for the
time being, we can simply take their meaning to have been stipulated in the main
text.
6. Compare Raz J., Practical Reason and Worms p, 17-8. "By fact is meant simply
that which can be designated by the use of the operator 'the fact that...'".
Also Waismann F., "Verifiability" (in Essays on Logic and Language ed. Flew) pp.
134-7 that words like 'real', 'fact', 'event', are like pegs; you can put
anything on them. (I do not agree with him however that the notion of reality is
hazy, containing different types of 'facts', and so affords no consistent
definition or uniform analysis),
7. The term 'nominalism' is not here meant to be used in strict accordance with
the established Anglo-American philosophical vocabulary, Neither do I intend to
refer specifically to the much misunderstood today medieval debate on the
existence of universals. Although this ontologlcal debate and its vocabulary
(which I take certain liberties with, especially regarding ' conceptualism'
later) is not unrelated to this epistemological study of our Part 3, it cannot
be discussed here,
8. On primary and secondary rules, cf. Hart op.cit. supra n. 2, p.77f, Cf.
further MacCormick N. H. L, A. Hart p. 20f,, Raz J, The Concept of a Legal System
p.147-67, Tapper C.F,H, "Powers and Secondary Rules of Change" (in Oxford Essays
in Jurisprudence sec, ser, ed. Simpson), for the relation between this
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distinction and the Hohfeldian conceptual system, and Martin M. op.cit. supra
n.O, p. 28-32 (for a not very constructive critique of Hart's dist inct ion (s)).
9. I.e. A can utter in Ra2's terns, statements from B's point of view. (Raz J.,
The Authority of Law p. 153f (and 137f.)).
10. Cf. autopoiesis; with this naming, self-referential closure has been achiev¬
ed.
10a. See Glanville Williams "The Controversy concerning the Word 'Law'" (in
Philosophy. Politics and Society ed. Lasiett), "The word 'law' is simply a
symbol for an idea, This idea may vary with the person who uses the word"
(p. 1361. Therefore, the problem of what law is, "is an unreal one:... it appears
to be insoluble because it is verbal" (p. 134). See also the account of
"conventionalism" in Beyleveld A Brownsword op.cit. infra n. 42a, p. 83f. The
conventionalist believes that the concept of law can only be a stipulation for
the use of the word, "Stipulations, however, cannot be correct or incorrect, and
so no genuinely rational criteria can be presented for preferences between
them,,. Controversies concerning the concept of law are pseudo-debates, and the
vast volumes of ink which have been spilt pursuing them are just so much useless
verbiage,"
11. So in this sense, Dworkin is of course right, that the debate on what law is,
is not merely about the meaning of the word 'law' in some established language
whose rules and criteria we share. Relate his Law's Empire p. 31ff. Notice
especially the argument he calls 'the semantic sting', p. 43-4, which is
equivalent to the picture we gave above of A's and B's debate. Notice further
his replies to the critiques by Soper and Lyons, in "A reply by Ronald Dworkin",
in Ronald Dworkin and Contemporary Jurisprudence (ed. M. Cohen). See p.256; "Law
is a political concept... It takes its sense from its use: from the contexts of
debates about what the law is, and from what turns on which view is accepted.
And all this is deeply, densely political. ...we would do well to look for the
deep sources of important theories of law in some assumptions of political
morality, about how judges should in general or in principle decide cases for
example, or about what social functions we should call upon our legal
institutions to perform."
12. Relate Raz's saying that what goals and desires we have, we often have for
reasons. And that if these reasons did not obtain, we'Id stop wanting the things
we happen to want. (The Morality of Freedom pp. 140-3, 300f, )
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13. Therefore we are speaking of a reality within the subject's mind. This fits
with and requires the old postulate of rationalism that the world is in me.
14. Notice that logic is Xdyoc; is speech.
15. Do not be led by the distinction between rules and lingual instances to think
that by rules of language we mean something very elaborate, or clearly
formulated, Normally these rules are not even explicit. Most of the time, they
are simply paradigms, (from! my and others' practice, utterances coupled with a
certain use in communication, A rule of language is, for example, that tree is
meant by 'tree' (and not by 'trii'; such an instance of language would be
identified as a typing error); or that if 'I proiise to pay you £50', I have
promised to pay you £50. So, - and in accordance with our analysis in Part 1 - a
rule of language is not normally distinct from the standard practice of the
(individual or collective) subject, the habit,
A rule of language can be distinct from the standard practice however, if we
are thinking of e.g. elaborate rules of grammar in the mind of highly educated
individuals, for whom the rule might well be completely independent of anybody's
practice. (As was the case for instance with the Alexandrian grammarians, in the
Hellenistic times, who regarded the common Greek, people spoke around them as
mistaken and to be corrected, insofar as it diverged from the standard lingual
practice of well educated Athenians in classical times. (See John Lyons
Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics p,8f. Further on the Alexandrian gram¬
marians, cf. R. H. Robins A short History of Linguistics p, 30f. ))
Insofar as we distinguish here between rules (i.e. the reasons and
rationalisations in the mind) and actual practice, the relation between the two
may range between a) the rules (the mind) are totally passive and so shift with
the practice - in other words prescription does not exist, and the limiting case
is where each lingual instance is okay/ acceptable Cx' meant y in that lingual
instance; it means z in this one) (assuming this extreme, I should never correct
my students' grammar), and, b) the rules regulate each observable instance and
the standard practice, and remain unaffected by it; each instance, as well as
the whole practice, is judged as right or wrong depending on its conformity to
the pre-established rules (in this case, assuming among other things the
accuracy of the distinction between the nominative and the accusative cases in
English, the answer "it is me" is to be banned, in favour of the answer "it is
I", or rather, "this am I" - unless of course an ad hoc rule (an exception) to
the contrary is understood to exist).
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17. Such a range can also exist between the rules and the observable, of the sane
individual's; in cases of dissonance here, we shall speak of a mistake in the
observable most of the time - or, occasionally, of innovation. Also, such a
range can exist between the rules in the mind (i.e. the reasons and
rationalisations as above), and the actual standard practice; in cases of
conflict here, we shall speak of a mistake in the rules or in the practice,
depending on whether and the extent to which a descriptive or a prescriptive
attitude in grammar is assumed.
18. This, given of course communication or attempt at communication. Otherwise,
one may simply go away, or stay mute. (Relate the phenomenon of autism),
19. For the tendency of an unsettled social environment to settle, a tendency to
communication/ community is required, that is stronger than its opposite. In the
inverse case, a settled social environment will tend to become unsettled.
Relate the well studied phenomena of speech convergence and speech
divergence, depending on social and psychological conditions. See Crystal D. ,
The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Language p.51: "When two people with different
social backgrounds meet, there is a tendency for their speech to alter, so that
they become more alike... (This happens) in order to reduce the differences
between participants, thus facilitating interaction, and obtaining social
approval." On the other hand, when people want to emphasize their different
allegiances and identity, speech divergence takes place. Cf. further Giles 4
Smith "Accommodation Theory: Optimal Levels of Convergence" in Language and
Social Psychology (Giles 4 St Clair ed.), where also extensive bibliography.
20. Or, more accurately, a practice and a set of rules that are perceived to be
uniform. This is enough, viz, the observer needn't judge how much difference is
needed, in order to speak of difference. It means that there is no difference
that matters.
21. Depending on its awareness of diverse lingual environments; this is very high
today, but was often very limited in traditional societies.
21a. Relate Stanley Cavell's tentative remarks on the distinctiveness of the first
person plural statements, in "Must we mean what we say?" (Ordinary language ed.
Chappell) p. 87. Relate the whole essay to this section in general, especially
pp, 65-9.
21b. Cf. Paul Amselek's, "Le droit dans les esprits" (in Controverses autour de
1'ontologie du droit),
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22. Cf. Lyons J., Seaantics V. 1 p. 235-6 (and p. 250f, ). Further on the idea that
different languages make different divisions in the outside world and for aany
examples, regarding differences among languages, in basic colours etc., cf.
Hjelmslev L., Prolegomena to a theory of language p. 47-60, Lyons J,,
Introduction to theoretical lingustlcs p, 429f., Ullmann S., Seaantics: An
Introduction to the Science of Meaning p. 246f,
22a. The argument from the different semantic structures has been advanced before
against the presumptions of ordinary language philosophy, Cf. Jerry Fodor 4
Jerrold Katz "The availability of what we say" (in Philosophical Review 72
(1963)) pp. 68-9: Since other natural languages code distinctions not coded in
English, English would have to be a privileged language, for the ordinary
language philosopher's claims to begin to sound sensible,
23. The "things" here are of course concepts, ideas (in accordance with our
understanding of "reality"); not eapirical bodies. (More on this later). In
linguistics a distinction between "sense" and "reference" exists, dividing what
a word means (e.g. in teras of its relation with other words) from the empirical
reality it may refer to. (Cf. Lyons Semantics V. 1 p. 177f. and 197f., or his
Introduction to theoretical Linguistics p. 424f., or Crystal D. op.cit. supra
n. J9, p. 102, or Hurford J. 4 Heasley B., Semantics: a coursebook p, 25f. ). We
might say that our things are the senses of the words; not their references.
They are (in the old Platonic distinction) the nouaena, not the phenoaena.
Robinson speaks also of "things" in the same way, in his Definition. See
p. 30: "The word 'thing' is here used in a very broad sense to cover anything.,,
at all that can possibly be symbolized by a single word".
24. This example has been taken from Crystal op.cit. supra n. 19, p. 106.
24a. See Finnis J., Natural Law and Natural Rights p. 4 that "the conceptions of
law (and of Jus, lex, droit, noaos, ...) which people have entertained, and have
used to shape their own conduct, are quite varied. ...social life and practice
bears labels in aany languages. The languages can be learned by speakers of
other languages, but the principles on which labels are adopted and applied...
are not uniform."
25. He can stay silent. "He who knows doesn't speak. He who speaks doesn't know."
(Lao Tzu Tao T& Ching. 56 (trans. Wu)).
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26. Because it is these, rather than the different lingual histories, that
provide for importance and significance, with respect to the abstractions we
(should) make. (More on this later).
27. In the traditional vocabulary of the ontological debate, "conceptualism"
stands for the idea that universals (i.e. abstractions, categories, ideas) are
concepts, and is (seen to be) a middle position between "realisn" (the idea that
universals exist in reality) and "nominalism" (the idea that universals do not
exist in reality). Although there is here a strong connection with our
discussion, and although I would rather keep this idea of conceptualism as a
middle position in the debate (unlike C. S. Peirce for instance, for whom - not
without good reason - conceptualism is the same as nominalism (in his Collected
Papers Vol. 1 p. 6-9)), I use 'conceptualism' in a manner quite separate from
this debate, and to include (even sometimes to primarily denote) what, in the
terms of this debate, is understood hy 'realism'. The reason I do this is mainly
the fact that 'realism' has today entirely different meanings, and its use in
the medieval ontological debate is entirely forgotten (except for dictionaries
of English and scholars of philosophy in the Anglo-American tradition (it also
maintains this (or a similar) use in the philosophy of mathematics)), Today,
"realism" and "realistic" normally mean down to earth (relate "realistic
depiction" in art or "Italian neo-realism"), especially in the Latin languages.
Even in philosophy "realism" is normally contrasted to idealism and stands
closely to materialism. "Realism" that is, has today exactly the opposite aura
and connotations from the idea that Plato's ideas exist in reality, and it is
this last idea's aura of absurdity, in our modern semiotic universe, that I want
to maintain by the use of 'conceptualism' in this Part. Besides, 'conceptualism'
has often been used in studies of legal reasoning to translate
"Beggriffsjurispruden2" from German, and is generally equivalent and has the
same "bad" aura as "mechanical jurisprudence". In the context of the study of
the law, it is easy to identify with attention to and reasoning from abstract
concepts in general, as opposed to "attention to the facts (of the case)". I
want to keep all these uses and connections of ' conceptualism'.
But we need not really pu22le ourselves with this ma2e. We can simply say
that 'conceptualism' here stands for the attitude of asking and trying to answer
questions like "what is law?" ("what is justice?" "what is truth?" "what is a
straight line?"), regardless of the ontological debate. (Thanks to the fact that
"reality" for us is simply what corresponds to language/ logic/ speech, I could
technically be a conceptualist in this sense, even with a nominalist answer to
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the ontological problen, to the extent that I have ay personal logic, i.e. ay
personal decisions on what matters and what does not as far as I am concerned).
'Idealism' is another good term to use, quite appropriate insofar as the aura
of absurdity goes, and rather more suitable for maintenance of vocabular
compatibility with general philosophy, although it is particularly ambivalent
there too (almost as much as 'realism'). It would have been the best term in
Greek (and perhaps in the Latin languages too). I have opted in English for
'conceptualism' nevertheless, as rather more apt for a technical use, and also
in view of the distinction between the "conceptual" and the "empirical". Our
"conceptualism" advances claims regarding the former, not the latter. It is in
view of this that the above definition becomes apposite from a strictly lingual
point of view too. (With 'idealism' the definition would instead rely on the
contrast between the idea of - say - the straight line (or the ideal straight
line (relate "abstraction as idealization" in Davis op.cit. infra n. 29a,
p, 126f. )) on the one hand, and any particular straight line on the other).
27a. See Gilbert Ryle "Ordinary language" (in Ordinary language ed. Chappell)
pp, 28-9. Although I would generally distinguish the use of a word from its
concept(s), his saying that the idiom chosen was a matter of vogue rather than
any difference of sense, is here instructive.
28. And there is also a range in between, where we cannot say that the word has
been used correctly or incorrectly; but we need not concern ourselves with this
just now.
29. From the point of view of a general theory of language and thought, the term
'concept' is an unfortunate choice as the general term, since, at least because
of etymology, it implies a gathering of elements into a whole. There are no
elements within the generalisation we speak of; it is the element itself (not
because it is not divisible - it may well be - but because it happens not to
have been divided in the subject's apprehension, and because it could equally
well have been fused itself into a larger, element again). Thus, and also
according to basic lingual intuition, this term is adequate only so far as we
have in mind ideas like the law for instance; it becomes inadequate, if we move
to e.g. the "ab-" in "abnormal", "not", "I", "and" etc. 'Notion' is more
successful, and 'sense' - although less neutral than 'notion' - could be a
possibility (especially in view of the distinction between sense and reference
in semantics (see supra n.23)). ' Evvoia' in Greek is ideal. Nevertheless, I
shall stick to 'concept'. Otherwise, this text would become much more
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complicated, and without any reason, given our main concern and the fact that
for the most part we'll be having in mind concepts anyway and not other notions.
29a. See the chapters ori abstraction and generalisation at Davis P. 4 Hersh R. ,
The Mathematical Experience, p. 126-36; see especially p. 129-33. See also
Buyssens E., La communication et 1' articulation linguistique p.29-36, and
relate here and to the second part of the following section on the indeterminacy
of concepts.
30. One of the older meanings of the verb 'import' is carry as its purport,
signify, imply; be of significance or importance (according to the Oxford
dictionary of English etymology). The "double meaning" of 'significance'
('signify' (from the 'sign', L. 'signum' Gr. 'oiijisTov' )), is even more evident
at its Greek equivalent of ' aqpaoior' and its family (' oqpavt ixdq', 'ai^fiatv»',
etc. (relate also its "third" meaning of "sound", in e.g. oqporivoov oi xapxiirvei;,
\a oij/iavrpa)).
30a. Relate Wittgenstein's conclusion that "if language is to be a means of
communication there must be agreement not only in definitions (by 'definition'
he means "nominal definition" or, better, stipulation (see n. 44a)l but also...
in judgments" (op. cit. infra n. 39, §242),
31. Donoghue v, Stevenson (1932) A. C. 562, S. C. (H. L. ) 31. Cf. J. Stone, The
Province and Function of Law p.187-8 (or his Legal System and Lawyers' Reasoning
p. 269-70, or MacCormick N., Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory p. 117-8).
31a. Starting with Hjelmslev (see what he says about "the so-called lexical
meanings" in the Prnlegomena p.45) and Buyssens (see his early Les langages et
le dlscours, or better the more recent La communication et 1' articulation
linguistique e.g. at p. 61), through to the post-structuralists (Barthes,
Derrida, Kristeva) on the one hand, and on the other Wittgenstein, J, L. Austin
(with his speech acts) and the ordinary language philosophers. Cf. Eco U.,
Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language 1.5,2. and 1.5.5. See also his work at
ch. 2, especially 2. 3. on the encyclopedia.
32. One might like to distinguish meaning of a situation or meaning to somebody,
from meaning in a text. To speak specifically of the latter then, the context
(i.e. surrounding text) provides for an abstraction of the meaningful aspects of
the item's sense - or, the context amounts to a pointing to these aspects. This,
in accordance of course with the reader's (or writer's) condition - but not
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necessarily the specific reader's, who nay be abstracted from, in exactly the
way I indicate in the next paragraph.
32a. Relate the author's "we". Also the traditional instruction (especially in
languages where the subject is indicated by the verb-ending) that one must not
say "I", because it is arrogant.
32b. According to Kant, this is the question that sums up in the end the whole of
the field of philosophy. Cf. his Introduction to Logic, s. 3. (I have consulted
the translation by Hartnan & Schwarz (cf. p. 29) and the one by Abbott (cf.
p. 15)),
33. If we will postulate independence from our community ton, i.e. will say that
things (and man) are what they are e.g. in virtue of God's creation, we shall
have what in the terms of the medieval ontological debate is called realism,
Without this postulate, but only the one of independence from the particular
speaker, we have conceptualisa. Were dependence on the particular speaker to be
assumed, we would have nominalism, (This however is not necessarily faithful to
the medieval distinctions, It is perhaps arguable that originally nominalism
included conceptualisa (in the above senses), and that William of Ockham might
agree with this conceptualism here. )
34. The example from the prohibition of discrimination refers to Ealing London
Borough Council v, Race Relations Board (1972) A. C. 342. Cf. N. MacCoraick Legal
Reasoning and Legal Theory p,66, The notorious example of the vehicles in the
park is from Hart op.cit. supra n. 2, p. 125.
35. Learning of course may take place after the action: learning from one's
mistakes, but also rationalisation of the successful move, ex post.
36. Relate Dworkin's theory of the interpretive attitude. (Law's Empire ch.2).
Relate also the view of Beyleveld 4 Brownsword (.op.cit. infra n. 42a, especially
p. 66; they refer to Dworkin "A Reply to Critics" (in R. Dworkin and contemporary
Jurisprudence) p.351-3 (which points of Dworkin were it seems the basis for his
subsequent theory of the interpretive attitude)) that the philosopher, when
designating the concept of law, presents a conception of the concept of law
which is picked out by an established "word-connotation".
36a. Relate A. W. B, Simpson on the achievement of cohesion in a customary system.
("The Common Law and Legal Theory", in Oxford Essavs in Jurisprudence sec, ser.
p. 95f, )
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37. What we have said about concepts is obviously relevant to a lot of other
discredited in ordinary language philosophy assuaptions, like the correspondence
theory of aeaning and truth, the vocabulary of natures and ideas, or even ideal
languages. It is also useful for a vindication of "traditional" philosophy
against some of analytic philosophy's most hollow reproofs, like "obscure
metaphysics".
38. Hart op.cii. supra n. 2, p, 15.
39. For the idea of the family resemblance cf. Wittgenstein L. Philosophical
Investigations §67.
40. This is perhaps the best way to understand Wittgenstein's proposition that
the aeaning is the use. (Though this is perhaps not what Wittgenstein himself
had in mind - but this is irrelevant).
41. "Everything is what it is and not another thing" (Bishop Butler).
42. Cf, Wallace's Prolegomena to The Logic of Hegel ch. X. esp. from p. lxxvil, and
the Tao, esp. 20, 47, 46, 71.
42a. Compare Beyleveld and Brownsword Law as a Moral Judgment p.93-8, for a very
good exposition why actual usage of a word like 'law' is of little relevance to
the philosopher's effort to designate the concept of law. See generally Ch. 3 for
their statement of the epistemological problems with respect to the advance of
conceptual preferences about law. But beware of the transcendental method that
they finally advance against nominalism ("conventionalism" in their terms). For,
in the words of Michel Villey, "cette voie est sterile et logoaachique, II ne
faut pas trop demander k la raison pure" ("Le droit dans les choses", in
Controverses autour de rpntologie du droit, p.23).
43. Define: de+finis. Determine: de+terminus. Definition of something is to place
its ends, to determine its boundaries. (Notice also 'tern' (terminus) and 6por,
its Greek equivalent (op((>, opiopdq), 'Tern' used to mean limit, end, as well.
(Relate "come to terms").)
44. The preference for the economical means of what is more commonly understood
by 'definition' is due, partly to the requirements of precision and strictness,
and partly to the general reasons why we like economy in speech, not the least
important among which is the indication by the fluency/ smoothness of
communication that the subject is not alone, that there is somebody (a brother)
thinking, understanding and perceiving in the same way.
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44a. With regard to the definition the traditional philosopher is after, and for a
further study of the process, and improvement on my work at this point, cf. the
chapter on "real definition", in Richard Robinson's Definition, esp, pp.170f.
The "abstraction" at §9 is obviously the concept, and the "analysis" at §10 is
the definition, as well as the "synthesis" at §11 and the "improvement of
concepts" at §12 (relate to the "improvement of concepts", what Heapel says
about explication, in Fundamentals of Concept Foraation in Empirical Science
p, 663-4); I do not think that there is any reason to distinguish among them,
here at least, Notice further that the search for the definition also involves
the activities described (or misdescribed) at §§ 1(search for identity of
meaning), 2<search for the essence), 7(search for the key) and 8(adoption and
recommendation of ideals). Naturally, I do not agree with Robinson that the
question-form "what is X?" is particularly vague in the context of philosophy,
nor that the related concept of definition is confused - although the uses of
the term 'definition' may well be confusing, especially in the traditionally
nominalist English-language-culture. I also disagree that we should abandon this
term here and reserve it for definition of words ("nominal definition") - after
all, if it is true that learning a language has little to do with learning
definitions of words, the concept of nominal definition becomes much less
useful, except in what regards stipulative definition, for which 'stipulation'
is of course available.
45, The most obvious such rearrangement of language happens, because, as Robinson
put it (ibid. p. 187) "Every improvement of a concept carries along with it a
stipulative redefinition of the word expressing the concept.., Changes in
insight lead to changes in nomenclature".
45a. A good illustration, for jurists, of the meaning and claims of traditional
conceptualism (especially as contrasted later in the text with linguistic
jurisprudence), might be the Hohfeldian conceptual system and the claims it puts
forth. (Cf. Hohfeld W, N., Fundamental Legal Conceptions, and Kocourek A., Jural
Relations). It is claimed that the units "right", "duty", "liability", etc.,
exist in fact, regardless of the fact that the words have been used in various
other manners, regardless of the fact that noone before noticed and understood
these units. They are the abstractions and distinctions jurists must make - if
they happen to make different ones, even as a rule, they are mistaken. (They
exist in the same way that numbers exist, or a point in Geometry. Relate how
Kocourek speaks ibid, in the preface p. iii-iv. ) And of course adopting them will
improve our common enterprise of judging. The philosopher does not describe
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already commonly held convictions. He discovers ways in which we should
reorganise our common activity. (See also Singer's argument on what a legal
power is in his "Hart's Concept of Law" in Journal of Philosophy 60 (1963)
p. 204 f. Notice further White's "Rights and Claims" (in Law. Morality and Rights
ed, Stewart) and his subsequent Rights, as an excellent indication of how much
coriceptualist the proponents of "ordinary language" csn be, even while rejecting
(or claiming to be rejecting) the idea of denotation and correspondence. (On the
substantive issue incidentally, we do not have to say that either White is right
or Hohfeld. I agree with what MacCormick says in pp. 170-3 of the above Law,
Morality and Rights - and not on the basis of what I take to be ordinary
language.))
Notice that the Hohfeldian claims could easily be understood as realist, in
the vocabulary of the ontological debate, in the sense that we distinguished
earlier realism from conceptualism and nominalism, However, the contrast with
linguistic jurisprudence does not depend on such a difference, i.e. on Hart's
not being a realist, and "old-fashioned" or "traditional" conceptualism must not
be understood as presupposing the realist answer in the ontological debate. The
basic understandings of "traditional philosophy", that I depict here, are the
same, regardless of the answer to the ontological debate (and even for
nominalism, thanks to my early definition of 'reality').
46, Hart op.cit. supra n. 2, p. 15.
47. We must take notice here of the fact that Hart's views regarding the problem
of the definition are somewhat ambivslent in The Concept of Law. Notice his
restrictive use of 'definition' which only refers to words (in accordance with
Robinson's advice, see above n. 44a), and, when available, regulates their use,
rather than determines the concept; see especially p,208: "It is because we make
no.., claim to identify or regulate... the use of words like 'law' or 'legal',
that this book is offered as an elucidation of the concept of law, rather than a
definition of 'law' which might naturally be expected to provide a rule or rules
for the use of these expressions." And see p.210 that "whereas the allotment of
proper names rests only on an ad hoc convention, the extension of the general
terms of any serious discipline (and therefore the extension of "law"] is never
without its principle or rationale, though it may not be obvious what that is."
In view of these passages, we could assume the ideas on the limits of the
definition to be peripheral rather than central to linguistic jurisprudence,
simple mistakes Hart happened to make in his earlier writings that should not be
included in the idea of (the method of) linguistic jurisprudence, oversights due
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to received slogans and standard at the time ways of speaking, However,
proceeding the way we do is much more fruitful as we shall see. As regards
Hart's views for their own sake, see further his earlier "Definition and Theory
in Jurisprudence" (republished in his Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy)
where his distinction between "definition" and "elucidation" is introduced, and
his reply to Cohen in "Theory and Definition in Jurisprudence" (Proceedings of
the Aristotelian Society supp, vol, 29 (1955)). See finally Martin op.cit. supra
n. 0, Ch. 4, for an analysis and critique of Hart's views on definition and
elucidation, and for further bibliography.
48. Or those that they do not share - e.g. each event began at a different Billi¬
second.
49. If both the shared and the non-shared characteristics are significant, then
the instances will be both grouped together and distinguished, e.g. in different
sub-groups, For example, there is a significant difference between a table and a
chair, and a significant similarity: they are both furniture.
49a. Like the robots, and the dogmatics, with their artificial languages.
50. This is the explanation behind dogmatism; the reluctance to drop the clarity
and certainty one worked so hard for, or rather, gave so much for (the
psychology of the forced pupil).
50a, This is the explanation behind the rigidity of scholasticism, Yet even in so
much more recent writers as Bentham and Austin, we find the same understanding
of a demand for strict classifications, even at the cost of a strangeness and
artificiality of language.
50b. "*Ev oTfia, on ou5£v otAcr".
51. Hart op.cit. supra n, 2, p. 17.
51a. Notice Marcus Singer ("Hart's concept of law" in Journal of philosophy 60
(1963)) for whom there is "nothing wrong with the conclusion that Hart has
provided a definition of law" (p. 200). See also Rolf Sartorius "Hart's concept
of law" (in More essays in legal philosophy ed. Summers) and Michael Martin
op.cit. supra n. 0, p. 39f f., for an attempt to pinpoint a definition by Hart,
(But I do not think that Sartorius' suggestion that law is a cluster concept is
here relevant; because the correct abstraction, does not amount to the essence
in his sense of the one most important feature, the key to the science of
jurisprudence, (Although it does amount to the essence or nature of law, under
realist, i.e. Platonic, ontological assumptions, in the sense of what the
P.4-9
underl vl ric nrincinle is (what natters, what is of essence, in the context of af u t t '
philosophical discussion), or in the sense of what law is by its nature, i.e. by
its make, i.e. before (the word or the idea is) put to work, in a context (cpuoei
t 0£oei)). And I do not wholly agree with Martin's critiques of the definitions
he extracts: he forgets that, like "law" or "legal system", "morality" or
"moral" would also - in Hart's vocabulary - have central cases and penumbra, and
that therefore, when employed in a definition of the (central case of the)
former, they should be understood in terns of their central cases. (In our
traditional vocabulary, the concept of Morality in Hart's definition of the
concept of law, need not cover every case for which one might happen to use the
term "morality"). )
52. Hart, Essays on Benthan p.10-1.
53. Cf. Hart op.cit, supra n.2, p. 18f., and MacCornick N. H. L, A. Hart, pp, 40f, ,
50f., respectively.
53a. See Buyssens' conclusion that "la signification est, par definition,
abstraite" (op.cit. supra n. 29a, p. 36),
54. Relate the section on the Chinese remainder theorem, in Davis A Hersh op.cit.
supra n. 29a, p. 187f. See also p. 204: "As abstraction is piled upon
abstraction, meaning recedes and becomes remote",
55. In order to perceive the correct abstraction, we must first look carefully
into the concrete (and vice versa).
56. I think therefore that Moles' critique of Hart is in this respect wrong. (Cf.
Robert Moles Definition and Rule in Legal Theory p. 21-6, where he points that
Austin was not trying to describe any particular thing (e.g. a legal system),
and that precisely for this Austin proceeds to abstract, in contrast to Hart,
who imagines Austin to be engaged in a description of empirical reality when
defining law as a command, and so proceeds to correct Austin for having
disregarded some elements of this empirical reality), It is not a matter of
having misunderstood Austin's concept (or its place in Austin's model) and
having mistaken it for a description whereas it is a definition vi2, an
abstraction (the very idea of which is indeed "that certain aspects of the
available material have been left out, and that we are utilizing a criterion of
demarcation, explicitly or implicitly, to indicate, in the light of the question
we are concerned to answer, what aspects of the phenomena we are concerned to
explain" (p. 26) - notice that this "criter ion of demarcation" is, in our
vocabulary here, the perception of significance (but also that it is not only a
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natter of what aspects one chooses to explain; it is also a aatter of what
aspects are worth explaining, what aspects we (in the connon enterprise, the
community) need to take into account)). Both concepts are abstractions (and
descriptions at the saae tine in precisely the sense of Holes' "descriptions of
concepts"), even though only Austin's concept is put forth as a stipulation.
Hart is saying that sonething inportant, nanely the difference of a social rule
fron a command based on political power, is missing from Austin's definition.
You might say that he is wrong, viz. that this "difference" is insignificant,
that this "difference" makes no difference (arguing for example, that the
jurist's subject matter is such commands only and not other social rules, or
that Austin, when using 'law', had lex in mind, not jus, or that today such
commands have entirely displaced the sense of Tightness on which obligation used
to depend). You cannot say that he is refusing to abstract, for he is not. He is
abstracting from what he takes to be unimportant, e.g. the fact that in English
law, the passage of time with regard to a debt, has the effect of divesting the
debtee of the right to have his claim enforced through the judicial apparatus
(limitation of action), whereas in German law, it has the effect that the debtor
acquires the liberty to refuse payment ( Verjtihrung); and he is trying to relate
everything he takes to be important, e.g. that international law lacks courts
with compulsory jurisdiction.
In view of Holes' style of scholarship and his beliefs regarding "fresh
starts", notice, that the truth or falsity of the above point is not so much to
he determined hy a careful psychohistorical investigation of what Hart, Holes or
Austin actually believe(d). For I am ready to concede, if you want me to, that
Hart (or anybody) did not know what he was saying (although I would be somewhat
reluctant to press such a point, and even more reluctant to boast, that I in
contrast do). But this is not the point. I am not interested in Hart, or Holes
as such, nor in recounting what they say. I am interested in learning, what is
true, what matters, and I try to say what I think - for noone in the end can
speak, except according to himself. Naturally, in order to learn and to speak, I
start from what others have said, and I try to listen to it, as carefully 86 I
can possibly manage. It would indeed be stupid, and arrogant, not to do that.
But it is also insolence, to stand yourself in order to judge, not a proposition
(which you yourself utter anyway), but an actual human being, whom, after all,
you've never even laid eyes on.
According to Edgeworth op. cit. infra n. 63 p. 117, in ordinary language
philosophy (and so linguistic jurisprudence) "...the suspicion of abstraction,
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theorisation and conceptualisation becomes enshrined as a methodological
principle"; see also p. 120-1, This is a standard to some extent reproach of
ordinary language philosophy, first appearing (insofar as I can tell) in
Gellner's Words and Things; see what he says about Polymorphism on p.44-5, 50-1,
57a, Relate Honor6's assumptions and how he speaks of the balmy days of linguistic
philosophy in his "Real Laws" (in Law, Morality and Society ed, Hacker S Raz).
58. Chiefly because of spelling and diverse origins of words, on the one hand, if
we are talking of the language in abstract. Regarding education, notice the
tradition of nominalism and empiricism, and the style of legal thinking. One
further partial explanation can perhaps be found in the tradition of
individualism.
59. This complaint is of course characteristic of earlier modern thought too,
which emerged characteristically with distinctions anyway. (Take for example the
is and ought distinction).
60. In accordance with this reasoning we should form two distinct instructions:
a) to attend to common people's speech (and so for example to folk tales etc.),
b) to attend to unreflective speech, i.e. the way we speak when we are not
making theory. Only the second instruction bears on linguistic jurisprudence's
search in the language.
61. In a society (see Part 2).
61a. After all, see J. L. Austin's "A Plea for Excuses" (in Ordinary Language ed.
Chappell), probably the most authoritative text with respect to the program of
ordinary language philosophy, at p, 49: "Certainly, then, ordinary language is
not the last word: in principle it can everywhere be supplemented and improved
upon and superseded. Only remember, it is the first word".
61b. So we are not in accord here with Edgeworth's otherwise very good paper (cit.
infra n.63), or with Martin op. cit. supra n. 0. I do not necessarily mean to
assert, that they are unjustified, in understanding Hart's (and especially the
ordinary language philosophers') methodological claim, to have been, that
ordinary language provides a warrant, through the distinctions enshrined in it,
for the substantive claims. All the same, even if this be the claim that Hart
(and the ordinary language philosophers) really made as a matter of historical
fact, this is not the way I understand linguistic jurisprudence.
62. Cf. J.L. Austin Joe. cit. supra n. 61a.
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63. Of. Edgeworth B., "Legal Positivism and the Philosophy of Language" (in Legal
Studies 6/2) p, 121. Relate also Donald C. Galloway "The Axiology of Analytical
Jurisprudence: A Study of the Underlying Sociological Assumptions and
Ideological Predilections" (in Law in a Social Context ed. Bechtler), especially
for the accusation of conservatism, e.g. at p. 54,73.
63a. Or does it? For can we deny that the actual is rational and the rational is
actual? I do not know. But anyway, this discussion cannot be made here. A
qualification however must be made, that this defence of linguistic
jurisprudence, is valid only under the specific understanding of philosophy that
we have put forth. And that only given this conception of philosophy (which fits
Plato fine, but not Hegel) is it true that it is understandable for historical
insight to be missing from conceptual questions. For, at least after Hegel, the
distinction between philosophy and history, even if it be true, can no longer be
taken for granted.
64. Cf, Hart op.cit. supra n, 2, p. 15,
65. Cf. the Tao.
66. Think of this. At the time of the Russian revolution, the bolsheviks were
putting to fire paintings, books and the old nobility, as symbols of capitalist
exploitation and corruption that they were (seen to be), in a noble effort to
extinguish the false ideologies, the errors of the past, and clear the road to a
bright future for humanity, Today, the nationalists are bringing down the
statues and the names of the "dictatorship of the proletariat", in a
corresponding effort to erase the past of an oppressive inefficient bureaucracy,
and clear the road to freedom,
67. On the other hand, don't we also need breaks with the past? Death and birth?
Cleansing fire? For don't we need - in contrast to the Tao (see infra n. 68) - to
act too?
67a, Depending on the other concepts surrounding them. Given concepts A, B, C,
concept X may be senseless, but not so given concepts A', -B, C'.
68. Notice that according to the Tao, we need not, and in fact, should not act:
the principle of inaction, (Cf, Giles' arrangement, ch.3).
69. So, we reach again the conclusion that it is impossible to merely describe
our actual ways of thinking (except in a formal way of course, viz. in the sense
that my chaotic model can be said to be a description). (This impossibility was
also asserted in Part 2, where the infinity of concepts was also assumed). And
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accordingly, there is no escape from the speaker's having to assert that "this
is what - I think - is correct; this is what we must do".
70. Cf. the Tao.
71. It is also probably the one that is most faithful to Hart's substantive
writings - but I am not interested in defending (or attacking) this claim.
72. This interplay is determined by the subject's degree of humility or
arrogance, openness or closure, to which also corresponds the subject's general
or specific (i.e. regarding the specific rule) tendency to imitate or depart,
(It may be assumed/ felt to be correct, easy, symmetrical, elegant (or their
opposites) to do like the others do).
73. If we want to be precise, "education" and "learning" must be understood in a
strictly descriptive technical sense here: whenever the individual changes its
assumptions and practice in response to the environment, we have learning, Thus,
I can learn to use "sex neutral terminology", after being exposed to it in
America, or I can learn to avoid it, after getting sick of the related
ideological brainwash.
Relate the understanding of "knowledge" in the "sociology of knowledge". (Cf.
the introduction at Berger 4 Luckmann op. cU. supra n. 4a.)
74. In many languages today, but especially in English (largely because of an
opposition to French (or "Continental") tradition and influence), the terms
'logic' and 'logical' are often used rather restrictively, referring to formal
and strict, necessary relations of propositions. Also, they are often
contrasted, in English, to notions like reasonableness and sense ("it makes
sense"), as they tend to connote a forcible exclusion of difference in points of
view and a certain inflexibility and mathematical unfriendliness. Here "logic"
will be understood in a much broader sense, closer to its Greek meaning and
origin, and equivalent to "reason" (especially in phrases like "this is the
reason why"). The reason why I speak here of logic rather than reason (which is
a more general term in English), is because of logic's archaic and intriguing
connection with speech, which is evidently quite important to this analysis
(A6yoq: speech/ reason ("the reason why"), Aoyix(^/6): logic/ reason ("man's
reason"), Aoyix(6q//|/6)/ enXoy(oq/q/o): reasonable/ (rational)).
Relate to my understanding of "logic" Toulmin's claims regarding what logic
(the discipline of correct argumentation) should be about, in The Uses of
Argument (see the introduction p,1-8 and the summation at p, 187-8 (where his
understanding of "sxiotij|iq" however is much too restrictive - "emoxfjim" is in
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fact much closer to "Wissenschaft" than to "science")). But see also Stone's
contrary advice regarding the use of 'logic', in Legal system and lawyers'
reasonings ch, 6 §1,
74a, So Moles is correct in saying that the "disjunction between merely convergent
and ruled behaviour", "is not merely frequent... but necessary. It is not a
matter of observation... but a necessary consequence of the definitions of
'convergent' and 'ruled' which Hart accepts... The statement is in brief
conceptual not empirical, analytic not synthetic". (op. cit, supra n. 56, p. 83-4).
74b. Compare C. S. Peirce's discussion of "leading principles" of inference, as
habits of the mind, in Collected Papers V. 3 §154-64. See also V. 5 §367: "That
which determines us, from given premisses, to draw one inference rather than
another, is some habit of mind, whether it be constitutional or acquired.,.".
See also Dewey's formulation at p, 13 of his Logic: the Theory of Inquiry: "Any
habit is a way or manner of action, not a particular act or deed. When it is
formulated it becomes, as far as it is accepted, a rule, or more generally, a
principle or "law" of action. It can hardly be denied that there are habits of
inference and that they may be formulated as rules or principles."
Notice that for both of these authors, "logic" is the science which seeks to
distinguish and determine the correct habits of inference; only the correct
rules are "logical". This as such, makes no difference to what we have said here
of course. From within logic in this sense, there will be a theorist, a subject,
asserting that these are the correct habits, that this is what logic says: these
assertions are the rules of logic, his habits of thought (which the theorist may
have acquired through his study indeed - no problem here). However, there is
this important difference, that what Peirce calls leading principles, i.e. rules
of logic, what he mostly has in mind as "habits of inference" in this context,
are not primarily the perceptions of significance. His "leading principles" are
not determinations of what counts as different or the same. They are rather what
connects the perceptions of significance. They regard the mode of inference from
a given concept. They regard what this concept analytically entails, and so they
correspond to what has traditionally been understood as rules of logic, i.e. to
rules like the law of identity. I would be quite reluctant to speak of
relativity with respect to these rules, i.e. to say that they are contingent
(although I would be also reluctant to assert strongly the opposite; we have not
corroborated them with - say - the Alpha-Centaurians yet). Peirce is quite
definite that they are not, and although he does put them down to habits along
with the perceptions of significance, he does not take the further step to
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dispense with the western - and for ae (and Toulmin) rather useless - narrow
concept of logic (see supra n, 74), probably because of the fact that he does not
notice, that, those habits deteruining in fact the inferences we draw, are not
so auch the modes of analytical inference, as the abstractions (our names) that
these modes connect.
75. This proposition is not accurate, unless within reason and habit, we include
feelings, e.g. of elegance.
76. However, some perceptions of significance will be more central than others,
in that they depend on less specific conditions, They will shift less easily
therefore, and will be more deeply engrained in our habits of thought and
language. Thus the distinction between the past and the future is aore central
to our condition than the one between before and after next Sunday: the
conditions for the significance of the first distinction are merely that there
be an acting or sensing subject in time; whereas the conditions for the
significance of the second one are many more besides. And naturally, as regards
very central distinctions, it is not very accurate to say that their
significance depends on e.g. who the subject is and what it wants, to the extent
that this question will be more properly seen to arise on their basis, rather
than the inverse.
76a. This has been the standard solution of pragmatism. There is however a defect
here, if this solution is understood, as is sometimes in pragmatism, to be the
rock-solid base on which everything else is ultimately founded. For it is not
rock-solid at all. It is seen to be solid, because of the modern Western
underlying assumption, of the independent and free individual, who has chosen
what it wants, what needs it has, It is accordingly, as such, one-sided. What we
need (the distinction or its negation for), is not necessarily a given, beyond
discussion. (It may happen to be given, i.e. we may happen to take it for
granted, on occasion). It is in its turn dependent on these very ideas
(distinctions, concepts - the logic, the language) we investigate, that form our
identity, who we are and what we want (what we are supposed to want), The
process is circular, dialectical.
77. "Be philosophical. Don't think about it." (Zenon Bankowski, quoting an
anecdote by Dworkin),
7B. Relate Herman Tennessen1s attack on ordinary language philosophy in "Ordinary
language in aemoriast' (in Inquiry 8 (1965)) p. 241: "Hence, the whole point of
exposing our undivulged habits - linguistic and non-linguistic - would be to
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improve our initial position for choosing better habits. To be unconscious of
one's habits is a sufficient (but not necessary) condition of being their slave.
The ambush of ordinary English is inescapable only to those who are blissfully
unaware of its pits and traps. Deceit is based upon trust. The more a speaker is
linguistically disillusioned, the less likely is he ever to be the laughing
stock of any natural, everyday, ordinary, 'gewbnliche', 'tatsStliche'
language,.. The object.., is.,, to enable us to disentangle ourselves from the
grip of our language habits, the ordinary language, its models and metaphors, to
be in command of the language, rather than under its command. 'The question is'
said Humpty Dumpty, 'who is to be the master, that's air."
"Deceit is based upon trust", Contrast the Tao: "If you don't trust the
people, you make them untrustworthy" (Hitchell 17). "He who has no faith in
others shall find no faith in them" (Giles p.53).
79. Remember that rational control is the Kantian definition of freedom,
80. Cf. Aristotle on the young, at Pqiopixfj B. 12 (1369a3-b 12).
81. Notice however that this is not the only possible conception of philosophy. I
would not even say that it is the best one.
82. Compare C. S. Peirce Collected Papers V. 5 §376: "...It is a very common idea
that a demonstration must rest on some ultimate and absolutely indubitable
propositions,.. But, in point of fact, an inquiry, to have that complete
satisfactory result called demonstration, has only to start with propositions
perfectly free from all actual doubt. If the premisses are not in fact doubted





Robert Moles, In his book Definition and Rule in Legal Theory,
has argued for a total condemnation of Hart and his Concept of Law,
which he sees to have been "a retrograde step" "in terms of the
historical development of ideas about law" (p.81), and the cause for
the professed fact that jurisprudence and our theorizing in general
about law have since been led astray. In his attempt to justify this
claim he discusses many issues, which are of some relevance to our
examination of linguistic jurisprudence - or what he would more
simply call the (lack of any) epistemological ground for Hart's
theory. Here, I shall try to relate to my work, those of his
comments, that coincide with, or are contradicted by, our
epistemological analyses. On the contrary, I shall not be concerned
with Moles' generally convincing re-interpretation of Austin's work,
or his bitter attack on Hart for the latter's failure to appreciate
Austin, or even his many substantive (i.e. not epistemological)
criticisms of Hart.
We may start by noting that Moles takes Hart's theory to have
nothing to do with descriptive sociology, or, at any rate, not to be
sociology itself. ' As we have discarded, in Part 2, any claims of
linguistic jurisprudence's to a pure positivist description of social
facts, we shall not take issue here. Furthermore, we too have come to
point in the end that the distinction between "merely convergent and
ruled behaviour" is analytic in linguistic jurisprudence; and we
shall also agree obviously, that as a claim regarding what people
actually happen to have in their minds, it is rather superficial.
(Cf. p. 83f. ). However, in view of Moles' taste for propositions of
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the type 'A in fact believed that X, not Y', I have to remark that
these conclusions of mine are not conclusions on what Hart (or
anybody else) actually thought. They are conclusions on the
epistemological possibility and worth of certain methodological
claims that Hart happens to make. For all I know, Hart might indeed
have happened on occasion to regard his writings as "descriptive
sociology"; or he might, on reading this book, denounce it even, in
indignation, as wild metaphysics having nothing to do with the spirit
of his work.
Another issue I obviously agree with Moles on, is that the
Concept of Law is quite confusing for methodological studies, and
that Hart has failed to articulate an adequate epistemology. 2 Let me
point out however, that I do not see this to be in itself so grave a
defect of Hart's theory. The importance of an adequate epistemology
lies not in some guarantee of value of the substantive work; there is
no such guarantee. And I do not believe that an epistemological
awareness is a prerequisite for making substantive claims; if it were
so, it would be impossible to speak. 3 The value of good
epistemological studies lies in themselves, in the knowledge and
indeed wisdom they may bring for their student, and in the latter's
ability as a result, to be able to accommodate apparently
contradictory ideas, and to relate diverse disciplines and viewpoints
a matter of extreme importance in our days of extreme
specialization, as Moles was keen to perceive.4
The main point, for what concerns us, that Moles makes, is that
Hart has misunderstood Austin to be making a description of empirical
- or anyway external - reality,5 when defining law to be a command of
a sovereign who i6 obeyed habitually. Accordingly, Hart examines this
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definition and finds it inadequate as a description of what law, i.e.
a legal system, actually is. But of course, Austin was making a
definition, i.e. a description of an analytical tool, of a concept,
in the process of forming and clearly presenting his (a priori, viz.
prior (to experience and description)) conceptual model, before
applying it to the external reality. (And this probably means, in
more simple words, that Hart should be concerned with the idea of
'command of a sovereign1 and whether it is a) analytically useful,
and b) adequately applied by Austin; not whether this idea is
actually equivalent in language to the word 'law', which Austin
stipulated - Austin could have used any symbol instead of 'law').
A few citations might be useful here.
[Austin's purpose in defining e.g. 'law'] is a descrip¬
tion of an analytical tool which can be used to enable us
to determine what features of the social order properly
belong to a legal system. It is a description of a concept,
(p.23)
[Austin16l critics mistake the object of his descrip¬
tions, and take his conceptual descriptions for empirical
ones, and challenge them by applying the wrong test. (p. 24-
5)
. . . the very idea of abstraction means that certain
aspects of the available material have been left out, and
that we are utilizing a criterion of demarcation,
explicitly or implicitly, to indicate, in the light of the
question we are concerned to answer, what aspects of the
phenomena we are concerned to explain, (p.26)
It is not just that Austin intends his definitions to be
placed in one context and that Hart places them in another.
The difference is that Hart believes Austin to be putting
forward statements of fact when he is actually putting
forward definitions and he is thus led to the erroneous
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view that Austin's claims can be refuted by facts, which
for Hart take the shape of claims about what people say and
do. This represents a failure to appreciate the conceptual-
empirical distinction, and attempts to set up an
inconsistency between logically different modes of
discourse, (p. 190)
First of all, I must again distinguish. I do not presume to know
what Hart or Austin really thought, and how in fact they regarded
what they wrote - or, at any rate, this, as such, is not what I am
interested to speak of. So I shall not discuss here whether or not
Hart did misunderstand Austin's work in fact, or whether he regarded
his statements to be true in virtue of the empirical reality - it is
possible that he did. It is a separate question how these statements
are to be understood - by us; viz. what we can learn, what we can
take from them, what value they can be of.
In Part 2, we did consider linguistic Jurisprudence, as making
statements regarding a reality, which the theorist is in principle
not part of. This was the social reality, the reality of the ways of
thinking in the social environment. This was the logic that exists
contingently to a social group, which group exists independently of
the theorist. Here, the analytical distinctions (i.e. Moles'
analytical tools, the concepts) the theorist starts from - e.g. the
disjunction between a social rule and merely convergent behaviour -
are taken from the standard ways of thinking of the social group
described (in accordance with Winchian ideas on the methodology of
sociology). Under this interpretation, linguistic jurisprudence was
seen to be somewhat problematic and incomplete; its claims to
objectivity were seen to be unjustified.
Moles does not pay much attention to the possibility of this
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interpretation. (See however p. 84-5). Nevertheless, what we said
regarding linguistic jurisprudence in its light, does not contradict
what Moles has said.
However, this was not the interpretation of linguistic
jurisprudence that we finally endorsed. For in the end, linguistic
jurisprudence was seen to be a conceptualism, and so to ask what is
the concept, or the nature, or the idea, or the central case, of law;
what is the appropriate abstraction, what is the category the subject
(and so the theorist) should employ. Here we are not in accord with
Moles. Because, in the light of this interpretation, Hart is also
seen to be making "descriptions of concepts" or of "analytical tools"
in the end, same as Austin does (in the beginning). And Hart is seen
to disagree with Austin - or perhaps with 'Austin' - not because of a
misunderstanding of what the latter said, but because he judges
Austin's analytical tool, Austin's definition of law, to be inad¬
equate, because it does not depict the correct category, the correct
lines of demarcation. It does not coincide with what is here
significant, what matters. It does not correspond to the meaning of
law; which meaning is of course an abstraction, and as such indeed
"leaves out certain aspects of the available material", in accordance
with a "criterion of demarcation", the theorist's perception of
significance, which indicates not just what aspects of the empirical
the theorist chooses to explain, but what aspects, according to the
theorist, we need look at and use, as distinctions, in our seeing the
empirical and Judging.
(To give an example, without prejudice to what Hart or Austin
really thought, the issue might be seen like this: What do we, the
lawyers, study, in studying the "law"? (Or, what are we to study?) Do
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we study (should we study) the commands of the sovereign, or do we
study those rules that are posited in accordance with our rule of
recognition? (What do we (or they), the judges, apply, in applying
the " law"?)5*'c In either case, 'law' is of course a concept - and
so is a 'legal system': each and every legal system, as well as the
idea of a legal system. Truly, what else could this term especially
be, "legal system", other than a category created by legal dogmatics
and jurisprudence, an abstraction, that defines (or "demarcates") its
material?)
Under this interpretation then, we can see Hart to end, where
Moles sees Austin to begin: at the creation and presentation of an
analytical model, at the creation and presentation of a logic/
language. This can then be used - in principle -for the description
of the empirical (i.e. the observable) - if this is what we want to
do. Or it can be valued as such, for the organization it provides of
what we observe and its effect of focussing the subject's attention
to what matters. And it can be used in the process of the subject's
learning and forming its identity, its place in the world, and in the
discussion and regulation regarding common problems and decisions for
action (i.e. politics). Of course, speaking of an "analytical model"
rather than "logic", is more in line with description of the
empirical, e.g. in sociology. But otherwise, there is no difference,
save for the fact that the subject will normally have an analytical
model, but, at least to the same extent, be had by (its) logic.
This disagreement of mine with Moles is of course in itself
superficial. It is not one of epistemology. It comes down in the end
to a disagreement of interpretation of Hart's work. Moles simply did
not think of this possibility - probably because he did not like
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Hart's work and style. Now what books one likes to read, is to a
great extent beyond intellectual disagreement - just like tastes in
food. And in the end, it is probably determined not by one's
philosophy, but the type of (legal) education one has received, and
the kind of confused and mistaken assertions one is tired of having
had to listen to and deal with.
However, there may well be a much deeper - in terms of scholarly
debate - disagreement too. Because Moles declares that stipulative
definition "is the only proper way in which conceptual analysis can
proceed, whether in law, mathematics or science" (p.26-7). I shall
have to say a few - too few unfortunately - words on this.
There are two possible rationales behind this declaration. The
first and foremost is the belief in nominalism, viz. the belief that
there are no right and wrong concepts; no true ideas/ abstractions.
What is significant, the differences and so analytical distinctions
that matter, this is a matter of the specific individual's
constitution and way of seeing things. It is a matter of the - non-
rational - decisions the specific subject takes, the purposes it
happens to have and so the projects on which it chooses to embark. So
the author should set out in the beginning these decisions, purposes
and projects, clearly, thus enabling the prospective reader to see
whether there is any significance here from the latter's viewpoint.
And so there is no sense in criticizing someone for having chosen
these rather than those concepts; it would be like criticizing him
for having named his son John rather than George. To say that
"command of a sovereign" is not the correct concept of law, would be
like saying "your son is not what a John is in fact".
Wittgenstein's writings and ordinary language philosophy in
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general, were to a large extent a rejection of precisely this
assertion - which remains nevertheless a perfectly respectable
position, even if my writings in Part 3 are not so friendly to it. I
have indeed tried to indicate that it is sensible and philosophically
respectable to argue about who we are, what decisions, purposes and
projects we must have, and so that it does make sense to argue on
true and false ideas - without thereby precluding the sense of the
opposite possibility, i.e. of the individual's choosing and
determining who he is and what matters to him, exclusively, viz.
irrespective of any community. Yet this is too great an issue, for me
to claim to have provided a complete proof, and Moles remains free to
stick to the above rationale, if indeed it be what he truly believes
(which I do not think is the case).
However, even so, we need not abandon our benign interpretation
of linguistic jurisprudence - or its being benign. In total agreement
with Moles on the importance he attaches to purpose as a
presupposition (and also a consequence) of demarcation and
generalization, s we can simply point out that the reader may happen
to have a different purpose from the author, and so see the given
demarcation and generalization not to suit him. Indeed, noone can
start a novo. One cannot but start from demarcations and
generalizations others have made. (One will start from a language
that precedes him). Why then cannot the reader take existing
demarcations and generalizations, and ask himself whether they are
correct, in view obviously of his own purposes, of his own projects,
thus modifying them and then using them as elements for his own
"analytical model"? - But he should first relate what his purposes
and projects are. - But again why cannot the reader ask himself what
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these purposes and these projects ought to be, in accordance with his
learning, i.e. receiving demarcations and generalizations (especially
as applied to himself), if the latter are also a presupposition of
purpose? Indeed, this is a good way to see my interpretation of
linguistic jurisprudence: The reader, in asking himself what the
concept of law is, is trying to determine what the appropriate
related demarcations, purposes and generalizations, i.e. what the
appropriate abstractions, for him (or according to him) are.
(And therefore, since nothing here is strictly predetermined, but
is allowed to evolve instead, it is only natural for the use of the
signs to shift, for "conceptual transitions" to take place,7 i.e. for
meaning as implication to prevail over meaning as equivalence. 9 It is
obviously at the end only of this process, that clarity of concepts
and rigour in the use of the signs can be achieved.)
Of course, it may well be that Hart the reader misunderstood
Austin the author, and/or was unfair to him. But this is another
issue. It does not entail that stipulative definition is the only
proper way in which conceptual analysis can proceed.
Still, there is another rationale to back this idea: Research i6
one thing, and presenting its results is another. When sitting down
to write a book as a scholar, one is expected to have finished
interrogating oneself, and to be able to present in a precise and
determinate fashion what his logic, i.e. his game is - so that the
reader can pinpoint exactly what is being said, and so that it is
easy to check for any mistakes. The loose style in writing, the lack
of rigour, is dangerous, because it may mislead the author, and
because it may cover his mistakes from the reader's check.
Again, this is a perfectly respectable position; except for the
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fact that it overlooks a) the problems of communication, and b) that
meaning, what matters, can recede through attention to the demand of
rigour. Stipulations may improve certainty and precision, from the
author's point of view, but they may also hamper the reader's
understanding; for you cannot expect the latter to start using right
away, after just reading a few definitions, a language of
abbreviations you have concluded with, perhaps after ages of
research. Because your analytical model will stand for and hide
behind it a whole series of reasons, viz. purposes, beliefs and
decisions. And unless you bring your reader into those reasons, he
will not be able to see, except at best a glimpse from your
definitions' sense, viz. reasonableness. As for the fear that loose
talk may mislead the author and also make his speech's correctness
difficult to check, it is only formal correctness that is assured
through rigour, at the expense of the ease of judgement regarding the
speech's wisdom. Because rigour and stipulative definitions, while
making clearer and precise the demarcations and generalisations that
are being made, will tend to blind one with regard to those
demarcations and generalisations that are not chosen, that are -
unconsciously, even by the author perhaps - rejected.
No. Stipulative definition at the beginning of the project is not
the only proper way for conceptual analysis. It is one way, one
style, which, just like the others, has its merits and demerits.
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NOTES
1. See p. 217: "Now,., we can see why Harris night, with sone justification,
regard [Hart's theory] as sociology fit for Martians - for it is, of course, not
sociology at all."
2. See p. 5; "...the methodology I Hart) employs is extremely confusing, This
results fro® his failure to articulate or employ an adequate epistenology,"
3. Indeed, theory always comes after the action - and so neta-theory after the
theory. I night even go as far as to admit that whatever the substantive clain,
an epistemological grounding for it can be constructed.
4. Cf. p. 6-7.
5. I do assume here that for Moles, 'empirical reality' is not contrasted to but
includes 'institutional reality', since the empirical he contrasts to the
conceptual, the forner being what the subject seeks to understand and relate,
the latter the analytical tools the subject uses in this process - and
institutional reality is obviously included in the former in this context, I
approve of course of the lack of contrast between the empirical and the
institutional here, but I have used the term 'external' to avoid
misunderstandings and make clear my assumption, as Moles is nowhere clear on
this. Notice that 'external reality' here is to be contrasted to the way I often
use 'reality' in the third Part, to refer primarily to the conceptual.
5a. Relate Beyleveld D, & Brownsword R., Law as a Moral Judgment p, 66 that
"designating the concept of law is to be regarded not as an operation which we
perform on the words we use to express concepts, but as an operation on concepts
which those who disagree about the nature of law mutually agree specify their
field of interest".
5b. It is true of course that for Austin at least, "the law" does not designate
the field of the jurists' or the sociologists' discipline. Jurisprudence for
Austin encompasses much much more than the law, viz. than the commands of the
sovereign. This is only the key to the field, and a principle of its rational
organisation. Yet Austin was subsequently very much criticized for his
definition of "law", long before Hart's time, by jurists and sociologists or
anthropologists alike, precisely because of the fact that his definition did not
provide for things like international law, or primitive law, which were very
much central in the activities of various people studying "the law". What in my
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opinion gives meaning to most of those criticisms (and I disagree here with
Williams ("The Controversy concerning the Word 'Law'" in Philosophy, Politics
and Society ed, Laslett - cf. with it for references also to the aforementioned
critics of Austin's definition)) is the need for a field-designating concept,
for the then strongly emerging social sciences, and the corresponding
(re)emergence of 'law' as this concept, When Hart's turn comes, the stage is
already long set, and his criticism of Austin's definition is a brilliant
rationalization of standard attacks (and it is certainly not, in this respect, a
revolution, a novo, as today's belated defenders of Austin seem to believe),
through which he then proceeds to put forth, in a further rationalization, the
field-designating concept history demands/ has impressed, So no wonder hi6
success. The point is that Hart is faced with and reproduces 'law' as the
concept that designates an empirical field for the social sciences (but which
concept must remain suitable for the legal dogmatics' activity too - hence the
internal point of view), and rejects the definition of 'command of the
sovereign', because unsuitable for this designation. And it is this
determination by "social science" that as a result produces and hides this
restriction of the field that is proper to legal dogmatics. It is the
scientistic (or positivist if you wish) ideology that has conquered the
humanities, and thus rendered ethics, what we must do, unsuitable for serious,
scientific knowledge, and so unsuitable for the base of the scholar's (be he a
lawyer or a "philosopher") claims to truth. It is this ideology that commands
the reduction from Austin's much greater field of the discipline of
jurisprudence, and, by the same token, renders 'law' suitable to become the
field-designating concept that it is. (But the same concept for all social
sciences? For jurisprudence and sociology alike? It is absurd yes, but under
these conditions jurisprudence cannot stand on its own feet. It has to borrow
sense from sociology. And anyway, the scientistic ideology, at least in the
English language culture, where it is very firmly based on nominalism and
empiricism (and where it is never seriously challenged) demands a thing, in
experience, prior to the theorist's view and independent of it, that provide for
the theorist's appearance to be talking about "facts" - no matter what kind of
"social science" he engages in. Hence all this discussion about what law is in
fact, viz. which is the sociai phenomenon we (must?) speak about. (Notice the
contradiction with nominalism here; but of course 'nominalism' has changed
meaning), Because some space need be retained for a part at least of the
traditional idea and role of legal studies. And naturally, despite the grounding
on empirical things, different studies (and also (the allowance of) different
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viewpoints) cannot but have (entail) different fields, and so different field-
designating concepts. Hence the production of this unbelievable anbiguity of the
basic vocabulary here (into which, after all, more traditional ideas will need
be translated as well), which cones to be explained away as inherent in
language. )
Teubner could see here the explanation behind Kelsen's and Hart's success.
With their theories, self-referential closure is achieved for legal dognatics.
(You night think that this applies better to Kelsen's theory, but I an tenpted
to say the opposite. Because with Hart, there is not even nuch restriction of
the applicability of the system's perception, for there is little awareness of
the system's perceiving and defining. The presentation is in terns of the wide
undifferentiated society - the ordinary nan in the street, And this is of course
a construct of the system. Thus, the systen defines the world. It is unaware
even of the possibility of the outside, which possibility is on the contrary
very pronounced once you explicitly assume a distinct viewpoint, like in the
pure theory of law: there are other viewpoints too. And so, with Hart's theory,
the move is not noticed, and thus becomes more acceptable and more complete.)
See p. 182: "It is not possible to say of demarcation, generalization and
purpose, which cones first. Each presupposes the other two. They can be
separated for purposes of analysis, but any abstraction is a manifestation of
all three; and thought necessarily presupposes the use of abstractions."
See pp. 115-6, where Moles complains that Hart uses in an ambiguous fashion,
concepts that are central to his exposition, and that he depends on the reader's
"natural attitude" to facilitate the acceptance of his conceptual transitions.
Cf. Eco U. Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language p.14f, on the distinction
between the sign as equivalence and the sign as implication.
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Ma r~ t ± n
Under the title The Legal Philosophy of H, L. A. Hart. Michael
Martin has attempted a painstaking analysis and thorough critique of
everything Hart ever dared write or think. In sharp contrast to most
of his specific points, his overall assessment of Hart is very
positive. But anyway, our concern, as with Moles, will be confined,
to those of Martin's discussions, that are directly related to our
examination of linguistic jurisprudence. However, in view of the fact
that Martin's epistemological criticisms, tend to centre on and take
meaning from his substantive ones, we shall need to digress into one
or two of his substantive criticisms, so that we may see more clearly
some essential differences between his work and mine.
The first point to take up, is Martin's censure of Hart's
allusions in The Concept of Law to a descriptive sociology. If Hart
is doing sociology, it is of a very bad kind. With its total
disregard for empirical evidence, and for the insights real
sociologists have in fact provided, it is nowhere near the type of
work sociologists are generally engaged in. And the sociological
assumptions Hart does in fact quite often happen to make, are, in
this context, rather crude, naive and unclear. <Cf. p.27-8).
We may easily agree, that as a sociology linguistic jurisprudence
would have little to offer, and that if Hart really thought he was
doing sociology, a major misunderstanding must have been involved, as
to what sociology is. I am less certain than Martin that Hart did so
think, but I confess that this question is beyond ray competence, or
indeed interest, to answer. At any rate, a certain controversial
understanding of the idea of social science, namely Winch's book by
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the same name, was in fact around and seems to have played some part
in Hart's allegation that he was doing sociology, with its fusion of
philosophy and social science, and its apparent claim that, since
meaning depends on a social context, the social scientist should rely
on those understandings only that are actually established in the
social context investigated and understood by the actors therein.
This understanding Martin has rejected as ill-conceived and absurdly
restrictive for social science (or philosophy).' When it comes to
confronting it in Hart, Martin's main reason for the rejection is
that surely the theorist cannot always be content with categories and
explanations the observed actors would themselves understand and use;
he may have instead "to ascend to abstract theory in order to gain a
theoretical understanding of a legal phenomenon". (Cf. p. 25-7). 2
In Part 2 we constructed linguistic jurisprudence's claims to
truth, as regarding the established meanings that exist within a
given social group and which the actors understand and use. We took
Hart on the basis of the same understanding of objectivity that a
Winchian social scientist would have assumed. Our reductio ad
absurdum succeeded in showing us that the prior decisions of the
theorist, in distinguishing and naming what he observes, regardless
of the corresponding names the observed social actors may happen to
use, is indispensable for any claim to impartial description. So long
as the postulate of positivist description of external reality is
observed, there is no escaping the adoption by the subject of a
Logic, regardless of what the observed logic (s) may be. If the
theorist should expect to get his logic of description from the ways
of thinking observed, the claim to a positivist description of an
external reality would be incompatible with the possibility that his
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work could come to an end. He could never come to tell us that this
is what "the law" is as a matter of social fact - for in saying so,
he would be choosing instead, one interpretation among many ones
observable.
There is no way for me to know whether Martin would agree with
this line of thought. In view of it however, it is obvious that I
agree with him that the sociologist cannot be expected to employ only
such categories as are actually used or understood by the actors
observed. Furthermore, the ascent to abstract theory he says is
needed for the social scientist, is equivalent, in my vocabulary,
either to the construction and application of the theorist's Logic
(if within this "abstract theory" he would allow the discussion and
decision of the subject's about what matters), or to the application
alone of this Logic to what is observed (if by "abstract theory" only
the formulation of "abstract nomological statements" - i.e. of
scientific laws - is meant).
Another point of general agreement with Martin lies in a) his
rejection of Hart's claim to be attempting to provide an
"elucidation" rather than a "definition" of law (cf. p.138-40), and
b) his decision to read The Concept of Law as providing a definition
in effect, regardless of what Hart says (cf. also p.39f. ). It is true
that, in Part 3. A, we have taken seriously this reluctance in
linguistic jurisprudence to speak of and demand a definition of law,
and we have given an explanation for it, in terms of the historical
condition linguistic jurisprudence finds itself in, and of its need
to accommodate some doubt in the theorist's conclusions.
Nevertheless, the rejection of the search for a definition is
incompatible with conceptualism. The question "what is X?" is to be
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answered by a definition of X, i.e. a determination of the
appropriate abstraction, the concept, of X. To the extent that the
subject remains confused or doubtful, the definition it results with
will be less clear and precise. Even if we should demand a certain
degree of clarity and precision before we speak of a definition, the
result of the investigation as to what is X, will still be an attempt
for a definition of X.3 Again I cannot say to what extent Martin
would agree with my definition of linguistic Jurisprudence as a
conceptualism, or with my reading of The Concept of Law at this
point. Nevertheless, his writings are perfectly compatible with my
definition of definition. s
On the other hand, even though I agree with Martin's decision to
read The Concept of Law as providing a definition of law, I do not
agree entirely with his analysis and criticism of the definition(s)
he actually extracts (p. 39-48). 6 His work here suffers from one major
defect, in that it disregards the theory of the open texture of
language. Insofar as they can be attributed to Hart, 7 these
definitions must be understood in accordance with this theory. And
this means that not only the definiendum "law" or "legal system", but
also each term in the definiens, is to be understood as capturing the
central case only of its application. Thus Hart should reply that,
for instance, an organised religious sect whose members follow as
morally obligatory such rules as a particular leader happens to
dictate (cf. p. 41f. ), does not fall within the central case of
"morality" (and so the fact that in such a sect the rules need not be
important and are changed deliberately, makes no difference to his
definition).
Martin would probably reply here that, even if Hart (or I) think
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that such a sect does not fall within the central case of "morality",
he, at least, thinks that it certainly does. And that this points
precisely to one of his most important general criticisms of Hart,
namely, Hart's disregard for the role empirical evidence should play
in the verification of claims about what constitutes each time the
central case in language and what not. The appropriate determination
of what exactly the practice of language within the social group
concerned is, can take place only through the methods of sociometrics
within the framework of linguistics. It is not a matter for the
philosopher to decide from his armchair. 8
This brings us to a most essential difference between Martin's
explication of Hart, and my understanding of linguistic Jurisprudence
in Part 3. For me, language here is not to be understood as the
happenstance of actual utterances and beliefs of other people, that a
detached scientific observer will collect, count and weigh. Language
is rules, taken for granted, in our minds, that we (the observers,
scientists, theorists - and actors) follow, assuming that they are
right, and which rules are being established and evolve, through our
experience, reflection and interaction - not detached scientific
observation. It is rules we (assume we) share - or should share; for
they are rules for one to learn and act upon, if one (like e.g. an
infant) happens to ignore them. Hence, the philosopher in linguistic
jurisprudence (or ordinary language philosophy), when speaking of
language, central cases in it, open texture, ordinariness and the
rest, does not report other people's language (way(s) of thinking,
form(s) of life). He examines his own. When he says "look at this
(standard) instance of language", he does not give evidence. He gives
an example (which he assumes is not only correct, but also standard,
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ordinary, common, viz. familiar to the listener and so most suitable
to illustrate the point). And hence, behind the open texture in
language, lies not a difference in lingual usage between different
individuals, but our doubt, our lack of knowledge and logical
determinacy.
Therefore, there is nothing here for empirical evidence to
decide. To return to our example about the central case of morality,
suppose one were to count heads, and find a certain majority to
acknowledge, that Martin's example of the religious sect does fall
within the central case of application of 'morality' in language. So
what? Any one in the minority - including Hart the theorist - could
simply reply that those in the majority were wrong. And what's most
important, in defending his definition(s), Hart should reply, that,
even if he were wrong to think, that the central case of the
application of 'morality', was one of rules that are considered
important and are not changed deliberately, let Martin provide
another way of denoting the central case Hart had in mind and meant
to put in the definition. Because these definitions that the theorist
seeks to provide, are not meant to be reporting others' ways of
thinking. They are meant to be determining (his/our) logic.
In sharp contrast to our final understanding of linguistic
jurisprudence, as a philosophy, Martin understands Hart to be engaged
- in part at least - in a description of observable lingual (and - we
should add - logical) regularities. And he sees Hart's claims to
depend - partly - on whether this description is in fact accurate,
i.e. on whether, if we were to count heads, we would find these
regularities or different ones.9
On one view of it, this is a mere difference in interpretation of
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The Concept of Law. In this case, there is not much to say. For even
though it might be absurd to attribute to Hart, a view of language he
is so much at pains to reject with respect to law and social rules in
general, questions like what did Hart believe, or even like what is
the correct interpretation of The Concept of Law, as such, do not
hold for me enough interest to pursue such debates. I should simply
end by saying, that if I saw a book like Hart's to be a matter of
empirical report of the lawyers' language, I would throw it in the
dustbin and forget all about it. I would not bother discussing it.
However, there is something more. For, on the understanding of
Martin that I find most tempting, he is not really interested in such
questions as what did Hart in fact believe either. I think he would
say that he is concerned with them only instrumentally, in an effort
to advance legal theory. And that what he tried to do was
a) to take the claims Hart made in legal philosophy and explicate
them for the purposes of theory construction in social science;
that is replace them partially, by ones that be (with respect to
these purposes) clearer, unambiguous, determinate and so easily
testable. '° Then, once explicated,
b) to test them logically, and/or point to the type of empirical
evidence that would be relevant to their empirical testing.
On this understanding, Martin's persistent and general criticism
of Hart, for disregarding the need for empirical evidence, is not
that much tied to the idea that Hart's claims are based on reports of
an observed social group's language. " It is part and parcel of his
underlying assumptions regarding the larger enterprise he sees Hart
and himself to be engaged in. And it is an indication of a vast
difference between his basic understandings and mine, which
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difference envelops his other major criticism of Hart as well, that
Hart's definition of law is inadequate, even if assessed in terms of
its usefulness on theoretical and practical grounds, because it fails
to transcend the categories of the legal actor and "ascend to
abstract theory".
[The rejection of the external point of view, for its
inadequacy to capture the concepts of lawyers and laymen]
will not do. First, it may be questioned whether an
elucidation of a legal system that is adequate from a
theoretical point of view needs to be concerned with the
concepts of lawyers and lay people. . . Such concepts may be
adequate for practical purposes but may have no relevance
for theoretical purposes. Second, even if the concepts of a
rule or a standard of conduct are utilized in an
elucidation of a legal system, one may question whether
they must be understood in terms of the categories of
lawyers and lay people. After all, rules and standards can
be understood from various theoretical points of view.
Philosophers of law may deem that the categories of the
actor are inadequate to their purposes, (p.27)
But perhaps Hart's definition should not be evaluated in
terms of standard usage but rather on theoretical and
practical grounds. If so, the task would not be to capture
the standard concept of a legal system but to develop a
concept of a legal system that would be useful. There is
surely no particular reason to suppose that [Hart's
definition] would be justified on these grounds. For
example, there is no attempt in tit] to transcend the
standard categories used by the legal actor and to
understand a legal system in terms of theoretical social
science... A theoretically fruitful elucidation may well be
couched in rather different term6 [from the ones of the
legal actor], (p.47)
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Behind these words, behind the invitation that the categories of
the actor be transcended by the theorist, I think I can detect a
certain general assumption about the discipline of jurisprudence,
that is quite popular in Britain and North America. According to it,
even if the "philosophy of law" is somehow to be distinguished from
the social sciences, it is still very much like them, in that in
either case the theorist is a spectator, who stands back and observes
the legal actors, in a detached, "objective" fashion, in order to
draw his theoretical (not practical) conclusions. No wonder then that
the conclusions depend to some extent on an accurate report of the
observed practice, and may be defective because insufficiently
corroborated by empirical evidence of how the legal actors under the
microscope actually behave. And no wonder that the categories of the
legal actors are of course to be distinguished from the theorist's
metalanguage. Because the categories of the legal actors do not
necessarily depict how they actually behave (which is for the
detached theorist to perceive), but only how they imagine they
behave.
In my view, this is a very distorted understanding of the
philosophy of law. (In my view, the philosophy of law is not science,
at all).12 And perhaps, in view of it, it is only natural that the
enterprise called jurisprudence, or legal philosophy, has become so
confused, in the twentieth century English language culture, at
least.
At any rate, regardless of what the philosophy of law is or
should be, this is fundamentally at odds with the understanding of
linguistic jurisprudence that we put forth in "Linguistic
jurisprudence as philosophy". According to it, the theorist in
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linguistic jurisprudence does not stand back to observe and report
(to whom?) what the actors do. He is one among them, speaking to
them, in their language, which is his own. There is no social group,
no other actors under the microscope. There is (our) logic, which the
theorist examines, in order to know, first and foremost himself, and
to try to teach the others what to do, if he can. Actual categories
and ideas, if diverging from the truth, are not data to be collected,
but mistakes, transcended and forgotten as soon as detected.
On this understanding, what Martin has written on Hart's internal
and external points of view (cf. p.20-7), is entirely beside the
point. Hart's talk and adoption of the internal point of view, has
nothing to do with what meaning is or with whether and to what extent
the social sciences should take the actor's point of view into
account, in an effort of understanding. It is a defence, and
definition, of his conceptualist enterprise. The external point of
view that Hart rejects is neither the "cognitive internal point of
view", nor the one that describes behavioural regularities in common
sense categories. It is precisely the one resulting in abstract
"nomological" statements (regardless of the employment or not of
common sense categories) in science, i.e. the one Martin vaguely
understands as "abstract theory", on p.26, and advocates. What makes
its rejection not just reasonable but logically necessary, a conditio
sine qua non indeed, is that Hart is not doing science at all. And
its reasonableness, is the reasonableness of the idea, that there are
other things we need to do from time to time, besides science.
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NOTES
1. Cf. Martin's "Winch on Philosophy, Social Science and Explanation" (in his
Social Science and Philosophical Analysis p,370f.),
2. Notice however that Martin's interpretation of Hart's "external point of
view" on p, 26 is aistaken. This is neither the "cognitive internal point of
view", nor the one that describes behavioural regularities in common sense
categories, It is precisely the one resulting in "abstract noaological
statements" (regardless of its employment or not of common sense categories),
i.e. the one Martin vaguely understands as "abstract theory" and advocates.
3. On this understanding of definition, it would be quite reasonable to say that
Hart does not mean to give a definition, but to stop midway the attempt to
answer what is law, in accordance with a certain scepticism regarding the
attainability of the end. The end would be such a clarity and precision of
logic, as to eliminate the penumbra of doubt. And indeed, Hart's answer to what
is law, does not provide a complete entrenchment of the concept; it only depicts
what he sees to be the central case.
Notice that this way, the contrast between the definition and the elucidation
can take a fruitful meaning in the interpretation of Hart's book: the definition
amounts to strict scholastic logic and mathematical precision; the elucidation
does not. However, when it comes to a general account, "elucidation" is a rather
vague term, and I do not see why "definition" should not apply in either case.
After all, clarity and determinacy exists not in an absolute way, as the above
contrast implies, but either with respect to the specific issue one has to
answer, or with respect to the degree of strictness of logic needed for the
purposes of education. So rather than speaking of strictness in abstract or its
lack, I would speak of a success or a failure, on the above accounts, to define.
4. See especially p.138-9, where Martin points that a definition need not be
concise, and that, even on the contrary assumption, a definition (i.e. the
answer to what is e.g. law) will be a necessary part of an elucidation of the
concept.
5. Hart's writings too are compatible with my definition of definition, They are
only incompatible with my use of 'definition'.
6. I would also put forth a rather different definition of law (the object of
legal study) than Hart's, but this is another story.
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7. And "Definition (3)" (at p, 41) can be so attributed, in my opinion, unlike
"Definition (+)" (at p,4t), whose added condition of the legal system's monopoly
over physical sanctions, renders it inconsistent and unduly restrictive, in the
context of a theory that, unlike Kelsen's, is not based on a point of view from
within legal dogmatics.
8. Cf. p. 46-7, 133-4, 276. See p. 133: "It would seem that finding the standard
or normal uses of expressions is a job for linguistic science. Philosophers of
law may suggest hypotheses based on their linguistic intuitions, but the
verification of these hypotheses is an empirical matter. So any approach that
stresses the specification of truth conditions for the standard use must be
based on empirical research that is not yet done,"
9. See the first part of his criticism of "Definition (4)" at p. 46-7. P, 46: "I
assume that a standard case of a legal system is a non-controversial case: a
system that does exist or has existed or could exist that has been or would be
generally considered to be a legal system, The determination of what is standard
usage is an empirical problem, not something that philosophers are particularly
competent to answer." P. 47: "I have argued that a definition can be extracted
from Hart's work, but that this definition may be inadequate if it is meant to
capture standard legal usage. Whether this definition is inadequate with respect
to standard usage I leave ultimately as a hypothesis to be confirmed by
science...u
10. Cf. his "The Explication of a Theory", as well as his other essays on
explication op.cit. supra n. 1.
11. Notice that the attack for the lack of attention to the need for empirical
evidence, is indeed very general in Martin. See his conclusion at p.276-7. It is
also a common theme throughout his work, presenting itself with every
opportunity, See for instance p.237, where Martin concludes that the
disagreement between Fuller and Hart is a matter of their making different
empirical claims which "go begging for empirical evidence". See also p,56-7
where he suggests that whether we should accept in practice or not the idea of
the one right answer, is a matter for future scientific research, that would
determine, whether people's confidence in the objectivity of the judicial
process would be thereby eroded and whether, on the other hand, judges work
harder on the influence of the one right answer as a working assumption, or not.
12. But it may be Wissenschaft or ETUotijpq.
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Edgewort In
In Legal Studies 6/2, there is a very interesting article by
Brendan Edgeworth, called "Legal positivism and the philosophy of
language: a critique of H. L. A. Hart's 'Descriptive Sociology'". In
it, a big part of our study of linguistic jurisprudence has been
anticipated. Even if somewhat crudely, and with less clarity and
awareness, many of the points we made in Part 2, against the idea of
linguistic jurisprudence as a matter of positivist description of
external facts, can embryonically be found in this article of
Edgeworth's. We shall here discuss it extensively, picking the points
of agreement and throwing light on the ones of potential
disagreement.
I shall start by enumerating those of Edgeworth's contentions,
that correspond to mine.
1) Hart tends to look at ordinary ways of lingually distinguishing
situations as different, but not at the - equally ordinary - ways
of assimilating them as the same. 1
2) "...as far as ordinary language and common usage goes, 'one can
find there anything one likes'". (p. 119-20) There are in it
contradictory interpretations and understandings. 2
3) There is not one "ordinary" language only. There are many ones.
(Cf. p. 123-5).
4) There is not in Hart's work the detached scientific objectivity
its aura projects. This is just a covei—up.3
5) A theory (a logic) is required determining what is to count as
relevant. Without it, facts cannot even be identified. (Cf.
p. 123-4)
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6) The approach that relies on common usage, expecting thereby to
improve knowledge of the social reality, is inadequate for the
explanation of social change or of the emergence and
disappearance of standard ways of speaking.*
7) "...all problems of legal philosophy... can reflect 'a divergence
of basic point of view or values or background theory'" (p. 125).s
A few clarifications and qualifications are in order.
With respect to contention 2
Edgeworth has only claimed that observable ways of thinking can
be contradictory. He might not agree with the - much more radical
and difficult to maintain - idea, which we have come to, that
they necessarily are.
With respect to contention 3
I must add here - what follows anyway from contention 5 - that
this depends on the viewer. Apart from a presupposed logic, or an
ad hoc decision what to see, there is one language, as much as
there are many.
With respect to contention 4
In Edgeworth's eyes, the aura of detached scientific objectivity
is a cover-up of ideology (in the Marxist sense) or myth (in
Barthes' terms). Behind it there is a conservative attitude,
serving the maintenance of the status quo. In my eyes, there is
behind this cover-up a much more interesting - even if older -
attitude, than the one of the detached scientist, and a much more
exciting and respectable epistemology, than the one we have both
rejected.
We shall leave this last disparity aside for the moment and turn
our eyes to a particular difference between Edgeworth's understanding
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of Hart's methodological assumptions, and our correlative
understanding in Part 2 (and 3). We can see it on p. 119, where
Edgeworth attacks Hart's identification and use of the lingual
distinction between "being obliged" and "having an obligation".
According to Edgeworth, "Hart claims that the term 'oblige' and not
'obligation' is appropriate" in the gunman situation - but other
people might speak differently; where does this standard of
correctness come from? We, on the other hand, have not taken
linguistic jurisprudence to be making claims about correct and
incorrect lingual usage. We have not taken it, that is, to be banning
certain expressions in favour of others. In our understanding, Hart's
claim here would be that in this lingual distinction (between "being
obliged" and "having an obligation"), which one can make, one can see
a real (i.e. significant, meaningful) difference. And there are these
two variations in our Parts 2 and 3, that in the former, this reality
of the difference, in no way depends on any involvement of me, the
theorist, but is a matter of the independently existing practice in
the social group I observe. Whereas in the latter, this reality is a
matter of our recognising significance in the things (e.g. social
groups) we observe and attributing it to them.
This (mis)representation by Edgeworth of Hart's position, has a
double effect. First, it makes things easier for Edgeworth, than what
they were for us in Part 2, since it furnishes him right away with a
simple contradiction, between the claims to a positivist description
on the one hand and the "foundation" the theorist gives to observed
lingual practice on the other. Second, it restricts the scope of his
work, as it means that, unlike us, he can reach the simple conclusion
that there is "a number of serious flaws in the epistemology and
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methodology central to Hart's work" (p. 137), without having to
examine first the senses in which it might be said that through
lingual distinctions one can grasp real ones, and without having to
take up any position on the structural character of language and
social reality, except the commonsensical one that existing ways of
thinking may happen to vary and to be contradictory on occasion.
With respect ' to this last difference, it is worth looking at
another particular argument Edgeworth makes against Hart. On p. 129-
30, Hart is accused of establishing the distinction between primary
and secondary rules, in a way different from the one of looking at
ordinary language, and despite the fact that this distinction seems
not to exist in per Hart common usage.
...unlike the discussion of the oblige/obligation
distinction, there is no term identified here which evokes
the different nature of secondary rules. On the contrary,
we use precisely the same words to describe officials'
behaviour under the law as we use to describe ordinary
citizens' behaviour, namely, the expressions 'follow',
'comply' or 'conform to'. Hart explicitly recognises this
but does not seem aware of its implications for ordinary
language philosophy. For if ordinary language falls to
provide a requisite expression here and, as he does, Hart
has to go beyond ordinary language to establish a real
difference, he is implicitly undermining the case he made
for this method earlier in the text.6
Now regardless of what Hart actually thought or said, it is
rather more pertinent to notice that ordinary language does not of
course fail to provide expressions indicative of the distinction
between the official's and the citizen's behaviour. We normally say
(and Hart could easily have said) that the judge or the public
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servant "applies" the law, but not that the citizen does so. The
citizen only "obeys" - or "complies with", "conforms to", "follows" -
the law; as does the official too of course (who does not merely obey
passively, but also works with the law actively). What more lingual
illustration do you want, for the dual character of the existence of
a legal system? And as for the distinction between "primary rules",
i.e. rules that everybody in the - "primitive" - social group is
aware of and conforms with, and "secondary rules", i.e. ones that
regulate the organisation and activity of the courts, the legislature
and the administration, is it not the case that only the former are
(meant to be) "obeyed" (by the citizen), while the latter are just
(meant to be) "applied" (by the official)?
The point I want to draw here is that the problem is not a
dishonesty on the part of the theorist, who sometimes relies on the
facts of ordinary language and sometimes transcends them instead. In
my opinion, there is no such discrepancy anyway: Every single
distinction Hart draws in The Concept of Law, can be put in the form
of the "obliged"/"obligation" one. What undermines the alleged
positivist scientificity of the ordinary language approach, is that
language, if meaning the actual observable ways of thinking in a
given aggregate, is chaotic. It will never fail to provide the
theorist with ways to distinguish two cases - or with ways to
assimilate them. (It may fail on occasion, if the referred to
language corresponds to a community or a society (as defined in Part
2), but then we have no postulate of positivist scientif icity to
begin with). Therefore a positive description of such a language
would have to be chaotic too; and interminable.
We noticed earlier that Edgeworth does not necessarily subscribe
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to this position about language (or social reality). And certainly,
this position is not self-evident, or indeed commonsensical. It is a
rather easy target for British scepticism instead. Without it
however, linguistic jurisprudence could still maintain the idea of a
positivist scientificity. It could still maintain the idea that
jurisprudence can be a sort of descriptive sociology, merely
describing what the law happens to be, in terms of the established
necessary presuppositions of our political and other communication.
It could still maintain that the theorist, in doing this, is a
scientist, who is "the passive site of experience of an active world,
and [who] can, if unbiassed, operate free from political and moral
evaluations", (p. 127) And it could still maintain that some problems
of legal philosophy do not reflect "a divergence of basic points of
view or values or background theory".
Edgeworth does not take this theoretical and obscure route.
Instead he takes two routes that we did not.
First, he moves to accuse the ordinary language approach of an
inherent predisposition to conservatism (p. 121). We have dismissed
this accusation in Part 3 as irrelevant, not because of a mistake in
Edgeworth's argument, but mainly because we have understood "ordinary
language" in a different way than the one that he has in mind. In our
interpretation, it is not observable usage that matters, but the
rules, the standard of correctness in our minds. Particular
conclusions of linguistic jurisprudence, or in my work, may happen to
be conservative (or progressive), but it is hard enough to establish
that something is true, correct, accurate, without also having to
make sure that it support progress. (And progress where to, anyway).
We also declined to take this up in Part 2, for the formal reason
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that we were concerned with the claims to a positivist description as
such. To these again, conservatism or progress!veness is irrelevant,
since the positivist is only concerned with relating how things
happen to be, without thereby advocating that they ought thus to
remain or not. There is also the substantive reason that, on a more
careful look, it is not perhaps so very easy to maintain that
attention to ordinary usage entails a predisposition to conservatism,
when it is the established ways of thinking that approve so much of
change, progress, innovation. Preserving the ideology of progress, is
this conservative, progressive or what?7
Second, Edgeworth moves to show that Hart's approach is
inadequate "for attending to the empirical realities of existent
legal orders" (p. 128). By these empirical realities he means objects
like the processes whereby political force is perceived to be
legitimate, the law's function in the preservation of the status quo,
its role in class struggle, etc. These issues would be pertinent from
the point of view of sociology or history. And this part of
Edgeworth's article is again irrelevant to our study, which was
concerned instead with showing that linguistic jurisprudence (and
jurisprudence in general) is and can be meaningful, interesting and
respectable, without having to be sociology or history, and without
having to be in some sense verified by them.
So we have a different view on what the appropriate understanding
of linguistic jurisprudence is. Linguistic jurisprudence is not
sociology, or science in any way. Despite its aura, it must not be
understood as such, if at least we ought to pay attention to what it
tries to do rather than what it (half) says it tries to do.® It is a
modern sort of conceptualism, asking and trying to answer questions
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of the form "what is X?". The theorist is no observer of empirical
realities, and the language he relies on is not just the happenstance
of observable utterances. These are not defects of a fundamentally
flawed theoretical manner, but main characteristics of a worthwhile
enterprise. We have said enough about these, especially under
"Martin"; there is no reason to repeat it here.
I like to think that Edgeworth would probably agree with this
reinterpretation of Hart, or anyway, and this is what matters, that
he would appreciate the epistemological way out that we have
provided. There is nothing in his article that is actually
incompatible with it.
On the other hand, he does not have to like this epistemology.
There are in fact some echoes of Hegelian and Marxist origin in his
article, indicating a strong challenge to the mode of philosophy we
have retrieved. 9 From this point of view, we have done nothing more,
than dress up an old cripple dinosaur in clothes torn long ago.
Edgeworth might take up the idea that the rational is actual and the
actual rational, that "what is" (and so logic, truth) is historical
not transcendental, and dismiss our conceptualism as a-historical -
if he has the faith in the route of history and/or the future of
mankind, that I lack.
What Edgeworth cannot do, is dismiss this idea too, and maintain
that a conceptualism such as we have understood it, will be "myth in
Roland Barthes' terms, namely depoliticised and de-historised speech
[having] the task of giving an historical intention a natural
justification, and making contingency appear natural" (p. 136), in
contrast to - say - studies of how power gets to be perceived as
legitimate. Such a theory in Jurisprudence will not be myth (not by
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definition anyway) any more than n is a myth in mathematics or the
school's function in socialization is a myth in sociology. And it
will certainly not be a-political, if by 'politics' we understand a
discourse concerned with the determination of the appropriate common
action. (It will be a-political if by 'politics' we understand some
technocratic science or the activity of managing to get votes; but
this I do not mind.) As for its making contingency appear natural,
i. e. normal, stable, becoming, thus excluding something (a change)
that would be abnormal or less becoming, I do not really care. I am
tired of this mania of demystification, which can result in nothing
more than the continuous replacement of concepts and points of view
with other (more detached of course) concepts and points of view, to
be demystified in their turn, in an endless verbiage, serving only
for the hollow pleasure of the intellectuals. If there is no truth to
teach, act on it and shut up.
The final attack against linguistic jurisprudence, that we can
read in this article, is this: "Why the legal theorist should
uncritically accept the discourse of officials at a particular point
in history to comprehend hermeneutically the essence of the legal
system, property, a contract, the corporation, is never convincingly
spelt out, nor is the question of why that discourse should take
epistemological pride of place over all others", (p. 138). We have
already given an answer. It is that the legal philosopher is himself
such an "official". He does not accept this discourse; he carries it.
As do we all, as we carry the discourse of sociology, physics,
mathematics. Or rather, as we carry our language: We do not
critically assess it and then decide to accept it or not. We modify
it by letting it evolve, while using it to think and communicate.
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Should this discourse take epistemological pride of place over all
others? (Should sociology take epistemological pride of place over
physics?) No, of course not, unless "it", is conceptualism
(philosophy) in general, in which case it is logically prior (even if
historically posterior) in every discourse. (And unless practical
"pride of place" is at issue, which naturally belongs to practical
disciplines rather than sciences). What is most important to make
clear (regardless of whether Edgeworth actually assumed the opposite
or was just following after what he saw Hart's assumptions to be), is
that with regard to law, there is no one such idea that all these
actual discourses (of "officials", of sociologists or of
psychologists) have as their common field-designating concept. It
makes no sense to speak of a "legal theorist" who should be expected
to take into account, on the same footing, what is being said under
the terms sociology of law, history of law, philosophy of law,
psychology of law, etc., or even MP* s talk, solicitors' talk,
criminals' talk, policemen's talk, etc., as giving different
perspectives on the same empirical object, before he can "comprehend
hermeneutically the essence of the legal system". To speak of "legal
theory", expecting in it to find equally sociology, history, legal
reasoning, "feminist studies", analytical jurisprudence, "semiotics",
and "jurimetrics", is to speak of "whoever happens to use the word
'law' when denoting his/her (empirical or not) field of study". And
this is fine, but it does not then follow that we can expect that
there actually is one field of study that is the same for all these
theorists. There will be more than one concepts (abstractions, ideas,
essences) corresponding to the field-designating word 'law', not
sharing obviously the same definition.
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One final general point. Edgeworth is the one critic of
linguistic jurisprudence who actually saw the importance of the
social reality of a variety of ways of thinking, for undermining
Hart's claims to a detached positivist description.10 Accordingly he
often speaks of the fact that people grow up in different
environments and come to believe and say different things; there are
many "incommensurable usages", there are many, not one, languages.
What we must add is that yes, people grow, people change, people
become different or similar. That whether they will be seen (by
themselves or someone else) to be different or not, depends on what
will be seen to matter. And that whether they will tend to grow apart
or alike depends on their eagerness to see past traits not to matter
and to imitate and adopt (to learn) new ways. It is therefore no less
a fiction to assume that we are fundamentally different, and that's
it, that we have different and incompatible languages, than it is to
presume "an essentialised, transhistorical, human subjectivity"
(p. 124). We can converge and we can diverge. It just so happens, that
people in the modern world of these last 400 years or so, have tended
to (choose to) diverge rather than converge. But this changes
nothing. It undermines not only linguistic jurisprudence, but
sociology, mathematics, and Edgeworth's article as well. Of course,
it undermines practical discourses more. But what good is speech with
no view to action?
And in any case, to speak to someone, is to assume, that they can
come nearer to you, and to invite them to do so.
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NOTES
1. See p. 120, that in ordinary language 'to have to' is applicable whether an
obligation or coercion is at issue. "... concentration on minimally small
differences can overemphasise the differences at the expense of the
similarities... Why the differences of some terms should take precedence over
the similarities of others is unclear",
2. See p, 124, that (as Gramsci says) the bulk of the population may have two
theoretical consciousnesses or one contradictory one. "...social pressures,
ideology, or general confusion might necessitate forms of verbal conformity
wholly at odds with material forces requiring practical conformity",
3. See p. 120 that "the implication from [Hart's! method is that there is no
question fo incommensurable usage, which gives the method, superficially, a
spurious scientific appearance and this... gives the theory its legitimacy". See
also the conclusion at p, 137 that "a number of assumptions embedded in the
theory and practice of ordinary language philosophy subvert its self-projected
aura of objective scientificity due primarily to the plenitude, fecundity and
plurality of day-to-day linguistic practices".
4. See p.137f. "...this approach makes the explanation of social change and the
emergence and disappearance of linguistic codes almost impossible".
5. The reference is to Hart, Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy, p.6.
6. Edgeworth refers to Hart, The Concept of Law p,112-3, The emphasis is mine.
7. And if this is not a demonstration of the dialectical character of history
and thought, I do not know what demonstration is.
8. See p.126,137, where Edgeworth remarks that Hart focuses on what language
says but not on what it does,
9. See especially p.124 that Hart "presumes an essentialised, transhistorical
human subjectivity, But every social subject is constantly affected,
transformed, modified by the unique interplay of forces in which he or she
develops, Thus, it is a mistake to rely on some transcendental, pre-given
essence,.." And Hart is repeatedly accused throughout the article of being a-
historical and a-political, and of covering the real transformations behind
ideology.
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10. See also Galloway "The Axiology of Analytical Jurisprudence; A Study of the
Underlying Sociological Assumptions and Ideological Predilections" (in Law in a
Social Context ed. Bechtler), p.69-74,95.
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